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SYNOPSIS
Contrary to arguments of social scientists as far back as Hegel, the
adoption of a successful foreign constitution as a model may offer
advantages to a country that has not yet consolidated its political
institutions. The nineteenth century experience of Argentina with the
U.S. Constitution shows that not only may rules from transplanted
constitutional models take root, but that such rules may enjoy extra
authority because of the prestige of the foreign model. Argentina's
elite adopted U.S. constitutional practice not only as a model, but as
a source of authority. Sometimes U.S. practice governed regardless
of Argentine needs and regardless of the result that textual interpre-
tation of the Argentine Constitution might have prescribed. Although
the rules adopted may not always have been suited ideally to
Argentina's conditions, the prestige of the model helped consolidate
a constitutional system where none had existed previously. Blind
copying is inappropriate, but because a foreign model may enjoy
greater authority than an autochthonous one, the Argentine example
shows that countries emerging from long periods of dictatorship or
instability should consider the extent to which foreign models and
international law may be harnessed to add to the authority of weak
domestic structures.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars studying political development must consider to what
extent foreign models matter. With dozens of countries undergoing
transitions to democracy, constitution drafters face basic issues of
whether, how, and to what extent they-should invoke foreign models.
The issues are not new. Many countries have used the U.S. Constitu-
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tion and others as models during the past two centuries.1 Until now,
however, scholars rarely have done more than note the degree to
which specific constitutional provisions have been borrowed or have
offered comparisons focused on specific government practices.' This
Article will examine the issues underlying the constitutional authority
and effectiveness of a constitutional transplant, focusing on
Argentina's nineteenth century experience with the U.S. Constitution.
By examining in detail the experience of a single country, Argentina,
the Article will focus on the authority enjoyed by a constitutional
transplant. Thus, although this Article will need to establish the
degree to which the United States provided a model for specific
constitutional provisions, its aim is to establish to what degree
previously non-existent rules actually came to operate in practice and
the extent to which the authority of a transplant was affected by the
fact that it came from abroad. Remarkably, Argentina offers an
example not only of the adoption of a foreign constitutional model,
but of the foreign model quickly becoming an article of faith, thereby
increasing the legitimacy of the Argentine Constitution and the
stability of Argentine political life.
Successful constitutionalism usually is ignored in explaining
Argentina's enormous economic success in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. Between 1880 and 1913 Argentina was neck-
and-neck with Japan for the title of fastest growing economy in the
world,3 and between 1869 and 1914 high European immigration
helped boost Argentina's population from 1.7 to 7.9 million people,
a growth rate of 3.4% per year.' Real Gross Domestic Product grew
at an average rate of at least 5% per year in the fifty years preceding
World War I,' and jumped to an average growth rate of 6.7%
between 1917 and 1929.6 In 1930, Argentines were better fed,
healthier, had better access to higher education, and in general
1. See Andrzej Rapaczyski, Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism
Abroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTTUTION ABROAD 405,407-12 (Louis Henkin &AlbertJ. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (explaining
impact of U.S. Constitution on development of political systems in Canada, Australia, Israel,
India, Scandanavia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America).
2. See id. at 406 (stating that "[e]xtensive scholarly research in this area is virtually
nonexistent" and offering a bibliography of literature on the influence of the U.S. Constitution).
Alan Watson is the only scholar to extensively examine the use of foreign models as a source of
authority, and his work focuses entirely in the private law sphere. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1993).
3. SeeW. ARTHUR LEWIS, GROWTH AND FLUCTUATIONS 1870-1913, at 197 (1978).
4. See CARLOS F. DiAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE
REPUBLIC 3, 421 (1970).
5. See id. at 3.
6. See id. at 52-53.
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enjoyed higher consumption levels, than most Europeans. Despite
its poor road system, Argentina had more automobiles per capita than
Great Britain in 1930.8 Scholars usually describe this spectacular
growth, followed from the 1930s by equally striking stagnation, in
terms of economic causes and the responses of different interest
groups to changes in the world trading system and Argentina's
domestic economy.9
One hardly can doubt that political stability is a necessary precondi-
tion for extended growth, however. Investors and immigrants could
show little long-term interest in Argentina during the civil wars and
political murders that characterized post-independence Argentina
from the early 1820s through the 1850s.1' Nor could immigrants
and investors have felt comfortable with the cycles of military govern-
ments, unrestrained populism, and bloodletting that increasingly
dominated Argentine politics from the 1930s through the 1970s.
Constitutionalism provided late nineteenth century Argentina with the
political stability needed for growth.
Perhaps one reason why social scientists ignore Argentina's
constitutionalism is that even in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century it was imperfect. Most elections until the presiden-
tial elections of 1916 were fraudulent." Major revolts occurred in
1874, 1880, 1890, 1891, and 1905.2 Federalism, extensively provided
7. See CARLOS H. WAISMAN, REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA: POSTWAR
COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY POUCIES AND THEIR STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCEs 7 (1987).
8. See DiAz ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 56.
9. Seegenera!y PAUL H. LEWIS, THE CRISIS OFARGENTINE CAPITALISM 1-7 (1990) (describing
and classifying traditional approaches taken by scholars on Argentine political economy);
WILLIAM C. SMITH, AUTHORrrARIANISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL ECONOMY
1-10 (1989) (noting that economic causes fail to entirely explain changes in Argentina's political
system); WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 3-23 (describing how economic change and crises produced
new interest groups and political instability).
10. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text (tracing evolution of Argentina's political
system from 1820 to 1853).
11. See infra Part V.
12. Rather than a source of regression, these revolts tended to be led by the more
democratically oriented forces in Argentine society, or at least by forces presenting themselves
as seeking a more open political structure. Former President Bartolomd Mitre, who presented
himself as the standardbearer of liberal interests seeking a more open political system, led an
unsuccessful revolt in 1874 alleging fraud in that year's presidential elections. See DAVID ROCK,
ARGENTINA 1516-1987: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO ALFONSIN 130 (1987). In 1880, the
Province of Buenos Aires led an unsuccessful revolt which led to the federalization of the City
of Buenos Aires and its separation from the Province. See id. at 155. In 1890, a coalition of
liberal politicians seeking political reform led an unsuccessful revolt with assistance from
segments of the army which, while defeated, ultimately forced President MiguelJudrez Celman
to resign. See id. at 160. In 1893 and 1905, the Union Cfvica Radical led uprisings calling for
honest elections and expanded suffrage. See id at 183, 186. For a succinct discussion of this
period, see id. at 118-213.
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for in the Constitution, never became a reality" Despite its gaps,
however, much of the Argentine Constitution did become the basis
of Argentine political life. Many important rules having scant
Argentine precedent quickly entered into practice. The process is
astonishing if one considers the complete lack of institutional and
constitutional rights until the 1850s, and is worthy of analysis by the
many countries that find themselves needing to establish constitution-
al government after long periods of chaos or dictatorship.
One of the lessons to be learned is that copying a foreign constitu-
tion can work. Moreover, in the Argentine case, one of the reasons
why it worked was precisely because it was a copy. As far back as
Hegel, many scholars have worked from the premise that a constitu-
tion cannot be copied, but must develop from established foundations
in each society. For example, Atilio Bor6n, a leading Argentine
sociologist, begins examining Latin America's modern constitutional
failure by quoting Hegel's argument that "[a] constitution is not [just
something] manufactured; it is the work of centuries, . . . the
consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed
in a particular nation." 4 According to Bor6n and many others,
Latin American societies were unprepared for liberal constitutional
models at the time of independence.15 Latin America, with a
13. See infra notes 365-69 and accompanying text.
14. Atilio A. Bor6n, Latin America: Constitutionalism and the Political Traditions of Liberalism
and Socialism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 339-40 (Douglas Greenberg etal. eds., 1993 (quoting GEORGWILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 286-87, addition to 1 274 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1967))); see, e.g., ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 34-36 (1978)
(referring to what author calls "The Law of Non-Transferability of Law"); Said Amir Arjomand,
Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order A Study in the Modernization of Political Traditions,
33 ARcIVES EUROPtENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 39, 49, 75 (1992) (emphasizing the diversity of
historical processes behind constitutions, which produces distinct patterns of constitutional
politics and inconsistent results); Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design
for Africa, 29 STAN.J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1992) (utilizing Seidman's principle of non-transferability
to analyze Africa's constitution-making). But see HowardJ. Wiarda, Law and PoliticalDevelopment
in Latin America: Toward aFrameworkforAnalysis, 19 AM.J. COMP. L. 434,442-443 (1971) (noting
that "a great deal of nonsense [has been] written about the inappropriateness... of the legal-
constitutional models adopted by the Latin American nations in the nineteenth century").
15. See Bor6n, supra note 14, at 339-40; see also SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT,
ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CULTURE AND INSTABILITY 48 (1989) (stating that social and economic
conditions were not ripe in Latin America for the adoption of Western political models);
JACQUES LAMBERT, LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 121-22
(Helen Katel trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (concluding that elite control led to spread of
Western ideas in Latin America) ;James L. Busey, Observations on Latin American Constitutionalism,
24 THE AMtERICAS 46, 49, 53 (1967) (stating that Latin American constitutions were artificial
because they either were adopted from abroad or were created by "small, unrepresentative
elites"); Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin
America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 9-11, 21-25 (1990) (contrasting
American experience with self-government to the lack of such experience in Latin American
nations to explain failure of constitutionalism in Latin America).
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colonial history of Hispanic authoritarianism, huge landholdings and
little self-government, lacked the traditions needed to support
constitutions based on liberal values, and as a consequence, the new
constitutions lacked the necessary psychological acceptance. 16  By
contrast, the United States, with a tradition of colonial self-govern-
ment and of protecting fundamental rights, was well prepared to
establish its own liberal constitution.
Hegel, moreover, goes beyond insisting merely that constitutions
cannot be copied. For Hegel, constitutions cannot even act as a
source of significant change, but rather must reflect the state of the
people they govern. "[T] he constitution of any given nation depends
in general on the character and development of its self-consciousness.
In its self-consciousness its subjective freedom is rooted and so,
therefore, is the actuality of its constitution.""8 On this view, copied
constitutions must fail, because no constitution can exceed what
members of society are prepared to accept in terms of the internal-
ized values of society. The longing of isolated individuals for a better
constitution is not enough.19 The constitution itself must enjoy what
this Article describes as a talismanic status.
[I]t is absolutely essential that the constitution should not be
regarded as something made, even though it has come into being
in time. It must be treated rather as something simply existent in
and by itself, as divine therefore, and constant, and so as exalted
above the sphere of things that are made.20
A copied constitution hardly would seem "divine," "constant," and
"exalted."
In the Argentine case, however, not only is Hegel's premise proved
wrong, but it is possible to go a step further and argue that the
country's Constitution acquired extra effectiveness precisely because
of its foreign origin. For much of the Argentine elite, the recognized
success of the U.S. Constitution gave that Constitution a talismanic
authority which the drafters of Argentina's Constitution of 1853/1860
took advantage of. Talismanic authority is defined here as authority
based on the presumed extraordinary effects of an object or docu-
16. See Bor6n, supra note 14, at 339-40; see also CALVERT & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 48
(explaining that values and attitudes from colonial period prevented immediate acceptance of
adopted political structures in Latin America); Busey, supra note 15, at 49 (stating that Latin
American constitutions failed to represent the result of real social forces); Rosenn, supra note
15, at 21-24 (stating that Latin American nations, for the most part, "have never undergone real
social revolutions").
17. See Rosenn, supra note 15, at 9-11 (relating conditions in pre-revolutionary America).
18. HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178-79, 1 274.
19. See id. at 286-87, addition to 1 274.
20. See id. at 178, 1273.
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ment-authority stemming not from rational acceptance of a
document because it has been agreed upon, but from a sense that, if
the document is followed, problems almost miraculously will be
overcome. The invocation of the talismanic authority of the U.S.
Constitution in Argentine political debate augmented the authority of
both the drafters and interpreters of the Argentine Constitution
during its early years. At times invocation of U.S. practice became
exaggerated. Decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court exist that
can be explained only as a desire to copy U.S. practice.2 1 However,
in the setting of a political system with few widely accepted sources of
authority and few entrenched political rules, sometimes the perfect
rule is less important than having a less-than-perfect one that enjoys
undisputed authority.
In calling for a constitution that seems "divine," Hegel expresses a
valid concern that a constitution possess an undisputed source of
authority. Hegel falls short by failing to recognize that in addition to
a sense of law springing from deep traditions, a variety of sources of
authority are accepted by societies as legitimate. A century later, Max
Weber's sociology of law offers the first attempt to systematize
different types of authority.
22
Although Weber analyzes law primarily in the context of what he
calls "rational" grounds of legitimate domination, meaning govern-
ment that rests "on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands,"2' he also describes two other types of legitimate
domination--"traditional" domination and "charismatic" domina-
tion.24 Under traditional grounds of domination, authority rests on
"an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the
legitimacy of those exercising authority under them."' Under
"charismatic" grounds of domination, authority rests on acceptance
of the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of a
particular person and corresponding acceptance of the decisions and
laws established by that person.26 The individual exercising charis-
matic authority enjoys the ability to exercise authority outside the
limits of formal legal rules and of tradition and to personally set,
21. See infra Part V (explainingArgentine Supreme Court's reliance on U.S. Supreme Court
opinions).
22. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIET. AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETVE SOCIOLOGY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).
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ignore, or rewrite any rules governing his authority and that of others.
Weber also notes that none of the three types of domina-
tion-rational, traditional, or charismatic-is usually found in "pure"l
form." Although one form of authority may predominate, societies
often exhibit all three types of authority."
However, even Weber's description of traditional, rational and
charismatic authority, although useful in analyzing nineteenth century
Argentina, fails to capture the full phenomenon. As Hegel recogniz-
es, constitutions do not work merely on the basis of rational authority,
particularly in countries emerging from a long period of political
disorder and lacking a tradition of respect for rational authority.29
Similarly, traditional authority counted for little in nineteenth century
Argentine politics as, having broken with the Spanish Crown,
Argentina faced the problem of a lack of autochthonous political
tradition. Moreover, charismatic authority, represented by audacious
military figures leading bands of gauchos, was exactly the type of
authority nineteenth century Argentina was trying to abandon. The
lack or limited availability of traditional, rational, and charismatic
authority as the basis for constructing a constitutional system was
precisely what led Argentina's political elite to turn to U.S. practice
and to raise it as an icon, a talisman.
Given its chaotic past, Argentina had little choice but to adopt an
aspirational constitution in seeking to create entirely new governmen-
tal institutions and to establish hitherto unprotected individual
liberties. The U.S. Constitution was an important model from the
beginning of the process that established the Constitution of 1853,
and interestingly, the U.S. influence increased, not decreased, during
the following three decades. Although Juan Bautista Alberdi, the
most important intellectual figure behind the Constitution of 1853,
sought to emulate the United States in general terms, he did not
believe in blind imitation. In developing its Constitution in 1853 and
1860, Argentina generally adopted only the U.S. practices that it
thought convenient. By the 1880s, however, one can point to
examples of U.S. practice being followed even when it made little
sense in the Argentine context. The tendency toward greater
invocation of the U.S. Constitution as authority would suggest that the
U.S. Constitution worked as a unifying force. Invocation of the U.S.
27. See id. at 216 n.2.
28. See id. at 262-63.
29. See HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178-79, 274 ("The proposal to give a constitution-even
one more or less rational in content-to a nation a prioriwould be a happy thought overlooking
precisely that factor in a constitution which makes it more than an ens rationis.").
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Constitution and practice began to lessen only toward the turn of the
century, by which time Argentina's political institutions were
sufficiently well-entrenched so that the U.S. Constitution no longer
was necessary as a talisman.
Most of this Article tells the story of nineteenth century Argentine
constitutionalism and will follow a roughly chronological approach.
Part I focuses on the backward nature of Argentine government prior
to the 1853/1860 Constitution-an unstable, authoritarian govern-
ment that was antithetical to the "liberal" model subsequently
adopted. ' Part II examines the Alberdian vision, a vision of the
future of Argentina inspired by the rapid growth of California once
it became part of the United States in 1848. The vision expounded
by Juan Bautista Alberdi in 1852 became the guiding political
philosophy of the Argentine political elite. Part III examines the
history and politics behind Argentina's Constitutional Conventions of
1853 and 1860, how the constitutional structure made use of the U.S.
Constitution, and how the Argentine elite became increasingly
exaggerated in its invocation of U.S. constitutional practice. Part IV
considers whether the Constitution provided effective rules and will
distinguish those rules that actually became part of Argentine practice
from those that did not. Part V offers examples of the importance of
U.S. practice in interpreting the Argentine Constitution, detailing
when rational interpretation of the document sometimes took a back
seat to U.S. practice even when it offered no political advantages to
the decisionmaker. From this analysis, it can be observed that the
Argentine elite, and particularly its courts, took the U.S. model so
seriously that they would overrule reasonable interpretations of the
Argentine Constitution solely because the precedent involved was
contrary to their increasing understanding of U.S. practice. More-
over, although the significance of U.S. practice began to decline in
the late 1890s, the Court relied heavily on contemporary U.S. practice
on critical occasions in the 1920s and 1930s when changes to long-
established readings of the Argentine Constitution were necessary.
Changes in U.S. practice gave the Court a basis for re-interpreting
Argentine law. Finally, this Article concludes that not only can
foreign models provide constitution writers and interpreters with
practical suggestions, but, that under the right conditions, foreign
models may offer authority that otherwise would be lacking. The
analysis of the origins of the Argentine Constitution and early practice
30. "Liberal" is used as the nineteenth century use of the term, emphasizing limited
government interference with individual conduct and the economy.
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will be quite extensive, but it is only by examining those origins that
one can begin to appreciate the extent of the Argentine elite's leap
of faith.
Two important asides are necessary before delving into Argentine
history. First, it must be understood that the relative success of a
constitutional system can be measured in a variety of ways. For
example, nineteenth centuryArgentine constitutionalism was a failure
if analyzed in terms of social and economic equality, the democratic
nature of its elections, or the implementation of all aspects of its
written text. It was an enormous success, however, in terms of what
its designers wished to accomplish-to encourage immigration and to
stimulate economic growth. It also was successful in establishing a
system of mutual security under which the political opposition, even
in the absence of democratic elections, knew that it would suffer only
limited oppression, and where the parties in power knew that even if
the opposition came to power, it would not do them serious harm.3 '
In recognition that not all parts of Argentina's written Constitution
were equally effective-or, as will be seen, were intended to achieve
equal effectiveness-rather than discuss rights, liberties, and restraints
on government power in terms of constitutional rights and limitation,
this Article will instead often use the term "rules of mutual security."
Argentine constitutionalism successfully established rules of mutual
security that gave both those in government and in opposition the
sense that certain rules limited government repression. Full compli-
ance with the Constitution is a different matter.
Second, although this Article will focus on U.S. constitutional
practice as a source of authority, it was not the only source of
authority. Rational authority, invoking the text of the Constitution
and the intent of its Framers' was always important. Likewise, past
practices that were not in conflict with the Constitution inevitably
continued to enjoy authority as the way that things had always been
done. What makes the Argentine case fascinating, however, is that for
several decades the authority derived from its foreign talisman was
equally if not more important than both rationalism and tradition.
31. SeegenerallyROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY 1-16 (1971) (developing the conceptofmutual
security as central to the development of democratic government). This Article uses mutual
security as a measure for successful constitutionalism. Dahl uses it in similar terms as an
element in the growth paths of nascent democracies. However, Dahl's work is not concerned
with the development of constitutional rules, but rather with the general sense of security that
exists between those in government and their political opposition.
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I. ARGENTINE LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO 1853
In 1850, while exiled in Chile, future Argentine President Domingo
F. Sarmiento lamented:
North America separated from England without renouncing the
history of its liberties, its juries, its parliaments and its letters. We,
the day after the revolution, had to turn our eyes to all parts
searching for something to fill the vacuum inevitably left by the
destroyed inquisition, the absolute power defeated, religious
exclusiveness flattened. 2
Little in Argentine colonial history, or in the decades following
independence in 1810, indicated that Argentina would find itself
poised in 1853 to adopt much of the U.S. constitutional model
successfully. During the colonial period, governmental structures left
Argentina unprepared for independence, let alone for a liberal system
of government. In the decades prior to 1853, civil war and dictator-
ship left Argentina even further afield from the U.S. model.
Although the philosophy of the European Enlightenment found
followers among a small sector of the colonial elite, its impact was
theoretical, not institutional. An examination of the legal institutions
that governed Argentina during its colonial period and from
independence through 1852, reveals that the protection of individual
liberties and the appearance of judicial review in the 1853/1860
Constitution are surprising innovations, not products of Argentine
political tradition.
Unlike the British colonies of North America, the Spanish colonies
in Central and South America received almost no experience in self-
government during their colonial period. Apart from its desire to
convert and offer limited protection to the local native populations,
Crown policy in the Americas was designed to maximize government
revenues, particularly from gold and silver mining,"3 and hence
sought to maximize its control over sources of income.' The Crown
32. DOMINGO FAUsTINO SARMIENTO, RECUERDOS DE PROVINCIA (1850) [hereinafter
SARMIENTO, REcuERDos], in 3 OBRAS coMPirAS DE SARMIENTO 117 (Editorial Luz del Dfa,
1950), quoted and analyzed in NATALIO R. BOTANA, LA TRADIcI6N REPUBLiCANA: ALBERDI,
SARMIENTO Y LAS IDEAS POLfTICAS DE SU TIEMPO 265 (1984).
33. See CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 103-05 (1966); see also C. H. HARING, THE
SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 313-14 (1947).
34. To prevent smuggling and tax evasion, as well as for security, the Crown restricted all
trade to two annual fleets, each numbering fifty or more ships, which gathered in Seville and
Cadiz and left as a group, with one fleet sailing for Veracruz on the Gulf Coast of Mexico and
the other for Panama and Cartagena, see GIBSON, supra note 33, at 101-02. All shipments from
Spain were dominated by the Seville merchant guild, which, until 1765, successfully excluded
even merchants from other parts of Spain. See id.; HARING, supra note 33, at 316-17.
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therefore virtually always appointed Spaniards born in Spain to be
viceroys, and assigned peninsular Spaniards to most lower offices. 5
To deter its officials from developing local attachments, the Crown
did not even permit senior officials or their children to marry in the
colonies without its consent." When it did grant permission, the
officials often were transferred to another territory.3 7
The concept of separation of powers did not exist in colonial
Spanish America; rather, the system emphasized multiple functions."8
Checks on viceroys and governors existed, but from other organs that
also exercised multiple functions. 9 Officials who exercised executive
functions were subject to the residencia, an inspection by an examiner
named by the viceroy or the Council for the Indies (the senior body
advising the King on colonial affairs). The residencia was conducted
at the conclusion of the official's term in office, although special
investigations often were ordered during an official's term.4"
Further, because all officials acted in the service of the King, abuses
by one official could be reported by another to the King or to the
Council for the Indies.41
At that time, the closest thing to a judicial body was the audienda.
This board was presided over by the viceroy or governor and heard
appeals in a variety of cases. As time went on, the audencia's powers
increasingly were restricted to judicial functions, although it retained
important non-judicial functions.42 Its members acted as advisors to
the viceroy or governor, approved emergency spending by the viceroy
or governor, played a role in the appointment of lower government
officials, and took over the viceroy's functions in the event of his
absence.43 The system contained nothing remotely similar to judicial
review. Because the Crown possessed absolute authority and colonial
officials were merely agents of the Crown, there was no need for
35. See GIBSON, supra note 33, at 102.
36. See HARING, supra note 33, at 316-17.
37. See id.
38. See RICARDO ZORRAQUiN BECO, LA ORGANIZACI6N JUDICIAL ARGENTINO EN EL PERiODO
HISPANICO 19 (1981).
39. See id.
40. During the residenda, members of the public also received the opportunity to present
complaints and to support their complaints with evidence. See HAR[ING, supra note 33, at 148-57;
ZORRAQUlN BEC(J, supra note 38, at 189-94.
41. See ZORRAQUiN BEG!), supra note 38, at 144-45.
42. See id.
43. See id. For a description of the gradual narrowing of the functions of the audiencias, see
id at 208; HARING, supra note 33, at 129-37 (describing powers of audiendas vis-A-vis viceroys and
captains-general); RICARDO LEVENE, INTRODUcci6N A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO INDIANO (1924),
in 3OBRAS DE RICARDO LEVENE 99 (Academia Nacional de Ia Historia 1962).
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judicial review or for the concept of division of powers-controls
existed only to prevent abuse of the King's authority.44
In 1777, Spain created the Viceroyalty of the River Plate and
designated Buenos Aires as the capital. Until the 1770s, Buenos Aires
had been a minor military garrison and a center for illegal smuggling
with the Portuguese and the British.' But the creation of the
viceroyalty, which included all of modem day Argentina, Bolivia,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well as part of Chile, dramatically changed
its status.46 Buenos Aires became the viceroyalty's sole legal center
for trade with Spain, and when wars cut-off supplies from Spain, a
center for trade with foreigners as well.47 As a consequence, the
city's population grew from 20,000 in 1766 to 42,000 in 1810.48
During this period, the interior cities of northern Argentina also
thrived, both as sources of supplies for silver mining activities in
Potosf (in present day Bolivia) and as stops along the trading routes
to Potosf.
49
However, the Argentine independence movement did not result
from local economic and political development, but from external
forces. Independence would have lagged for many years were it not
for the turmoil that enveloped Spain during the Napoleonic Wars.5"
In 1808, Napoleon held the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII,
prisoner in France, placed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the
Spanish throne, and then invaded Spain to maintain his brother in
power. Consequently, Argentina's elite, like elites across Latin
America, was forced to choose among allegiance to a new French
44. See ZoRRAQuiN BEd), supra note 38, at 19. This is not to say that law was not important;
it was. The King's power, although theoretically absolute, with both legislation and justice
originating from the King, was restricted by a self-imposed obligation to follow the law and to
act in accordance with naturaljustice. See id. at 14-15. Distance obviously weakened the Crown's
authority. Colonial officials had the power to stay the execution of orders from the Crown if
local application would be inappropriate, and often instructions simply were ignored. See
HA NG, supra note 33, at 122-24. Legislation establishing monopoly privileges and governing
trade was important for ensuring appropriate license and tax payments to the Crown, however.
See id. at 314-21. Legislation to protect the Indians was required as part of the official mission
of the Spanish Crown to proselytize the Americas-the grounds on which the Crown initially
received its grant of control from the Pope. See id. at 43, 48-49. See generally id at 42-74
(analyzing the legislation governing Indian rights and obligations and its degree of observance).
Property and inheritance rights also were central. These rights were interpreted with a goal of
furthering Crown policies, particularly its policy in the sixteenth century of curbing the
emergence of feudal structures in the Americas that might compete with its authority, see
ZORRAQUiN BEC6, supra note 88, at 144, although the Crown could not ignore property and
inheritance rights without serious risk of revolt, see GIBSON, supra note 33, at 58-62.
45. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 40-45.
46. See id. at 62-63.
47. See id. at 61-62.
48. See id. at 64.
49. See id. at 55-58.
50. See NICOLAS SHURWAY, THE INVENTION OF ARGENTINA 18 (1991).
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ruler, allegiance to the Spanish Resistance, or independence, with
independence offering the lure of free trade with Great Britain."
On May 25, 1810, prompted by the Spanish Resistance's loss of Seville
to French forces, the Buenos Aires creole elite overthrew the viceroy,
whom the Spanish Resistance had appointed the previous year, and
established an independent government that claimed to rule in the
name of Ferdinand VIIY2 By 1816, the pro-independence forces had
solidified their position sufficiently to declare independence in spite
of Ferdinand VII's return to the Spanish throne.3
Independence resulted in war and chaos. Spanish America's wars
for independence from Spain lasted much longer than the United
States' war for independence from Great Britain. The wars lasted
from 1808 to 1824, and not only caused tremendous destruction, but
also dislocated all previous political and trading arrangements.5 4
Buenos Aires lost the hegemony it had enjoyed as the capital of the
viceroyalty.5 The City of Buenos Aires was too small and too distant
to maintain effective authority over the Argentine interior, let alone
over Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, all of which soon broke away.
Argentina, with an area approximately the size of the United States
east of the Mississippi, had a population of only 500,000 in 18166
and had no political group that could generate a military force large
enough to control the entire expanse. Local caudillos-ranch owners
who formed mounted militia with their own peons and those of allied
or client ranch owners-seized power in the interior and acted as
warlords over as much territory as their militia could control.
Civil war plagued Argentina starting well before Bolivar's final
victory over Spanish forces in Per in 1824. In general terms, the
battles were betweenfederaists--rural caudilloswho wished to maintain
their autonomy-and unitarians-members of the professional and
commercial class in Buenos Aires who sought a centralized system of
51. See generally RocK, supra note 12, at 73-76 (describing early stages of the Argentine
independence movement).
52. See id. at 76.
53. See id. at 92.
54. See id. (analyzing effects of the wars).
55. See id. at 82; JAMEs R. SCOBIE, ARGENTINA: A Cri AND A NATION 93-94 (2d ed. 1971).
56. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 114.
57. See John Lynch, From Independence to National Organization, in ARGENTINA SINCE
INDEPENDENCE 15-18 (Leslie Bethel ed., 1993) [hereinafter Lynch, From Independence to National
Organization]; SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 91-92 (discussing role and influence of local caudillos
during first half of nineteenth century in Argentina); see alsoJOHN LYNCH, CAUDILLOS IN SPANISH
AMERICA 1800-1850, at 3-9 (1992) [hereinafter LYNCH, CAUDILLos] (describing characteristics
and historical significance of caudillos in Spanish America).
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government with themselves in charge."8 The 1820s were marked by
nearly continuous warfare until a federalist, General Juan Manuel de
Rosas, established a dictatorship over the City and Province of Buenos
Aires. 9
The reign of General Rosas constituted the ultimate submission of
Buenos Aires to caudillo government He believed in order through
authority and fear, and openly despised the liberal values that some
of his unitarian opponents espoused.' When Rosas assumed the
governorship of Buenos Aires in 1829, he did so on the condition that
the provincial legislature formally grant him "the entire sum of public
power."6 In 1832, when the legislature hesitated at renewing such
sweeping authority, he resigned rather than rule subject to any legal
controls.62 He assumed the governorship again in 1835 only after he
had sufficient political control over the legislature to receive a new
grant of absolute power.63 The Decree of March 7, 1835 which
appointed him announced:
Brigadier General Rosas is appointed Governor and Captain-
General of the Province for the term of five years. The entire sum
of public power is deposited in his hands, without further restric-
tions than the following:
1. He shall defend and protect the holy Catholic religion.
2. He shall sustain and defend the national cause of federation as
proclaimed by all the people of the Republic.
3. This extraordinary power shall continue for such time as the
Governor-elect shall judge to be necessary.
58. See 1 CARLOS ALBERTO FLORIA & CfSAR A. GARCiA BELSUNCE, HISTORIA DE LOS
ARGENTINOS 461-62 (1992).
59. The first battle occurred in early 1820, when federalist cavalry forces from the provinces
of Santa F6, Entre Rfos, and Corrientes, responding in part to Buenos Aires' river blockades,
defeated Buenos Aires unitarians and took the city. They agreed to leave in return for 25,000
head of cattle, promises of free river navigation of the River Plate and its tributaries, and non-
interference by Buenos Aires in their affairs. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 93-94. However,
fighting between federalist caudillos permitted Buenos Aires, under unitarian control, to start
blockading river traffic again the following year. See i& at 96-97. From 1825 through 1827, with
Buenos Aires unitarian forces in control, Argentina fought an unsuccessful war with Brazil over
control of Uruguay, and in 1827, General Manuel Dorrego, a federalist, displaced the then
unpopular unitarians and became Governor of Buenos Aires. See id. at 102-03; 1 FLOIHA &
GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 471-80. But after only a few months in power, Dorrego was
overthrown and executed by a unitarian army under General Juan Lavalle, who in turn was
defeated in 1829 by General Rosas. See i&. at 480-86;JOHN LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR, JUAN
MANUEL DE ROSAS, 1829-1852, at 38-41 (1981); ROCK, supra, at 102-03.
60. See LYNCH, sutpra note 59, at 154.
61. Id at 48.
62. See id. at 49.
63. See id. at 49, 162.
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4. He is to appear on the 11th and swear to exercise faithfully the
power entrusted to him, in the way that he believes most suitable
for the well-being of the province and the Republic in general.'
Rosas' power exceeded that of the most absolutist Spanish mon-
archs of the colonial period, and he used it to the fullest. Rosas
legislated by decree and decided many judicial cases himself. His
justices of the peace, who generally were restricted to handling minor
matters, also were his political agents in their districts.6" Starting in
1831, Rosas ordered the justices of the peace to create lists recording
the names of opposition members along with the property they owned
in their respective districts. 66  Property confiscations grew to the
point that land became worthless, because no landowner, unless a
friend of Rosas, had security of tenure.67 Moreover, friends of Rosas
had little need for the market, as they usually could acquire land
through confiscations, sales under pressure, or grants of newly opened
territories along the Indian frontier.' Rosas pronounced 2000
confiscations during his tenure, including 500 estancias and approxi-
mately one million head of cattle.69  He eliminated all opposition
press early in his regime, 70 and his terror squad, known as the
Mazorca,7 openly brandished long knives that were used to cut the
throats of adversaries, frequently killing them in public and leaving
their bodies in the street
72
The bloodshed diminished in the later years of the regime, as all
opposition had been killed or had fled, and the lessons of earlier
years made discipline easy to maintain. 7' Nevertheless, even in those
64. Md at 162-63 (translation by Lynch).
65. See id. at 169-71.
66. See id. at 212.
67. See id. at 66-67 (discussing prevalence and impact of land confiscations).
68. See id. at 56-60.
69. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 56-60.
70. See id. at 158.
71. The formal name was "Socedad PopularRestauradord" (Popular Society for Restoration).
The name "Mazorcd' comes from "mds horca," more hanging. See id. at 215. But see WILLIAM
HADFIELD, EL BRASIL, EL RiO DE LA PLATA Y EL PARAGUAY 138 (1854) (Betty B. de Cabral trans.,
1943) (citing British sources claiming that the name came from a torture technique using corn
cobs). The terror reached its peak between 1838 and 1842, during and following a French naval
blockade of Buenos Aires from 1838-40. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 109-10.
72. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 216-46. Perhaps the most striking act of terror was the
murder of the President of the Chamber of Deputies at his desk for allegedly sympathizing with
unitarian enemies of the regime. See id. at 226. Rosas' victims were selected carefully, and many
came from the educated elite. See i. at 209-46; L.S. RowE, THE FEDERAL SwTEM OF THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 37 (1921). The unitarians subsequently claimed that the death toll
reached 5884, not counting individuals killed in battle or executed for desertion. On the other
hand, the government newspaper Gazeta Mercantilclaimed that the number did not exceed 500
during the period from 1829 through 1843. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 242-43.
73. See i. at 209-10, 220, 223-24, 228, 235, 238-39, 241-46 (describing Rosas' strategic use
of terror as mechanism of control).
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more subdued times, John Pendleton, the newly-arrived Charg6 d'
Affaires from the United States, began his first Despatch to the
Secretary of State on September 22, 1851, with this harsh indictment:
The government of Buenos Aires and of those states originally
forming the Argentine Confederation-and not now in open
rebellion against them, is I suppose the most simple and rigorous
despotism in the entire world....
[Rosas] unites in his own person all the powers of the
state-makes the laws-executes them, controls in every possible
respect the whole subject of the finances and currency ... settles
disputes as he pleases... causes to be shot any citizen of that State
at his pleasure-and such is the terror of his system that no subject
dare ever speak of it, much less complain.
74
When Rosas was forced from power in February 1852, it was not
due to internal dissent. Indeed, he maintained substantial support
within the lower classes until the very end.75 Known as a figure who
governed and raised armies based on the strength of his character, his
toughness made him a popular figure among the rural poor.71 Most
of his terror tactics were not aimed at the rural poor, but instead
focused on keeping the commercial and professional elite in line.
77
Rosas' defeat came at the hands of General Justo Jos6 de Urquiza,
the caudillo of the Entre Rios province, who led a combination of
forces from the provinces of Entre Rfos, Santa F6, and Corrientes,
with support from Uruguay, Brazil, and a contingent of unitarian
exiles.78 Urquiza, a rich estanciero and longtime federalist, apparently
was provoked in part by Rosas' decision in 1848 to close the River
Plate system to upriver foreign traffic.79 But he also justified his
attack on Rosas, arguing that the time had come to give Argentina its
first real national constitution.
s0
Until this time, Argentina had never had a successful experience
with liberal governmental institutions even with a national govern-
ment. Colonial rule, existing primarily to siphon wealth to Spain and
offering no self-government, at least had offered stability and
administrative recourse against capricious conduct by colonial
74. John Pendleton, Despatch No. I to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Sept. 22, 1851,
microform ed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, Microcopy
No. 69, reel 9 (National Archives Microfilm Publications).
75. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 805. /
76. See id.; SHUmWAY, supra note 50, at 117-19.
77. See generaly LYNCH, supra note 59, at 201-46 (describing the nature of Rosas' terror).
78. See 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 66-67.
79. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 112.
80. See BEATRIZ BOSCH, URQUIZA Y SU TIEMPO 167-69 (1971).
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officials."1 The previous four decades had provided only wars with
Spain and Brazil, civil wars, and dictatorship. A National Constitution,
sanctioned in December 1826, by a unitarian-dominated Congress,
had provided for a powerful central government and a system of
division of powers based on the U.S. Constitution, 2 but that Consti-
tution was rejected almost immediately by most of the provinces.8 3
An earlier unitarian Constitution drafted in 1819 never went into
effect because of a federalist invasion of Buenos Aires. 4 Other
provisional organic statutes and regulations, passed by congresses
acting both as constitutional assemblies and as ordinary legislative
bodies, never lasted more than two or three years. 5 Some zeal for
reform certainly existed during the first years after independence,
86
with prohibition of slavery,8 elimination of prior censorship of the
press,88 some protection against arbitrary searches and criminal
prosecutions, 9 and the beginning of a sense of the need to limit
executive power.9" But the reformers' political dominance was
limited to very short stretches of time.
The situation of the judiciary was particularly bleak. During the
period of predominantly unitarian control of Buenos Aires immediate-
ly following independence, a court of appeals took over the judicial
functions of the audiencia, including, in some periods, the critical
81. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
82. The text of the 1826 Constitution can be found in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, at 309-23 (Arturo Enrique Sampay ed., 1975).
83. See I FLoRIA & GARciA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 467-71.
84. SeeSANTOS PRIMO AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSrITUTIONAL LAW: THEJUDICIAL FUNCTION
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND THE PRESERVATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 15-
18 (1943). The text of the 1819 Constitution can be found in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 269-79.
85. See geerally 1 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 3-614 (Emilio Ravignani ed.,
1937) (containing transcripts of the proceedings of all legislatures from 1813-1820 that had the
power to draft a constitution as well as organic statutes and regulations); AMADEO, supra note
84, at 11-18 (describing Argentina's early attempts at writing a constitution).
86. See generaly DAVID BUSHNELL, REFORM AND REACTION IN THE PLATINE PROVINCES, 1810-
1852 (1983) (offering a study of the rise of liberalism in Argentina in the early years after
independence, what the author describes as a conservative reaction under Rosas, and the return
of liberalism in 1852).
87. SeeDeeeto de la Asanblea de 1813 (Feb. 4,1813), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA
1810/1972, supra note 82, at 126.
88. See Decreto de la Libertad de Imprenta, art. 1 (Oct. 26, 1811), in LAS CONSTTIUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 121.
89. See Decreto de Seguridad Individual (Nov. 23, 1811), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 120 (offering guarantees of due process in criminal
proceedings, arts. 1, 2 & 5, and placing restrictions on searches and seizures, arts. 3-4).
90. See Reglamento de la divisidn depoderes sandonadopor la Pu meraJunta Conservadara (Oct. 22,
1811), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 109-13 (placing
limits on the Executive); Constituci6n de las Provindas Unidas en Sud Ambica (Apr. 22, 1819), in
LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LAARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 269-79 (establishingseparate
executive, legislative and judicial branches).
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areas of customs disputes and other tax matters. 91 In most provinces
between 1810 and 1852, as in Buenos Aires under Rosas, whatjustice
existed was exercised personally by the local caudillo.92
II. THE ALBERDIAN VISION
The Argentine Constitution of 1853/1860 emerged from the
intellectual vision of a small group of Argentine thinkers who lived in
exile during Rosas' reign and were inspired by the model of the
United States. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which enshrined
governmental institutions that already had strong roots, the Argentine
Constitution was a forward-looking vision of what its drafters wished
Argentina to become. Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino
Sarmiento, the two leaders of the group, had important academic and
political differences, although both shared a basic constitutional vision
consisting of free immigration, economic growth, and the full
protection of the individual liberties necessary to encourage immigra-
tion and investment. The vision did not, however, include political
rights, and regarded federalism-the burning political issue of the
post-independence period-as a necessary evil that could be omitted
from the model if it were possible politically.93
Alberdi (1810-1884) and Sarmiento (1811-1888) often have been
associated with a literary circle formed in Buenos Aires in 1837,
referred to as the Generation of '37, although Sarmiento lived in the
province of San Juan in 1837 and participated only vicariously. The
literary circle, led by poet Esteban Echeverrfa, sought inspiration in
European and U.S. culture and believed that through the power of
their ideas a small intellectual elite could transform the country.
94
The circle did not last very long with Rosas in power. Organized in
May 1837, the circle met for conversation in a Buenos Aires book-
store. Starting in November 1937, the group published a literary
magazine which although it prudently lauded Rosas and his policies,
was shut down anyway in April 1838. Most of the circle left the
country shortly thereafter. Alberdi and Sarmiento, as well as most
group members, wrote the bulk of their work while in exile. In 1852,
Alberdi provided the single most important statement of the
Generation of '37's political vision in Bases y puntos de partida para la
organizaci6n politica de la Repi(blica Argentina (Bases and Points of
91. See ZORRAQUIN BEcfJ, supra note 38, at 216.
92. See id. at 215.
93. See infra notes 124-60 and accompanying text.
94. See generally SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 126-32 (describing the Generation of'37 literary
circle and its activities).
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Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Repub-
lic)," probably the most politically influential book in Argentine
history. His vision was fundamental at the Constitutional Convention
of 1853, and was essentially realized in the following years.
Alberdi published Bases in Chile in May 1852,96 and immediately
sent a copy to General Urquiza,97 the key figure for making any
constitutional innovation a reality. Bases examined what Alberdi
perceived to be the fundamental ills besetting Argentine society,
offered a manifesto of fundamental constitutional principles to cure
them, and in the second edition published later that year, included
a draft constitution in an appendix. Urquiza responded to Bases
enthusiastically in a public letter 8 and immediately ordered the
printing of an edition in Argentina.99 Sarmiento called it a "monu-
ment," "our banner, our symbol" and forecast that "it will become the
Argentine decalogue."1°
Bases argued that an Argentine constitution should not be limited
to a legal framework incorporating the status quo because the status
quo in Spanish America was a failure.1"1 "[F]or these republics of
one day, the future is everything, the present, hardly anything."
10 2
Thus Alberdi's constitution unavoidably was a project to remake the
country. "There are constitutions of transition and creation, and
definitive constitutions which conserve. The [constitutions] which
America asks for today are of the first type; they are for exceptional
times."0 3  Alberdi's goal was prosperity," and he argued that to
realize the goal, a constitution must seek to "organize and establish
the great practical measures to take emancipated America out of the
dark and subordinate state in which it finds itself."105
Alberdi offered a straightforward program. With only one million
inhabitants, Argentina was an empty, under-utilized expanse with little
agriculture, no railroads, and no vibrant cities except for Buenos
95. SeeJUAN BAUTISTAALBERDI, BASESYPUNTOS DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACI6N POLfTICA
DE LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA (1852) [hereinafter ALBERDI, BASES], in 3 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE
JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 371 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886).
96. See id. at 383.
97. SeeBOSCH, supra note 80, at 259; 1JORGE M. MAYER, ALERDI Y SU TIEMPO 529 & n.215
(1973).
98. See BoscH, supra note 80, at 259; 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 531.
99. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 541.
100. 1& at 552.
101. SeeALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 426.
102. I. at 405.
103. Id. at 410.
104. See id. at 409.
105. IML
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Aires.06  Facilitating progress required encouraging European
immigration to fill the empty expanses and improve the cultural level
of the country, permitting free commerce, and attracting the
investment needed to build railroads and establish industry.
0 7
He argued that immigrants could be attracted to Argentina by
offering them ample individual liberty. The rights conferred on
immigrants would include: tolerance of their religious practices,""
legislation allowing marriage of persons of different religions, 1 9
freedom of movement within Argentina,1 equal rights in private
law matters,"' access to the lower ranks of public employment,
12
the right to property,"' freedom to work and engage in indus-
try,114 freedom of commerce," 5 easy transfer of property,16 and
an efficient judicial system to provide redress."7 The model for this
program was the State of California, which in the few years since it
had been seized by the United States from Mexico had achieved
spectacular growth through the opportunities it offered to newcom-
ers--opportunities unavailable under Mexican rule."8 In the draft
constitution included as an appendix to Bases, Alberdi afforded both
citizens and foreigners essentially the same rights as those of the U.S.
Bill of Rights, but with a greater emphasis on economic liberties than
in the U.S. Constitution."
9
Alberdi further extended his argument for protection of civil
liberties to encourage growth in Sistema econ6mico y rentistico de la
Confederaci6n Argentina segan su Constituci6n de 1853 (Economic and
Tax System of the Argentine Confederation under the Constitution
of 1853),110 published two years after Bases. In Sistema econ6mico, all
individual liberties in the 1853 Constitution were described in terms
106. See id. at 451, 456.
107. See iU at 409, 426-38. Reduced to a slogan, his message was "to govern is to populate."
I& at 527.
108. See id. at 430, 449-51, 455.
109. See id. at 440, 451.
110. See id- at 431-32.




115. See id. at 455.
116. See id. at 440, 441-42.
117. See id. at 440.
118. See id. at 403, 411-13, 453, 457.
119. See id. at 561-63 (arts. 16-20).
120. JuAN BAuTrSTA ALBERDI, SISTEMA ECON6MICO Y RENTISTICO DE LA CONFEDERACI6N
ARGENTINASEGWNSU CONSTITUCI6N DE 1853 (1854) [hereinafterALBERDI, SISTEMA ECON6MICO],
in 4 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAuTIsTA ALBERDI 143 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional
1886).
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of the contribution they make to economic growth. For example,
Alberdi argued that a free press is required because the press itself is
a type of industry, because it improves productive techniques by
spreading knowledge, and because it acts as a watchdog "to denounce
and combat ... the errors and abuses which hinder industry."
121
Personal security is required because without it there can be no
confidence in the promises made by a merchant who might be
attacked at any time and thrown into prison, no agricultural produc-
tion or mining if workers might suddenly be pressed into army
service, and no confidential business dealings if private correspon-
dence might be opened.1 22 In the political economy of Alberdi's
Constitution, individual liberties were a means for achieving economic
prosperity, the essential mission of the Constitution, 12' rather than
ends in themselves. 24
At their heart, both Bases and Sistea econ/mico are adaptations of
liberal, laissez faire capitalism to an empty land populated largely by
Indians and gauchos too uncouth (or perhaps too free-spirited?) to
form a stable workforce. Significantly, the vision did not include free
suffrage or a widening of the ranks of those wielding political
power.1" In Bases, Alberdi argued that "[i]t is utopian, it is a dream
and pure falsity to think that our hispanic-american race as formed by
the hands of our dreadful colonial past can today realize a representa-
tive republic" when in the entire world only the United States and the
Swiss cantons have succeeded in doing so. 12 6 In Sistema econ6mico,
Alberdi carefully distinguished "economic liberty," which all are
capable of exercising, from "political liberty," which "requires
education, if not science" and affects the future of others, not just
oneself.27 "I do not participate in that fanaticism, inexperienced
when not hypocritical, which asks for abundant political liberties for
peoples who only know how to employ them to create their own
tyrants."12 s He sought only the individual liberties necessary for
"those endeavoring to populate, enrich and civilize these countries,
not the political liberties, an instrument of agitation and ambition in
our hands, never longed for or useful to the foreigner, who comes to
121. Id. at 159.
122. See id. at 168.
123. See id. at 148-52, 525, 527.
124. See id. at 175.
125. See NATALIO R. BOTANA, EL ORDEN CONSERVADOR: 1A POLfTIrA ARGENTINA ENTRE 1880
Y 1916, at 50-54 (1977).
126. ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 528.
127. SeeALBERDI, SISTEMA EcON6MIcO, supra note 120, at 150.
128. IM. at 188.
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us seeking well-being, family, dignity and peace.""2  Alberdi's
approach toward political rights is central to understanding the rules
of mutual security that actually were established in the Argentine
Constitution, because as will be seen, political rights, although
formally part of the Constitution of 1853/1860, were not operative as
rules of mutual security until at least 1912.11°
Like Alberdi in Bases, Sarmiento also wrote a book in the early
1850's directed in part toward General Urquiza and his aspiration to
offer the country a constitution.13 1 Titled Argir6polis, some aspects
of this book are spur of the moment fantasy from a writer who writes
provocatively but leaves loose ends. Thus, his proposal to move
Argentina's capital to Martin Garcia, a deserted island in the middle
of the River Plate, safely can be ignored' 2-- as it was by Sarmiento
himself in his later work. Like Alberdi two years later, however,
Sarmiento argued that Argentina must imitate the progress of the
United States,3 3 and particularly of California,TM to become the
United States of South America.' He argued that Argentina
needed a national government "which proposes as its sole objective
to devote itself to populating the country and creating riches."3 6
Argentina's present population would need five hundred years to fill
up its empty spaces through reproduction and would only fill them
With more of the same-people lacking in knowledge and indus-
try. 7 The European immigrant would bring his arts and sciences
vith him."s Commerce needed to be freed by eliminating internal
tariff barriers 39 and by opening the interior to international
trade."4  Foreign capital could be attracted to build canals and
railroads if Argentina became a more stable environment, thereby
129. 1&
130. See infra notes 402-12, 427 and accompanying text.
131. Written in Chile in 1850 when Urquiza was beginning to assert his independence from
Rosas, Argirdpolis begins by indicating to Urquiza that he, Urquiza, is the man who can challenge
Rosas and establish a national constitution, and therefore, he should pay careful attention to the
ideas that follow. See DOMINGo FAUSTINO SARmIENTO, ARGIRPOuS (1896) [hereinafter
SARMIENTO, ARGIR6POUS], in 13 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 17-18 (Editorial Luz del DNa,
1950).
132. See id at 67-69. He combines this with a recommendation that Paraguay and Uruguay
rejoin Argentina, a recommendation that was hardly likely to be acceptable to Paraguay or
Uruguay. See id
133. See id. at 17, 76, 91.
134. See id. at 73, 101.
135. See id. at 103.
136. Id. at 93.
137. See id. at 91.
138. See id. at 93.
139. See id. at 56.
140. See id. at 64-65, 83.
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limiting the risks capital would face. 4' Sarmiento did not discuss
individual liberties in depth in Argir6polis, but he clearly intended that
they be part of any future constitution."1 In later work he would
describe liberty as a type of "capital," arguing that it was through the
liberty offered to their citizens that the great economic powers
achieved their success.'4
Sarmiento also shared Alberdi's preference for government by men
of reason and not by Argentina's uneducated populace.'4 In
newspaper articles written in the 1840s, he advocated "democracy by
national intelligence and not by national will."" In fact, in a later
work he argued that the Constitution did not exist for the Argentine
masses, because they were not prepared to understand a liberal
constitution. 1" The bulk of the population only needed to deal
with ordinary civil and criminal matters, the judges who decide their
cases, and the police. 47 "It is the educated classes that need a
Constitution which assures freedom of action and thought, the press,
public speech, and property," because unlike the masses of the
population, these classes can "understand the rules of the institutions
which they adopt." "
141. See id. at 101-02.
142. See id. at 102.
143. See DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS DE LA CONSTITUCI6N DE LA
CONFEDERACI6N ARGENTINA (1853) (hereinafter SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS], in 8 OBRAS
COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 101 (Editorial Luz del Da, 1950); see also DOMINGO FAUSTINO
SARMIENTo, Prini pios y tdctica de la Prensa, in EL NACIONAL, Mar. 7, 1856, reprinted in 25 OBRAs
COMPI.ETAS DE SARMIENTO 142 (Editorial Luz del Dfa, 1950).
144. See SARMIENTO, Prinioios y tdctica de la Prensa, supra note 143, at 55-58.
145. Id.
146. See SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 29.
147. See id.
148. 1& Sarmiento's best known book is DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, FACUNDO:
CIVIUZACI6NYBARBARIE EN LAREPiBLICAARGENTINA (1845) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, FACUNDO],
in 7 OBRAS COmpLETAS DE SARMIENTO 14 (Editorial Luz del Dfa, 1950). In the book, he
describes Argentina's civil wars as a battle between the European culture of Argentina's cities
and the gaucho barbarism of the countryside, and recounts the bloody exploits ofJuan Facundo
Quiroga, a leading federalist caudi!o and ally of Rosas who was murdered in 1835. The gaucho,
used by Sarmiento as a term to define the mass of the population in the countryside (and
accordingly the country), does not work and seeks to live free of all rules and government. See
id at 33, 48. Life in the outdoors "has developed the physical qualities of the gaucho, without
any qualities of intelligence." Id at 33. Even if the unitarians had succeeded in killing Rosas
before he came to power, the countryside would have discovered another, equally barbarous
leader. See id at 125. When Rosas returned to the governorship of Buenos Aires in 1835 with
a new grant of absolute power, "there never was a government more popular, more sought after,
or better supported by [public] opinion." Id at 192; see SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 118-19.
Sarmiento argued that Argentina's useless gaucho population needed to be replaced with
European immigrants, see SARMIENTO, FACUNDO, supra, at 238-39, not placed in control of the
government, see Nicolas Shumway, Sarmiento and the Narrative of Failure, in SARMIENTO AND His
ARGENTINA 51, 54-55 (Joseph T. Criscenti ed., 1993).
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Alberdi and Sarmiento's vision of federalism is harder to establish,
but both were frustrated unitarians at heart. Alberdi opted for a
federal system based on the U.S. Constitution,'49 but only because
geographical distances were too great5 0 and local bases of power
too strong to allow a unitary system of government"' Alberdi also
insisted that historically "unity is not the point of departure, [but] it
is the final achievement of governments." 52 The unitarians, who
failed in their 1826 attempt to establish a unitary system of govern-
ment, did not present "a bad principle, but a principle impractical in
the country in the period and manner that they desired."' In
Alberdi's view, they were not wrong, just too precocious.' Further,
Alberdi would have been a Hamiltonian in the United States. He
expected the nation to embark on great projects, and in his draft
constitution indicated that Congress shall:
Provide for the prosperity, defense and security of the country; for
the advancement and well-being of the Provinces, stimulating the
progress of education and industry, immigration, the construction
of railroads and navigable canals, the colonization of empty lands
and those inhabited by Indians, the establishment of new industries,
the importation of foreign capital, [and] the exploration of
navigable rivers, through laws directed towards these ends and
through the concession of temporary privileges and enticements for
progress.1
55
Alberdi does not desire to limit the powers of the federal government
merely to temporarily permit a structure allowing provincial govern-
ment.
15 6
In Argir6polis, Sarmiento is less precise but little different. A federal
system is necessary not because of its merits, but because the
unitarians have failed politically.'57 Sarmiento called for Argentina
to copy U.S. federalism," but never suggested that any limits be
placed on the federal government's powers and called for the federal
government to contribute to the country's growth.' 59 He certainly
did not place much faith in the administrative capacity of the
149. See ALB..RDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 470.
150. See id. at 460-61.
151. See id. at 461-62, 463-67.
152. Id. at 462.
153. Md
154. See id.
155. Id at 570, art. 67, § 3. This section later became incorporated into the CONST. ARG.
OF 1853 art. 64, § 16, and the CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, § 16.
156. See BOTANA, supra note 124, at 358-59.
157. See SARMIENTO, ARGIR6POLIS, supra note 131, at 56.
158. See id. at 102.
159. See id. at 101.
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provinces. In other writings, he argued that most provinces in the
interior of the country were too backward even to administer their
own judicial systems.1" Like Alberdi, he saw federalism as a politi-
cal necessity given the provinces' aversion toward Buenos Aires.
Although he appreciated the success of federalism in the United
States, his basic political tendencies were unitarian and his conduct,
once he began to hold posts in the federal government, was consis-
tently unitarian.1
61
III. THE GENESIS OF THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION OF 1853/1860
In 1852, General Urquiza commanded an army of 30,000 men, the
largest army hitherto assembled in Argentina.162 He saw the estab-
lishment of a national constitution as his fundamental task, but it took
ten years to establish the national unity necessary to make the
constitution a national reality. Two features would mark the process.
First, Buenos Aires would move from occupation by Urquiza's army
following the defeat of Rosas in 1852 to control of the national
government in 1861. This change would set back the cause of
federalism permanently. Second, although the Argentine Constitu-
tion increasingly would come to look like that of the United States,
the effective rules of mutual security would become those of Alberdi's
vision: ample individual liberties, but only limited federalism and
little protection of political rights.
A. The Agreement of San Nicolds and the Constitutional
Convention of 1853
In September 1852, only seven months after defeating Rosas,
General Urquiza lost control of the Province of Buenos Aires. Many
of the exiled unitarians who had accompanied him rejected him after
his victory for having once been Rosas' lieutenant, accusing him of
being too similar to the federalist caudillo he replaced." Sarmiento
was perhaps the most vociferous in his condemnation." 4 Some of
160. See SARMIENTO, COMENrAPIOS, supra note 143, at 225.
161. SeeDARDO PREz GUILHOU, SARMIENTOY LA CONSTITUCI6N 76-79 (1989) (including an
excellent summary of Sarmiento's writings on federalism); see also CARLOS OcrAvIo BUNGE,
SARMIENTO (ESTUDIO BIOGRAFICO Y CRITICO) 134 (1926); ALISON WILLIAMS BUNKLEY, TiE LIFE
OF SARMmNTO 406, 472-76 (1969) (noting Sarmiento's unitarian tendencies when in federal
government).
162. See 2 FLORIA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 67.
163. See id. at 75-76.
164. SeeDOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, CARTA DEYUNGAY (1852) [hereinafter SARMIENTO,
CARTA DE YUNGAY], in 15 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 21, 28, 34-36, 38 (Editorial Luz del
Dfa, 1950). This open letter forms part of a collection known as Las dento y una. See id.
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Urquiza's actions showed a certain sympathy towards Rosas. When
Urquiza's army entered the city, he limited executions to a handful
of high ranking officers and a regiment that revolted."6 Urquiza
refused to confiscate Rosas' property,"6 and with the help of the
British Ambassador, Rosas himself escaped to Britain aboard a British
naval vessel. 67 Further, in a move with enormous symbolic impor-
tance, Urquiza encouraged the population to wear a scarlet rib-
bon-the traditional symbol of Argentine federalism-emphasizing
that despite opposing Rosas, he remained a federalist."6
At the core of the liberal exiles' objections, however, was the
concern that Urquiza represented caudillosfrom the interior provinces
who sought to retain their own power as a condition of national unity,
whereas they wished to control the nation themselves from Buenos
Aires. 69 Further, and of concern not so much to the former exiles
as to Buenos Aires' estancieros and trading interests, Urquiza actively
sought a national constitution that would federalize the City of
Buenos Aires as the nation's capital and would place its customs
revenues in the hands of the national government.'
In May 1852, Urqulza met with some of the leading political figures
of the Province to test their reaction to his plan to federalize the City
of Buenos Aires, a test balloon that met strong resistance.1 7 1  In
June of that same year, he held a summit with governors and
representatives from all the provinces that resulted in the Agreement
of San NicolAs.7 2 This Agreement had two important aspects. First,
it established Urquiza with the title of Provisional Director of the
Argentine Confederation. Although the provinces previously had
designated him as responsible for handling the nation's foreign
165. SeeBOSCH, supra note 80, at 221, 228;JAMES PL SCOBIE, LA LUCHA POR LA CONSOLIDACI6N
DE LA NACIONALIDAD ARGENTINA, 1852-62, at 25-26 (2d ed. 1964); SHUMVAY, supra note 50, at
170-71.
166. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 53.
167. See id. at 17-23.
168. See Proclamation of General Urquiza to the People of Buenos Aires (Feb. 21, 1852), in BEATRIZ
BOSCH, PRESENCIA DE URQUIZA 118-20 (1953); SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 26-27. Sarmiento
naturallyjoined the protests against its use. See SARMIENTO, CARTA DE YUNGAY, supra note 164,
at 26.
169. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 34 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, June 24,
1853, microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra
note 74 (noting that Buenos Aires wanted a Constitution with which it could rule the country);
2 FLORIA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 75 (noting that this "nationalist" line was led by
Bartolom6 Mitre). Mitre was one of the most prominent of the exiles who joined Urquiza's
army, and led Buenos Aires' military forces in all of its subsequent battles with Urquiza. See
ROCK, supra note 12, at 122; SHUMXVAY, supra note 50, at 188-90.
170. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 247; SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 34.
171. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 34-35.
172. See id. at 35-37. For a discussion of what occurred at the Congress and its results, see
generally id. at 35-39.
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affairs, as the temporary national Executive he was now granted the
authority to quash any disorder.17 Second, and more important, it
provided for a Constitutional Convention that would draft a Constitu-
tion without any subsequent ratification by the provinces,17 4 with
decisions at the Convention made by majority vote,175 and with all
provinces at the Convention receiving equal representation. 176  As
the largest province in the country and the one with the most to lose
from a Constitutional Convention where each province had one vote,
Buenos Aires' reaction was predictable. The treaty, which Urquiza's
puppet Governor of the Province had signed, 177 was rejected vocifer-
ously by the provincial legislature and led to a successful provincial
coup by anti-Urquiza forces. 7 Rather than enter into a new battle
with Buenos Aires, however, Urquiza decided to continue with the
plans for the Constitutional Convention, in the hope that Buenos
Aires eventually might be coaxed into participating. 179 The Conven-
tion began in November 1852, without delegates from the Province
of Buenos Aires, and in the midst of a war by proxy between Urquiza
and the Province."t During most of the Convention, dissident rural
Buenos Aires forces, with military support from Urquiza, engaged in
a failed blockade of the City of Buenos Aires.1 '
The absence of the Province of Buenos Aires from the Constitution-
al Convention probably had minimal impact on the product that
resulted. The 1853 text conflicted with Buenos Aires' interests only
in its declaration of the City of Buenos Aires as a federal capital
forming an independent federal district I 2 and its nationalization of
customs revenues.1s If anything, the absence of the Province of
Buenos Aires motivated the delegates to adopt a more unitarian text
than otherwise, so that the Confederation would be better able to
stand up to Buenos Aires."s Roughly two-thirds of the text used the
173. See Acuerdo de San Nicolds de Ice Arroyos, arts. 12-18, in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 335, 337-38.
174. See id. art. 12, at 337.
175. See id. art. 6, at 336.
176. See id. art. 5, at 336.
177. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 4048.
178. See id. at 56-58.
179. See id. at 60.
180. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 104.
181. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 56-95 (offering detailed description of relations between
Urquiza and Province of Buenos Aires between September 1852 andJuly 1853).
182. CoNsr. ARG. [CONSTITUCION DE LA CONFEDERAC6N ARGENTINA, arts/ 3. 34. 42
[hereinafter CONST. ARG. OF 1853]].
183. CONsT. ARG. OF 1853 art. 64(1).
184. For example, during a debate at the Constitutional Convention regarding whether it
was appropriate to adopt a constitution when the country was so divided, Juan Seguf, a delegate
from the Province of Santa F, argued that a National Constitution was needed to prevent
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same approach as Alberdi's draft, and approximately two-thirds
originated in the United States' Constitution-often by way of
Alberdi.1' With respect to a number of individual liberties, the
1853 Constitution looked to France's Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizen of 1789.186
Like the U.S. Constitution, the 1853 text provided for a federal
system of government s7 with the power of the federal government
divided between a President,ltu a Judiciary,189 and a bicameral
Congress,"9 with a Senate having equal representation for each
province 91 and a House of Deputies having representation based
proportionately on population.9 Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
there was no separation of Church and State, 93 the Executive
enjoyed comparatively stronger powers" but sat for only a single
consecutive six-year term, 95 and the federal government possessed
broader authority vis-4-vis the states and explicit authorization to take
over provincial govermnents in the case of unrest 96 The 1853
Constitution's only draconian aspect was a grant of authority to the
President to declare a state of siege to suspend most constitutional
division and to show Buenos Aires what the Confederation was capable of. See Congreso General
Constituyente de la Confederaci6n Argentina [hereinafter Constitutional Convention of 1853],
Session of Apr. 20,1853, in 4ASAMBLEAS CONgTuVENTEs ARGENTINAS, 1813-1893, at 467, 468-87
(Emilio Ravignani ed., 1937) [hereinafter 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTUVENTES ARGENTINAS]; see also
SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 104 (offering general observation that the threat from Buenos Aires
probably caused the provinces to accept greater federal authority than they would have under
other circumstances).
185. Alberdi's draft and the Argentine Constitution of 1853 may be conveniently compared
in LAS CONSTrrIuCIONES DE LA ARGENTnA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 341-53 (Alberdi's draft),
358-72 (Constitution of 1853). An artide by article account of similarities and differences
among Aberdi's draft, the U.S. Constitution, and the Argentine Constitution of 1853 would be
a waste of space. Many scholars have offered comparisons of the three texts. See, e.g., AMADEO,
supra note 84, at 28-35; ALBERTO PADI.LA, LA CONSTrfuCI6N DE ESrADOS UNIDos COMO
PREcEDENTE ARGENTINO 103-23 (1921); 1 SEGUNDO V. LINARES QUINTANA, TRATADO DE iA
CIENCIA DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 419, 427-34 (1977); JORGE REINALDO VANOSSI, LA
INFLUENCIA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N DE LOS ESrADOS UNIDOS DE NORTEAmRCA EN LA CONSTJTUCI6N
DE LA REPiBurCA ARGENTINA 10-11, 73, 74-75, 81, 107 (1976).
186. See VANOSSi, supra note 184, at 107. Compare Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen of 1789 art. 5, adth CONST. ARm. OF 1853 arL 19.
187. See CONST. ARG. OF 1853 arts. 1, 5, 101-107.
188. See id. arts. 71-83.
189. See id. arts. 91-100.
190. See id. arts. 32-70.
191. See id. art. 42.
192. See id. arts. 33-35.
193. See id. art. 2.
194. See id. art. 66 (incorporating line item veto); art. 83, § 10 (allowing cabinet ministers
to be named without subsequent Senate consent); art. 83, § 19 (granting president power to
announce a state of siege, with the consent of the Senate required if in session); art. 83, § 20
(authorizing detention of persons threatening public tranquility).
195. See id. art. 74.
196. See id. art. 6.
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rights in the face of external attack or internal disorder, with the
consent of the Senate required if it was in session,19 7 and authority
for the President to detain individuals who threaten public tranquility
for up to ten days while waiting for a sitting Senate to declare a state
of siege. 198 The list of individual liberties protected is more exten-
sive than that of the U.S. Constitution and places particularly heavy
emphasis on economic rights." Under the framework, foreigners
enjoyed equal rights2" and freedom from military service." 1
Most of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1853
were liberals who shared the Alberdian vision and its admiration for
the United States. Although Sarmiento and many other liberals who
recently had returned from exile allied themselves with the interests
of Buenos Aires, enough remained loyal to Urquiza to help him
develop a progressive document. Alberdi missed the Convention,
remaining in Chile as Urquiza's ambassador0 2 and defending
Urquiza against attacks by Sarmiento in the Chilean press. 3
However, the two key draftsmen at the Convention, Juan Marfa
Gutierrez andJos6 Benjamfn Gorostiaga, were likewise indistinguish-
able from the liberals allied with Buenos Aires in their political values
and fascination with the United States. Gutierrez, a novelist and
critic, attended high school with Alberdi,2 4 actively participated in
the activities of the Generation of '37 literary circle,205 and later
traveled with Alberdi in exile in Europe.05 Gorostiaga was much
younger than the members of the Generation of '37, but certainly
read English2"7 and was influenced heavily by U.S. constitutional
practice.2'u  Even Urquiza himself was captivated by the United
197. See id. arts. 23, 83, § 19.
198. See id. art. 83, § 20.
199. See id. arts. 14-19.
200. See id. art. 20.
201. See id. art. 21 (providing that, even if they become citizens, foreigners enjoy a ten-year
exemption from military service).
202. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 557.
203. See id. at 557-58. Alberdi's best known defense of Urquiza during the Constitutional
Convention was a series of public letters known as the "Cartas quillotanas," written at his home
in Quillota, Chile. SeeJuAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, Cartas sobre la prensa y la polftica militante de la
Reptlica Argentina (1853), in 4 OBRAS COMPLErAS DEJUAN BAUTISTA ALBIERDI 5 (Buenos Aires,
La Tribuna Nacional 1886); see also BOTANA, supra note 125, at 340; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at
182-86 (offering analysis of the debate).
204. See SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 85.
205. See id. at 129; 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 214-15.
206. See I MAYER, supra note 97, at 355.
207. SeeJORGE RErNALDO A. VANOSSi, LA RNLUENCIA DEJost BENJAMiN GOROSTIAGA EN LA
CONSTITUCI'N ARGENTINA Y SU JURISPRUDENCIA 27 (1970).
208. At the Constitutional Convention, he was the first to emphasize the drafting
committee's use of the U.S. Constitution as a model. See Constitutional Convention of 1853,
Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 468; see also VANOSSI, supra note 207, at 26 (noting
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States and its history."°  He looked to George Washington as his
model210 and appointed his eldest son the Ambassador to the
United States.21 ' According to John Pendleton, the U.S. Charg6 d'
Affaires, he received privileged treatment compared with other
diplomatic representatives because of Urquiza's eagerness to approxi-
mate the United States' model of government.1 2 He accompanied
Urquiza to the summit of Governors at San Nicolas,218 was given the
first copy of the resulting agreement,21 4 and later received one of
the first copies of the 1853 Constitution.1 5
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1858 clearly were
aware 'both that they were drafting a forward-looking document to
create a system of government that had not existed previously in
Argentina and that the United States, as a successful constitutional
model, could provide authority for their endeavor. There was
surprisingly little explicit discussion of Alberdi or his vision, given the
extent to which the Drafting Committee and Convention relied on his
draft. During the debate on freedom of religion, Gutirrez respond-
ed to conservative critics from an Alberdian perspective, arguing that
that Gorostiaga was famiiar with U.S. constitutional law).
209. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 8 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Mar., 1852,
microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note
74. This letter from the U.S. Charg6 d' Affbires notes:
Should Genl Urquiza continue at the head of affairs, he will exercise a controlling
influence, and will endeavor to conform the work as near as possible to the model of
our own government. He says so at any time and to any body, without reserve-and
his preference for North Americans is undisguised--expressed in the most open
manner.
Id.
210. Urquiza often compared himself to George Washington and was compared to
Washington in correspondence that sought to flatter him. See BOSCH, supra note 168, at 286
(quoting letter from Urquiza to Mitre in 1860 which read, "Without pretending in any way to
merit the glories of Washington I very much wish and endeavor to imitate his example."); id.
at 205, 246, 254, 367, 438, 463 (noting that Washington's portrait hung in Urquiza's living
room), 673 (citing correspondence). When the Constitutional Convention of 1853 sent the
completed Constitution to Urquiza and wished to praise him, it wrote: "The Congress confers
upon you the glory of Washington. You can aspire to no other." Constitutional Convention of
1858, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 468.
211. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 13 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, July 9,
1852), micmfarmed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra
note 74.
212. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 10 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, Apr. 28,
1852), microfored on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra
note 74.
213. See id.
214. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 11 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, June 1,
1852), microfored on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra
note 74.
215. SeeJohn Pendleton, Despatch No. 30 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, June 1,
1853), microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra
note 74.
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it would be impossible to attract foreigners without allowing them to
practice their religion.216 His opponents, alarmed by this aspect of
the Alberdi draft, indicated that the people of their provinces were
distressed by Alberdi's emphasis on religious freedom 217 and that
Catholic immigration could satisfy Argentina's needs.218 Other
references to Alberdi are minimal.219  However, as even the above
discussion of religious freedom and immigration indicates, the
delegates to the Convention understood that a plan of action for the
future was at stake, not the consolidation of an existing system. This
focus on hopes for the future surfaced most clearly in a debate
generated at the beginning of the Convention when Facundo Zuvirfa,
the President of the Convention, asserted that it was inappropriate to
draft a Constitution with Buenos Aires still separated from the other
provinces, with an uneducated populace unprepared for liberal
government, and with the country facing constant hostilities both with
Buenos Aires and within the provinces.22  Gutidrrez, however,
responded that "Iti he Constitution is the solution for these evils: it
is the best element for order because it indicates to everyone their
duties and their rights."221 If one waits, "it is like waiting for the
sick patient to recover before giving him medical treatment."
222 If
the people lack republican customs, then it is necessary to "enroll
them as soon as possible in the school of constitutional life."
22
1
Another delegate then added that "the Constitution is a powerful tool
for pacifying and instructing the People,"224 and a third delegate
described the need to be forward-looking as a necessary difference
between United States and Argentine constitutionalism:
216. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 24, 1853, supra note 184, at 511
(statement of Gutirrez).
217. See id at 512 (statement of Fray Manuel Prez). FriarJos6 Manuel Perez, a member of
the Dominican Order, was a delegate from the Province of Tucumdn. See5 VIcENTE OSVALDO
CIJTOLO, NUEVO DICCIONARIO BIOGPARCO ARGENTIN 432-33 (1971).
218. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 24, 1853, supra note 184, at 511
(statement of Manuel Leiva).
219. Aside from the two references in the text, Alberdi is mentioned by name twice during
the Convention-once to imply (incorrectly) that Alberdi did not favor nationalization of
customs duties, see iU. at 501 (statement of Manuel Leiva), and once to refute that claim, see id.
at 504 (statement of Gorostiaga). In fact, Alberdi's draft constitution clearly provided that
Congress would create customs offices and establish customs duties. SeeJuan Bautista Alberdi,
Proyecto de Constitucid6n de Juan Bautista Alberd4 art. 68, § 5, in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA
ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 341, 344.
220. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 469-
79 (statement of Facundo Zuvirfa).
221. Id. at 480 (statement ofJuan Maria Guti~rrez).
222. I&
223. I& (blaming Argentina's anarchistic and despotic history on lack of good republican
citizens).
224. Id. at 483 (statement of Martin Zapata).
1514
THE AUTHORTY OF A FOREIGN TALISMAN
Constitutions are sometimes the result and many other times the
cause of the moral order of Nations.-In England, in the United
States, the Constitution has been the result of [existing] order and
good custom.-Among us, as in many other parts, the Constitution
will be the cause, she will be the instrument which tempers our
habits and which educates our Peoples.
225
Zuvirfa's proposal for delay did not receive significant support.226
In 1853, the invocation of the United States as authority was not
nearly as pronounced as it would become in 1860, but it certainly was
apparent Thus, Gorostiaga introduced the Drafting Committee's
draft to the Convention indicating that it was "cast in the mold of the
Constitution of the United States, the only model of a true federation
which exists in the world,"2 27 and Guti~rrez repeated Gorostiaga's
statement almost verbatim later in the same session.228 Once the
Convention had approved the constitutional text, even Zuvirfa, who
had earlier insisted that the time was not yet ripe for a constitution,
remarked that Argentine federalism "would be well understood if
understood as that of the United States of the North, the only model
of a federation which exists in the civilized world."22 9 Gorostiaga
also cited U.S. practice on the critical issue of import and export
duties, to justify these being placed in the hands of the federal
government,2 ° and on two occasions delegates felt it necessary to
explain variations between their proposals and the U.S. Constitution,
because of specific differences in local conditions.23' The number
of references to the U.S. Constitution during the Convention of 1853
is insufficient to prove that it had a talismanic function, but the
references constitute an important trend that would become marked
in 1860.232
225. KIL (statement of Huergo); see id at 479 (statement of Juan Maria Guti&rrez) (noting
that there are two ways to form a country. (1) to write a constitution considering the customs,
values, and character of the country, or (2) to write a constitution hoping to create the required
corresponding values).
226. See id. at 488 (voting to proceed with Drafting Committee Report).
227. Id. at 468 (statement ofJos6 Benjamin Gorostiaga).
228. See id. at 479 (statement ofJuan Maria Guti6rrez).
229. Id. at 539 (statement of Facundo Zuvirfa).
230. See id. at 502 (statement ofJos6 Benjamin Gorostiaga).
231. Thus, a provision authorizing Congress to impeach governors in the case of serious
crimes was explained as necessary given Argentina's high level of instability. See id. at 521-22
(statement of Zavalfa). Similarly, a provision authorizing national civil, commercial, penal, and
mining codes was justified on grounds that Argentina did not share the common law tradition
of the United States in which much of this law was based (an explanation that obviously does
not explain why the power to write codes was given to the Congress and not to the provincial
legislatures). See id. at 529 (statement ofJos6 Benjamin Gorostiaga).
232. See generally PADILLA, supra note 185, at 103-07 (describing references to U.S.
Constitution at Convention).
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The Convention approved the new Constitution on May 1, 1853,
and its approval ushered in both a new rivalry between Buenos Aires
and the Confederation and a unique debate between Alberdi and
Sarmiento regarding the nature of the Argentine Constitution.
B. Alberdi (and the Confederation) Versus Sarmiento (and Buenos Aires)
The Alberdi-Sarmiento constitutional debate, as opposed to mere
scrapping over whether Urquiza was fit to govern the country, began
when Sarmiento published Comentarios de la Constituci6n de la
Confederaci6n Argentina (Commentaries on the Constitution of the Argentine
Confederation) in September 1853.233 Although Comentarios displays
Sarmiento's partisanship for the Province of Buenos Aires against the
Confederation, it is less partisan than most of Sarmiento's writing.
Sarmiento begins by congratulating the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention of 1853 for their wise decision to follow the model of the
U.S. Constitution," a surprising start, because he admits he boycott-
ed the Convention due to his differences with Urquiza.
235
Sarmiento's thesis is that the Argentine Constitution must be
interpreted precisely in accordance with U.S. constitutional law.236
To show how this should be done, he offers extensive citations to The
Federalist,237 to Joseph Story's Commentary on the Constitution of the
United States,24 and to other works. Although Comentarios is not one
of Sarmiento's most cited works, the book has the virtue of foreshad-
owing the approaches that the Argentine Supreme Court would come
to take once it was established in 1863.
Comentarios can be read in two ways, and each echos later in the
Argentine Supreme Court's style. One way to read Comentarios is as
an excessively rational work. Noting the identical content of the
preambles of the U.S. and Argentine Constitutions, Sarmiento argues
that "it would be monstrous, if not to say ridiculous, to pretend that
the same ideas, expressed with the same words, for the same ends,
might produce different results in our Constitution or have a different
meaning."239 Having appreciated the success of the United States,
it was the intention of the legislators to assure the same results.
240
233. See SARMINwo, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 30.
234. See id. at 33.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 33-35.
237. See id. at 83 (discussing the distribution of power under a federal system).
238. See id. at 61 (discussingJustice Story's description of the preamble's purpose).
239. Id at 60.
240. See id. at 60-61.
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Further, because the Constitutional Convention adopted a text based
on that of the U.S. Constitution, he argues:
North American constitutional law, the doctrine of its statesmen,
the declarations of its tribunals, the constant practice in analogous
or identical points, are authority in the Argentine Republic, can be
alleged in litigation ... and adopted as genuine interpretation of
our own Constitution. The [Constitutional] Congress wanted the
young Federation, inexpert in the practice of the form of govern-
ment which it embraced, not to launch itself on a new path blindly
and without a guide, and therefore gave it all the science and all
the practice of the only federation which exists.241
Just as ajudge often will look to legislative intent for assistance in
interpreting the law, anyone interpreting the Argentine Constitution
may look to the United States, because the intent upon adopting a
Constitution modeled after that of the United States was to copy its
constitutional system in all relevant detail.' "North American
commentary becomes Argentine commentary; North American
practice, Argentine rules, and the decisions of its federal tribunals
become antecedents and norms for our own. "2 41 The interpreter is
not expected to focus on Argentine reality, but to trust U.S. law to
construct a new Argentine reality. One must understand every
sentence, every period of the U.S. Constitution because it forms an
interrelated whole. 4" Sarmiento's approach is entirely consistent
with an excessively rational approach toward law, that views law as
independent of society and able to operate to shape behavior
regardless of the situation of the society in which it operates. Law
shapes society, society does not shape law.
A second way to view Comentarios, which is probably much closer to
Sarmiento's mind-set, is that it turns to the U.S. Constitution and its
interpreters because of their talismanic authority. It is obviously a big
stretch for Sarmiento to assert that because the Argentine
Constitution's Preamble tracks the language of that of the United
States-"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility"21 etc.-it also adopts all of U.S. constitutional
practice. Although Sarmiento leaves room for variation from U.S.
practice when the Argentine Constitution specifically provides
241. See id. at 59.
242. See id. at 60 (writing that Constitutional Convention had given Argentina both
constitution and case law).
243. Id. at 60.
244. See id. at 62.
245. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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otherwise,2" U.S. constitutional law is more than an interpretive aid,
it must be followed even when one does not understand its reasoning.
At one point Sarmiento compares the U.S. Constitution to an herbal
remedy, and its commentary to the package insert-if you follow the
instructions you can be assured of a fine medicinal brew.147  The
U.S. Constitution and its interpretation have produced enviable
results and therefore a cure for Argentina's past failure.2 41 Its
success has eliminated the possibility of error and taken away
authority to interpret the same provisions differently. "What
arbitrariness or error can be admitted in the execution of the same
dispositions, conceived of in the same terms? 2 49  Sarmiento ac-
knowledges that the reader could dismiss a book on constitutional law
if it consisted merely of Sarmiento's own opinions, but "to inspire the
necessary confidence" he turns to the authority of the U.S. commenta-
tors of the U.S. Constitution.2" The U.S. Constitution exercises
authority not just because Sarmiento understands its reasoning and
an objective reader will appreciate that reasoning, but because
Sarmiento-and presumably his reader-believes in the U.S.
Constitution as a source of authority for the proper way to organize
a government. The U.S. Constitution is more than a source of new
ideas, it is a talisman.
Sarmiento's fawning over the U.S. Constitution was too much for
Alberdi. In Bases, he called for a forward-looking Constitution to
transform Argentina and to create a modem society, but he did not
simply copy the U.S. Constitution.25 Alberdi viewed the Constitu-
tion of 1853 as an original work that took into account Argentina's
political history in seeking to create a liberal society. His reply, in
246. See, eg., SARMIENTO COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 123-27 (recognizing that
Argentina's approach to religion and state is different); id. at 215-16 (recognizing need for
national civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes even though U.S. practice leaves these areas
to the states).
247. See id. at 29.
248. See id. at 60, 69-70.
249. Id at 60.
250. See i&. at 61; ef. id. at 30 (arguing that revisiting the authority of U.S. system will not
inspire confidence).
251. See, e.g., ALBERto, BAsES, supra note 95, at 448 (noting that any constitution must look
at Argentine history and reality in developing a federal system of government); see id. at 521
(describing a constitution as a compromise among political interests); see id. at 389-90 (noting
that Argentina and United States have different needs in the areas of foreign relations and
economic development). Some commentators have described the differences between Alberdi
and Sarmiento as depending, at least in part, on differing views of Argentine history. Sarmiento
simply discards Argentina's past of barbaric caudilos as offering nothing for Argentina's future.
Alberdi never rejects the past as irrelevant and sometimes identifies characteristics that can be
used as foundation. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 263-84; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 122-23,
132, 135, 181-84.
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Estudios sobre la Constituci6n Argentina de 1853 (Studies on the Argentine
Constitution of 1853),2 appeared only three months after
Comentario?53 and begins with blast after blast at Sarmiento's use of
the U.S. Constitution as authority. "To dissolve the unity or national
integrity of the Argentine Republic, it is enough to apply the exact
letter of the Constitution of the United States, converting into States
entities which are and were provinces of a single state."' "To
falsify or bastardize the National Constitution of the Argentine
Republic, one need only interpret it with the commentaries of the
Constitution of the United States." 2 5  Sarmiento's work is "anar-
chist"' and Estudios must re-establish the understanding of the
Argentine Constitution after the "disorder and anarchy" created by
Comentarios.257
Estudios has no purpose other than to rebuff Sarmiento, and
Alberdi does so by making two principal points. First, he asserts that
Sarmiento is foolish if he thinks a foreign model can be imported and
made to work ignoring all local history. Citing Alex de Tocqueville,
he argues that every nation has a constitution consisting of its past
governmental practices, and that this past inevitably carries forward
into a new constitution.' He notes that Joseph Story, the writer
Sarmiento cites most often, devotes long sections of his treatise to
American constitutional history before and after the Revolution
before analyzing the Constitution itself.259 In Argentina's case,
constitutional scholars must recognize its long experience with
Spanish public law, where all power resided in the King. It is "the
product of this legislation; and while we should change the ends, the
means for a long time must be those under which we were educat-
ed."21 That difference in public law traditions between the United
States and Argentina explains why Argentina needs a stronger
Executive Branch than the United States,2 1 and why Argentina
252. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA coNSTITUcION ARGENTINA DE 1853 (1853)
[hereinafterALBERDI, ESTUDIOS], in5 OBRAS COMPLETAS DEJUAN BAUTISTAALBERD1 148 (Buenos
Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886).
253. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 595 n.476.
254. ALBERDI, ESTUDIOS, supra note 252, at 148.
255. IL
256. Id.
257. I& at 149.
258. See id. at 150.
259. See id. at 154.
260. Id at 151.
261. See id. at 157.
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needs greater control by the central government over the provinc-
es. 
2 62
Second, Alberdi argues that Sarmiento misreads and distorts the
Argentine Constitution of 1853 in thinking it is the same as the U.S.
Constitution, because many provisions were written with Argentine
history in mind." Sarmiento's ingenuous focus on the Preamble
to insist that the constitutions are similar, ignores the fact that the
Preamble recites only the ends of the Constitution, not the means by
which it will achieve those ends.2" Argentina's lack of strong
traditions of local government led the Convention of 1853 to require
that each Province write its own constitution and to allow the national
Congress to review the consistency of each provincial constitution with
261the national constitution. Such a provision would have been
inappropriate in the United States with its tradition of state autono-
my.2 Joseph Story interprets the U.S. Constitution as preventing
the federal government from intervening in a state to restore order
if the state's legislature is in place and has not requested federal
intervention. The Argentine Constitution of 1853, given Argentina's
past of provincial rebellions and disorder, allows federal intervention
to put down sedition and to restore public order without a request
from provincial authorities.267  Sarmiento can only claim that the
two constitutions are the same by ignoring their text and the reasons
for their differences.
263
If Comentarios and Estudios are judged as a debate, then any modem
day reader will judge Alberdi's Estudios the winner. The Argentine
Constitution of 1853, while inspired by and modeled after the U.S.
Constitution, varied from it substantially in many areas.269 More-
over, Sarmiento's insistence that a similar preamble means that the
two constitutions must be interpreted alike is obviously ludicrous. But
the tide at that time was moving against Alberdi. Sarmiento was
noted, even among his contemporaries, for his exaggerated admira-
tion of the United States.27° Yet he was able to accurately indicate
that members of the Drafting Committee at the Constitutional
Convention (specifically, Gorostiaga and Gutirrez) declared that the
262. See id. at 159.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 155.
265. See id. at 182-83.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 194-96.
268. See id. at 155-60.
269. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
270. See Michael Aaron Rockland, Sarmiento's Views on the United States, in SARMIENTO AND HIS
ARGENTINA, supra note 147, at 45.
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Argentine Constitution was an adaptation of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 1  With even Urquiza, an old federalist, liking to compare
himself with Washington,272 Sarmiento's approach, not Alberdi's, is
the approach that prevailed in the constitutional reforms that later
followed.
Confrontations between the Confederation and Buenos Aires
continued both during and after the Alberdi-Sarmiento debates.
After an election in which he ran unopposed, General Urquiza
assumed the presidency of the Argentine Confederation in March
1854. He then established a temporary national capital in Parang, the
largest city in his home province of Entre Rfos.273 The next six
years were a period of constant intrigues by Buenos Aires and the
Confederation against each other, with each seeking to obtain foreign
support and to de-stabilize the other.2 74  The Confederation,
however, suffered from a shortage of cash. Despite Urquiza's efforts,
almost all foreign shipping continued to go to Buenos Aires, a city
with over 100,000 inhabitants and the means to pay for goods. None
of the Confederation's river ports had more than 10,000 inhabitants,
and all lacked the merchant houses and market needed to attract
foreign shipping.275 Starting in 1856, the Confederation began to
apply a two-tiered tariff system, requiring goods that entered its
territory after passing through Buenos Aires to pay twice the tariff of
goods entering directly, but this measure mainly increased smuggling
and did little to improve Confederation finances.
Nevertheless, the Confederation continued to muster superior
military forces. In October 1859, armies from the two sides again met
in battle and Urquiza won. 77 The Province of Buenos Aires was not
left prostrate, because much of its army was able to retreat to the City
of Buenos Aires, but loss of the battle did lead to the resignation of
the hard line anti-Confederation faction that had dominated the
government of Buenos Aires, and led to the opening of negotia-
tions.278  Urquiza conditioned peace on the incorporation of the
Province of Buenos Aires into the Confederation, and Buenos Aires
agreed, but with conditions. Under the resulting Pact of San Jos6 de
271. SeeSARMINTO, COMENTAPIOS, supra note 143, at 52. The comments of Gorosdaga and
Gutirrez are discussed supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
273. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 105-06.
274. See id. at 107-12, 134-38, 142-53, 164-94.
275. See id. at 118-120, 132.
276. See id. at 158-60.
277. See id. at 254-55.
278. See id. at 254-60; 2 FLOltA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 88-89.
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Flores,2 79 signed on November 11, 1859, the Province of Buenos
Aires agreed to incorporate itself fully into the Confederation 28" and
to turn over its customs operations,28 but it was also agreed that
Buenos Aires would retain all existing provincial institutions,
212
would have its entire provincial budget paid for by the Confederation
for the next five years (to compensate for the lost customs reve-
nues) ,2' and could block the loss or division of any of its territory
without the consent of its legislature (thereby blocking any attempt
to separate the City of Buenos Aires from the Province as the federal
capital).284 Most importantly, however, Buenos Aires retained the
right to review the Constitution before accepting it.21 Within
twenty days of signing the Pact, Buenos Aires was obligated to
convoke a convention to recommend constitutional changes,286 and
in the event that changes were recommended, the Confederation
would hold a new Constitutional Convention to which-unlike the
Convention of 1853-each province would send delegates in
proportion to its population.287
C. The Constitutional Changes of 1860
Remarkably, events proceeded almost exactly as planned. The
Province of Buenos Aires held a Convention, which ran from January
through May 1860, to recommend changes to the Constitution.
2
8
That Convention's debates and reports were more extensive than
those of the Constitutional Convention of 1853.289 The Convention
was dominated by Bartolom6 Mitre and his allies.29" Mitre had been
part of the group of liberal exiles who initially fought at Urquiza's
side against Rosas before rejecting him after the victory as a federalist
279. SeePacto de Uni6n de SanJos6 de Flores (Nov. 11, 1859), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE
LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 381.
280. See LAS CONSTrruCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, art. 1, at 382.
281. See id. art. 8, at 382-83.
282. See id. art. 7, at 382.
283. See id. art. 8, at 382-83.
284. See id. art. 5, at 382.
285. See id. arts. 1-5, at 382.
286. See id. art. 2, at 382.
287. See id. art. 5, at 382.
288. See Sesiones de la Convenci6n del Estado de Buenos Aires, encargada del examen de
la Constituci6n federal [hereinafter Buenos Aires Convention], in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTrrUYENTES
ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 705, 938.
289. Compare iUL at 705-988 (including not only the floor debates but a summary of sessions
of the committee appointed to report to the Convention, and the Committee's report to the
Convention), with Constitutional Convention of 1853, supra note 184, at 402-536 (containing
debates and reports of the 1853 Convention).
290. Mitre led a political grouping called Club Libertad that won a majority of the seats at
the Convention. See SCOBI, supra note 55, at 262-64, 273-75.
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caudillo.29' He led a "nationalist" wing of Buenos Aires politics
which, like Urquiza, desired a national government, but unlike
Urquiza, wanted one that Buenos Aires could use to control the
country.292 During the course of the Convention he was successful
in a bid for the governorship of Buenos Aires, and took office on May
2, 1860, just as the Convention was coming to a close.293
Most of the work of the Buenos Aires Convention was done by a
Committee to Examine the Federal Constitution (hereinafter
"Examining Committee") of seven persons chosen by the Convention.
Mitre presided over the Examining Committee and he and his allies
held five votes.29 Sarmiento and Dalmacio V6lez Sgirsfield, Buenos
Aires' most prominent jurist, were the most active members of the
Examining Committee in defending its work on the floor of the
Convention. Both supported the Mitre line of sincerely seeking a
national government and avoiding changes unacceptable to the
Confederation.295  Mitre and his allies won all votes at the Conven-
tion except for an amendment from the floor from more parochial
forces that placed export tariffs in provincial hands starting in 1866,
the end of the period under which the federal government was
obligated under the Pact of San Joss de Flores to pay for the
Provincial budget
296
Perhaps even more interesting than what the delegates at the
Convention actually did is the manner in which they used the U.S.
Constitution to justify their actions. The Report of the Examining
Committee reads as though it were Sarmiento's rebuttal to Alberdi's
Estudios, though Sarmiento would state on the Convention floor that
291. See SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 189-90.
292. 2 FLORiA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 75.
293. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 274-76.
294. See id. at 264, 266. Sarmiento indicated that Mitre was the author of the Examining
Committee's Report. See Buenos Aires Convention, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, supra note 288, at
804 (statement of Sarmiento).
295. See, e.g., Buenos Aires Convention, Informe de Ia Comisi6n Examinadora de la
Constituci6n Federal [hereinafter Examining Committee Report], Session of Apr. 26, 1860, in
4 ASAIIBLEAS CONSTrIuVrENTs ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 768 (on the general approach of
making the smallest possible number of changes); id. at 787,791-92 (statement ofV6lez Srsfield
arguing that the Examining Committee properly kept changes to a minimum); id., Session of
Apr. 27, 1860, at 804 (statement of Sarmiento arguing that Mitre in drafting the report of the
Examining Committee wanted to avoid further tensions with General Urquiza); id, at 868
(statement of Sarmiento noting that the Examining Committee tried to keep changes to a
minimum).
296. The reservation of export tariffs for the provinces was proposed initially by Francisco
de Elizalde and Rufino Elizalde at a meeting with the Examining Committee and was rejected
by the Committee. See id. at 853 (statement ofV6lez SArsfield); id. at 879 (statement of Rufino
Elizalde). The issue, however, was then successfully raised and passed on the floor of the
Convention. See Ud. (statement of Rufino Elizalde); see also id., Session of May 9, 1860, at 913
(indicating passage of the amendment).
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Mitre was the author.297 According to the Committee, its criteria "in
formulating its reforms has been the science and the experience of
the analogous or similar Constitution which is recognized as most
perfect,-that of the United States-because it is the most applicable
and is the standard of the Constitution of the Confederation."
29
Moreover, along with the U.S. Constitution, the Committee used U.S.
legislation and constitutional doctrine, without which the Argentine
Constitution would "lack meaning."21
The Committee then justified its approach in natural law terms. It
admitted that "every People has its own way of being," with its own
customs, history, and unwritten institutions, and that no nation can
be organized without recognizing these features."° However, it also
insisted that constitutional principles based on reason took prece-
dence over the actual situation of society."0 1 "[R]ather than capitu-
lating before the facts" the legislator must recognize that 'Just as
custom may influence the law, law may influence custom." °2 "Free
peoples share a political morality and certain fixed principles whose
essence cannot be modified."3 But then the Committee went a
step further and equated the U.S. Constitution with natural lawl The
Committee concluded that:
Given that up to the present the democratic government of the
United States has been the ultimate result of human logic, because
its Constitution is the only one that has been made by the people
and for the people, without taking into account any bastard
interest, without compromising with any illegitimate element, it
would have been as much presumption as ignorance to pretend to
innovate in constitutional law, casting aside the lessons given by the
experience, the truths, accepted by the conscience of human-
kind.'
The United States comes closer to eternal constitutional principles
than anything Argentina might write on its own. Particularly in the
area of federalism, where the United States has been unique,
Argentina has "no right to amend or mutilate the laws of that
nation."305 Moreover, according to the Committee, nothing is lost
in ignoring Argentine practices because there are none. "The
297. See id., Session of Apr. 27, 1860, at 804 (statement of Sarmiento).
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Argentine Republic does not have a single surviving historical
antecedent in the field of national public law."3" Argentine public
law dates only from the Constitution of 1853.8o
The Examining Committee's statements offer a powerful indication
of the thinking of Argentina's political elite, since its composition
included Mitre and Sarmiento-both of whom later would become
President of the Nation-as well as Velez Sarsfield, who would become
Mitre's Secretary of the Treasury and Sarmiento's Secretary of the
Interior, and who later would write the Civil Code. This elite
maintained that the U.S. Constitution offered a superior form of
government to anything Argentina could possibly design. An
Argentine creation could be questioned, but not the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Wlez S6hsfield introduced the Examining Committee's work
with the suggestion that the Convention of 1853 took the U.S.
Constitution as a model, "but... did not respect this sacred text, and
an ignorant hand made deletions or alterations of great importance,
pretending to improve it."3 ° He asserted that the Commission had
"done nothing more than restore the constitutional law of the United
States in the part that was changed." 9  According to V6lez
Sirsfield, Argentines were ignorant compared to the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution. The failure of the delegates at the Convention of
1853 to incorporate the ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
into their document demonstrated only that "those who deleted it
knew less than those who made that great Constitution." ° Accep-
tance of language from the U.S. Constitution rose to a matter of faith
during the debate regarding the jurisdiction of the Argentine federal
courts. Sarmiento admitted that he was unable to answer several
questions about the proposed text that were put to him on the
Convention floor, but asserted that it was sufficient "to know that it
is literally copied from the Constitution of the United States, and
[because it is an exact copy,] if there is anything which is clear and
luminous, it is this part which seems nebulous and obscure to us right
now."311 Sarmiento further insisted, as he had in Comentaios,1 2
that U.S. constitutional case law should be binding on Argentine
306. Id
307. See id.
308. Id. at 791 (statement of VIez Sdrsfield).
309. 1I (statement of Wlez Sdrsfield).
310. Id-, Session of May 1, 1860, at 843 (statement of Wlez Sdrsfield). WVez Sdrsfield used
his reputation as an expert in U.S. law to try to prevent less informed opponents from debating
him. See id. at 853 (statement of Wlez Sdrsfield).
311. 1I, Session of May 7, 1860, at 872 (statement of Sarmiento).
312. See supra notes 233-50 and accompanying text.
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courts."' 3 He believed that the Argentine Constitution should track
the language of the U.S. Constitution as closely as possible "not
because it is more or less applicable to us, but because we will find
ourselves with a case law to which no one will be permitted to say, 'this is my
opinion. ,,14
The U.S. Constitution became the currency of debate. Mitre party
opponents raised some minor opposition to the glorification of the
U.S. Constitution, but even they sought to cite its text and U.S.
practice, though often in error. Thus one delegate sarcastically
criticized Sarmiento's admission that he did not understand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the United States,3 15 but later
tried to support his own proposal that the provinces retain authority
to impose export tariffs by incorrectly asserting that the states in the
United States retained this power.316 Another delegate complained
about excessive praise of the U.S. Constitution and then subsequently
cited it, erroneously, for the proposition that surplus provincial funds
revert to the federal treasury. 17 Perhaps most absurd, however, was
a proposed amendment that required Argentina's inhabitants to show
the Catholic Church "the highest respect and the most profound
veneration,"3 18 that was defended by a conservative delegate with
extensive discussion of how the religious origins of America's
colonization were responsible for its success.3 19  The amendment
was rejected, 20 but only after extensive debate between Sarmiento and
conservative delegates regarding the role of religion in the United
States.2' Such difficulties illustrate that the liberals' invocation of
the U.S. Constitution was a double-edged sword.
Notwithstanding the use of the U.S. Constitution as a talisman, the
constitutional changes proposed by the Convention were entirely
consistent with the needs of the Buenos Aires political elite. Although
U.S. practice often was cited as a justification, the final Argentine
Constitution was largely the product of concrete political interests.
313. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 7, 1860, supra note 295, at 870-71
(statement of Sarmiento).
314. Id at 872 (statement of Sarmiento) (emphasis added).
315. See id., Session of May 8, 1860, at 879 (statement of Rufino Elizalde).
316. See id. at 879, 893 (statement of Rufino Elizalde) (rebuking Sarmiento and arguing for
export tariff proposal); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (forbidding Congress to impose
export taxes); id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2 (barring states from imposing export taxes without
congressional consent).
317. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 9, 1860, supra note 295, at 910
(statement of Esteves SeguO.
318. Id., Session of May 11, 1860, at 921 (statement of Frias).
319. See id. at 916-21.
320. See id. at 930.
321. See id. at 922-27.
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The most significant constitutional changes generally fell within three
overlapping categories: (1) provisions designed to protect specific
interests of the Province of Buenos Aires not common to all provinc-
es; (2) provisions taken from U.S. practice to augment the federal
nature of the Argentine Constitution; and (3) provisions inspired by
U.S. practice designed to limit the power of government or to
increase its responsiveness.
The amendments proposed by the Buenos Aires Convention to
protect Buenos Aires' interests were the most predictable. Buenos
Aires needed to protect its economy, and as a result the Convention
provided: (1) that no port could be favored over any other, meaning
that customs duties had to be kept uniform across the entire
nation 2 (a concern prompted by differential tariffs the Confeder-
ation had used to increase its own commerce at the expense of
Buenos Aires);S (2) that the federal government could not elimi-
nate the customs facilities of existing ports of entry 24 (thereby
eliminating Buenos Aires' ability to continue to act as an international
port) ;" (3) that the provinces would administer export tariffs after
1866326 (when Buenos Aires would no longer have the right to have
its budget paid for by the federal government, as provided in the Pact
of San Jos6 de Flores);127 (4) that customs duties could be paid in
the currency of the province where the customs house was located328
(to create a demand for Buenos Aires paper money) ;s29 and (5) that
the Province of Buenos Aires would only be obligated to comply with
international treaties entered into after the Pact of San Jos6 de
Flores" ° (to put an end to complaints that in drumming up foreign
support against the Province of Buenos Aires, the Confederation had
improperly agreed to demands by Spain that it exempt the children
of Spanish citizens born in Argentina from military service and other
322. See CoNST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 12 & art. 67, § 1.
323. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 26, 1860, supra note 295, at 784
(noting that the change comes from the U.S. Constitution).
324. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, § 9.
325. See Buenos Aires Convention, Sesiones de la Comisi6n del Estado de Buenos Aires,
Examinadora de la Constituci6n Federal [hereinafter Sessions of the Examining Committee],
in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 961; see Examining Committee
Report, Session of Apr. 26, 1860, supra note 295, at 784.
326. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, § 1.
327. See supra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
328. See id.
329. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 9, 1860, supra note 295, at 907-08
(statements of Sarmiento, Riestra, and Elizalde).
330. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 31.
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obligations of Argentine citizens)."' There were also several
provisions that were authorized by the Pact of SanJos6 de Flores: (1)
that the Capital could not be established in a province without its
consent;3 2 (2) that the City of Buenos Aires' deputies to Congress
would be selected with those of the province, treating the City of
Buenos Aires as part of the province and not as a separate district as
the Federal Capital as provided in 1853;'33 and (3) that the provinc-
es would retain all authority conferred by pre-existing pacts,
314
preventing the federalization of provincial institutions such as the
Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires.3 5
The proposals to increase the federal nature of the Argentine
Constitution are more surprising, because the liberals allied with
Mitre had previously usually taken a unitarian position, and Mitre and
his allies would return to that perspective during his presidency.336
However with Urquiza's recent military victory over Buenos Aires, the
liberals became enthusiastic federalists for a few months, since they
worried that Urquiza would control the national government, and not
themselves . 3 7 Theyjustified virtually all of their federalist proposals
in whole or in part on U.S. constitutional practice."M Thus relying
on U.S. practice: (1) The Convention eliminated a provision in the
1853 Constitution giving Congress the right to examine the constitu-
tionality of provincial constitutions,33 9 because the courts could
judge the constitutionality of any norm. 4° (2) The Convention
eliminated a requirement that the provinces provide free public
education, 41 in deference to the provinces' right to develop their
institutions as they saw fit.' (3) The Convention tracked the U.S.
331. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 8, 1860, supra note 295, at 875-78
(statements of Mdrmol and Sarmiento); see SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 269, 291.
332. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 3.
333. See id. art. 38.
334. See id. art. 104.
335. SeeBanco de laProvincia de Buenos Aires C/Nacid6n Argentina, 186 Fallos 170, 222-24 (1940)
(analyzing the Bank's status as a provincial institution that was protected under the Pact of San
Josd de Flores and accordingly under article 104 of the Constitution, and holding that the Bank
could not be subject to federal taxation).
336. See 2 FLORIA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 79-80, 100-01.
337. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 270.
338. See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text (reviewing liberal proposals influenced by
American practice).
339. See CONST. ARO. OF 1860 art. 5.
340. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, supra note 295, at 809
(statement of V6lez SS&sfield); see also i&. at 808 (discussing utility of U.S. practice).
341. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 5 (imposing no requirement upon provinces to provide
free education).
342. The issue was important for Buenos Aires, because it had the most extensive system of
public education in the country, but it was not free. See Examining Committee Report, Session
of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 773. The utility of the U.S. practice of not imposing any
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Constitution to narrow the language dealing with federal interven-
tions,m allowing the federal government to take over the govern-
ment of a province only if necessary to "guarantee the Republican
form of government, repel a foreign invasion, or establish order if so
requested by provincial authorities."' 4 (4) The Convention re-
quired that senators and deputies be natives of the province that they
represent or residents of the province for at least three years. 4  (5)
The Convention established that federal officials could not hold
provincial positions simultaneously and could not vote in provincial
elections if they were not normally residents of the province,' thus
eliminating the risk that officials sent by the federal government
might dominate provincial government. 7 (6) The Convention
provided that the existing constitutional provision authorizing
Congress to write civil, commercial, criminal and mining codes would
nevertheless leave jurisdiction over these areas and family law matters
to provincial courts.' (7) The Convention eliminated federal
jurisdiction over conflicts between branches of a provincial govern-
ment.349 (8) The Convention barred the federal government from
requirements on the states in this area is discussed at the Session of Apr. 27, 1860, id at 808
(statement of V61ez Sgrsfield).
343. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence."); see also Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr.
27, 1860, supra note 295, at 808 (statement of V1ez S~.sfield) (discussing U.S. practice).
344. CONsT. ARG. OF 1860 art. 6; see Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860,
supra note 295, at 777; i&t, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, at 811 (statement of Sarmiento) (discussing
need to adopt U.S. practice regarding federal intervention).
345. See CONsT. ARG. OF 1860 art. 40; id. art. 47; see also Examining Committee Report,
Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 775; i&t, Session of May 1, 1860, at 849 (statement
of Sarmiento) (arguing the need to follow the U.S. model).
346. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 34 (restricting rights of federal officials).
347. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 776;
Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 978 (discussing adherence to U.S.
approach).
348. &e CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, § 11, & art. 100 (providing that the national nature of
the civil, commercial, criminal and mining codes does not create federal jurisdiction). The
effect of the change was to bring Argentine practice closer to that of the United States,
requiring that most private law matters be heard in provincial courts, though there is no specific
discussion at the Convention of U.S. practice in this area. With regard to family law, Article 97
of the Constitution of 1853 originally gave the Supreme Courtjurisdiction over recursos defuerza,
which were appeals from ecclesiastical tribunals that handled most marriage and divorce cases.
See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 772-73. This
jurisdiction was taken away from the Supreme Court in the new article on the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, see CONST. ARG. OF 1860, art. 100, with reference to the need to follow U.S. law on
Supreme Courtjurisdiction. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra
note 295, at 772-73.
349. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 100. This change also reflected U.S. practice. See
Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 781; Sessions of the
Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 871-72 (acknowledging the centrality of U.S.
jurisdictional law).
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passing laws that would restrict the freedom of the press or establish
federal jurisdiction over the press 50 (out of concern that the federal
government could smother local expression). 5  (9) The Conven-
tion eliminated the authority of Congress to impeach provincial
governors. 52
Urquiza's control of the federal government not only motivated
Mitre and his allies to augment Argentine federalism, but also
encouraged them to introduce provisions limiting the power of
government and preventing its abuse. Facing an adversary in power,
their arguments were consistent with the liberal postures that always
had been part of their program. Here as well, the delegates defended
proposed changes on the grounds that the Constitution needed to be
adapted to match U.S. practice, but they also discussed the rationale
behind U.S. practice and its applicability in Argentina. Thus: (1)
Sarmiento obtained the incorporation of an article protecting
unenumerated rights enjoyed by the people,531 explaining that, as
provided in the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it would
protect the multitude of rights inherent in natural law too numerous
to list in a constitution."M (2) The Drafting Committee expanded
the grounds for congressional impeachment and removal of Executive
Branch officers and judges from only including serious crimes to
include "bad conduct,"355 because the people required greater
control over the acts of officials and the U.S. Constitution provided
for impeachment for "misdemeanors."5 ' (3) The Convention cited
U.S. practice to provide that officers named to posts during a Senate
recess would lose their posts automatically if not confirmed during the
next legislative session. 57 (4) Sarmiento obtained changes to the
provisions governing the Supreme Court to make it more flexible, as
350. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 772-73
(citing liberties granted by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); id., Session of May
1, 1860, at 84041.
351. CoNsT. ARG. OF 1860 art. 32.
352. This change corresponds to the U.S. Constitution, but no explanation for the change
is offered. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 778;
id., Session of May 7, 1860, at 857-58; Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at
980-83.
353. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 33.
354. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 1, 1860, supra note 295, at 841
(statement of Sarmiento).
355. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 45 (setting forth grounds for impeachment and removal).
356. Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 981-83 (translating
.misdemeanor" in British and U.S. practice as "mala conductd' or "bad conduct," and therefore
not requiring commission of a crime for impeachment and removal from office).
357. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 83, § 22; Examining Committee Report, Session of May
7, 1860, supra note 295, at 869 (statement of Sarmiento) (emphasizing that the change was
taken literally from U.S. Constitution and reflected common international practice).
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in the United States, so that its judges might be made to ride a circuit
and thereby brought closer to the people.' s The Convention also
made several liberal changes consistent with U.S. practice without
specific discussion of the United States, such as: (1) modifying the
general prohibition of slavery to declare the freedom of all slaves
from the moment they set foot in Argentine territory; 59 (2) elimi-
nating the president's authority to detain persons threatening public
order temporarily, unless he declares a state of siege;" and (3)
limiting the president's authority to delegate to his ministers5 61-to
prevent the exercise of excessive authority by individuals lacking
accountability 62
Regardless of their pledges of fidelity to the U.S. model, the
delegates to the Buenos Aires Convention did not pursue changes
that were inconsistent with the interests of Buenos Aires and its
governing liberal elite. Many differences with the U.S. model
remained, particularly with respect to the authority of the presi-
dent. 3 The impression that the Convention used the U.S. Consti-
tution as its model, however, helped confer legitimacy on its work.
No significant disagreements or discussions occurred in September
1860, at the National Constitutional Convention held to review the
Buenos Aires Convention's proposals and virtually all of its proposals
were adopted." 4  Rather than allowing the provinces to apply
export tariffs after 1866, the delegates agreed to eliminate the
authority of both the federal government and the provinces to apply
358. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 94 (altering responsibilities of Supreme Court judges);
Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 775; i&., Session of
May 7, 1860, at 870-71 (statement of Sarmiento) (arguing that the change would enhance the
judiciary).
359. See CoNsT. ARG. OF 1860 art. 15. The primary concern of the convention that prompted
the change was an unratified treaty between the Confederation and Brazil promising to return
runaway slaves. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 30, 1860, supra note 295, at
829-30.
360. See CoNST. ARG. OF 1860 (deleting article 83, section 20, of the Constitution of 1853);
Examining Committee Report, Session of May 7, 1860, supra note 295, at 868 (statement of
Sarmiento) (introducing change on behalf of Examining Committee and arguing that 1853
Constitution gave too much power to President and circumvented proper congressional
authority).
361. Compare CoNsT. ARG. OF 1853 art. 86, zuith CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 89 (the new version
eliminating the possibility of Cabinet Ministers -issuing resolutions outside the area of their
departments even if specially authorized to do so by the President).
362. See Examining Committee Report, supra note 295, at 780-81.
363. See id.
364. A Committee 'appointed to review the reforms proposed by the Buenos Aires
Convention accepted those reforms virtually unchanged. See Actas de las Sesiones de la
Convenci6n Nacional "ad hoc," Reunida en Santa Fe en 1860, par examinar las reformas
propuestas a la Constituci6n de 1853 [hereinafter Convention of 1860], in 4 AsAMBLEAS
CONSTrrUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 1048-50; see SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 290-91;
1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 525-26.
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export tariffs after that date," a change sought by Buenos Aires
estancieros.3" They also agreed to eliminate federal jurisdiction over
disputes between provincial governments and their citizens, maintain-
ing it only for disputes between a province and citizens of another
province,-67 and agreed to lower the proposed provincial residency
requirement to become a member of Congress from three years to
two.s6 No one mentioned the illegitimacy of the entire reform
process in the face of an article in the 1853 Constitution which barred
any amendment for ten years. 69 The Buenos Aires Convention
amended this prohibition in its proposed reforms, so as to eliminate
the issue, although eliminating the article obviously does not mean
that it was not violated."' The proposed reforms contained nothing
to which the Confederation could object. The Treaty of San Nicols
already had resolved the key issue of the nationalization of the
Buenos Aires Customs House and payments to Buenos Aires to make
up for the lost revenues. Further, provincial caudillos were interested
primarily in maintaining their autonomy, and the changes proposed
by Buenos Aires only increased the federalist character of the
Constitution. No one objected to proposals that slightly weakened the
president's powers, because General Urquiza had finished his six-year
term as president and had turned the government over to a weaker
successor, Santiago Derqui."' All of the principal figures present
at the Convention, Gorostiaga, Gutifrrez, Sarmiento, and Vlez
S~nsfield, shared the Alberdian vision, and all made comments at the
Constitutional Convention of 1853 or at the 1860 Buenos Aires
Convention invoking the U.S. model.
365. See Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1049.
366. SeeJost NICOLs MATIENZO, EL COBIERNO REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA REPOBLICA
ARGENTINA 93 (2d ed. 1917).
367. See Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1049. Compare CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 97
(allowing federal jurisdiction over disputes between a citizen of a province and his provincial
government), with CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 100 (providing only for federal jurisdiction when
dispute is between a province and a citizen of another province). In addition, while the
Convention accepted the Buenos Aires Convention's proposal to free the Supreme Court from
permanent installation in the federal capital so that its members might ride circuit, it also,
without explanation, eliminated any reference to a set number of Supreme Court judges,
following the U.S. practice of leaving this determination to the legislature. See Convention of
1860, supra note 364, at 1048.
368. See id. at 1049.
369. See CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 30 (providing that the Constitution could not be amended
during its first ten years); see also Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1037-59 (making no
reference of any kind to the issue).
370. See Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 968-69.
371. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 290 (noting that Mitre and Urquiza's forces were united
at the Convention, somewhat to the exclusion of Derqui).
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The unity of 1860 disintegrated rapidly in 1861. Buenos Aires was
unwilling to give up its sovereignty to a national entity that its elite
did not control. Buenos Aires' deputies were never incorporated into
the National Congress because Buenos Aires insisted on holding its
elections under a provincial electoral law that permitted its governor,
Bart6lome Mitre, to retain control, rather than a national electoral
law as required by the Constitution.372 Further, although President
Derqui initially brought prominent Buenos Aires figures into his
government to use as a counterweight to General Urquiza,373 who
remained the commander of the army and retained the support of
many provincial governors,3 74 the Buenos Aires elite continued to
engage in conspiracies and develop alliances in the interior provinces
to try to gradually win control of the country. 5 Ultimately, a battle
for control of the Province of C6rdoba ended Buenos Aires' integra-
tion into the Confederation,376 and in June 1861, Buenos Aires
stopped sending funds from its Customs House to the national
government. 77 In September 1861, Buenos Aires forces under
Mitre again met the Confederation army under Urquiza, but this time
the battle was fought to a draw. 8  Urquiza then withdrew to his
home province of Entre Rios with those forces that were loyal directly
to him, and reached an understanding with Mitre that he would
respect Entre Rios' provincial autonomy. In return, he then allowed
the national government to fall into Mitre's hands. 9
Mitre, after taking de facto control of the national government, re-
established constitutional authority on the basis of the Constitutions
of 1853 and 1860, and, in 1862 became the first president chosen on
the basis of a national election including Buenos Aires. During
Mitre's term of office and that of Sarmiento, his successor, gover-
nors/caudillos led significant revolts under the banner of federalism,
but they always were overthrown by national government forces.3 °
Moreover, although initially the City of Buenos Aires became the seat
of the federal government but remained under the jurisdiction of the
372. See id. at 318-19, 321-29.
373. See id. at 293, 302-03.
374. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 508.
375. See 2 MAYER, supra note 97, at 779-81; SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 273, 295, 305-17.
376. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 333-34.
377. See id. at 336.
378. See id. at 354.
379. See id at 356-76; BOSCH, supra note 80, at 563-77 (describing negotiations between Mitre
and Urquiza that lead to Urquiza's semi-withdrawal from national politics).
380. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 126, 129; 2 FLORIA & GARCA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at
103-04, 144-45.
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Province of Buenos Aires,"' ultimately even the Province of Buenos
Aires was forced to submit to national authorities. After a short but
bloody military confrontation in 1880, the Province ceded control of
Buenos Aires to the federal government, and by constitutional
amendment the City became a special federal district governed
directly by national authorities. 2 Mitre's 1861 victory and the final
establishment of Buenos Aires as the Federal Capital ushered in a
remarkable era of stability compared to the chaos that reigned during
the period following independence, and led to the entrenchment of
a number of long-lived rules of mutual security.
IV. THE "REAL" ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION: CIVIL LIBERTIES
WITHOUT POLITICAL RIGHTS
To find the real Argentine Constitution from 1862 until shortly
before World War I, one needs to look to the Alberdian vision in
addition to the constitutional text. Argentina in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries initially offered ample civil liberties
combined with little political participation, as one would expect under
the Alberdian vision. Assuming that an important part of
constutitionalism involves the establishment of rules that provide
sufficient security to all politically significant groups in society so that
they join the system rather than engage in armed revolt, Argentine
constitutionalism was only a partial success. The entrenchment of
civil liberties and property rights, however, ultimately gave the elite
the security it needed to expand political participation as well.
In 1910, Joaqufn V. Gonz~1ez, cabinet minister in two different
(fraudulently elected) administrations and one of the country's
leading legal scholars,' aptly described Argentina as possessing
"two completely distinct ways of life,""s a liberal economic and
social order, and a corrupt political order."s From Gonzalez's
perspective, the country's success was due to its economic struc-
ture, 6 and its adoption of many progressive initiatives, including:
381. See 2 FLoRIA & GARCiA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 106.
382. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 131.
383. From 1901 to 1904, during the second presidency of RocaJoaqufn V. Gonzdlez served
as Minister of the Interior, Minister ofJustice and Public Education, and Minister of Foreign
Relations. For a time, he held more than one post simultaneously. From 1904 to 1906, he
served as Minister of Justice and Public Education for President Manuel Quintana. See 5
CUTOLO, supra note 217, at 372. His chief constitutional law work was MANUAL DE LA
CONSTITUTION ARGENTINA (1897).
384. JOAQUIN V. GONZALEZ,JUICIO DEL SIGLO 0 CIEN ANOS DE HISTORIA ARGENTINA (1910),
in 21 OBRAS COMPLETAS DEJOAQUIN V. GoNzAL 190 (1936).
385. See id. at 191-93.
386. See id. at 190-92.
1534
THE AuTHoRIY OF A FOREIGN TALISMAN
relaxed immigration standards; legislation assuring protection in
personal affairs and work; and protection of "the fundamental
liberties which do not affect the political mechanism of the coun-
try.,3
87
Economic liberty and social mobility lay at the heart of the liberal
economic order. The phrase "the business of America is busi-
ness"388 could have been applied equally to Argentina. Foreign
visitors described Argentina as "the United States of the Southern
Hemisphere," 9 a place where people came to work and became
rich. Money, not bloodline, counted in the social order, and it was
a place where many penniless immigrants made enormous for-
tunes."' Even the sharpest critics of the political elite who dominat-
ed the political life of the country admitted that it was an open
caste.391 Most commerce and industry was in the hands of foreign
immigrants.39 2 Although creole estancieros made fortunes from the
rising value of their lands,393 many immigrants joined them at the
elite Jockey Club and at the Sociedad Rural Argentina, the organization
that brought the largest landowners together.3" Laissez-faire
capitalism governed, and the corresponding constitutional provisions
protecting property and commerce from state control were respect-
ed.3 95
This protection of civil liberties inevitably influenced the political
process. For example, the Constitution barred the death penalty for
political crimes and required due process of law for criminal
defendants.396 Within a few years of the Constitution's adoption,
earlier practice, in which rebel leaders ended their careers with their
heads displayed on stakes, was relegated to historical folklore. In
1863, Angel Vicente Pefialoza, a popular caudillo in La Rioja, was
387. Id. at 168.
388. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 938 (1993) (quoting
President Calvin Coolidge).
389. JAMES BRYcE, SOUTH AMERICA, OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS 315 (Macmillan 2d ed.
1917).
390. See LEWIS, supra note 9, at 13, 16, 18-20, 58-65; LUCAS AYARRAGARAY, SoCIA sMo
ARGENTINO Y LEGISLAcI6N OBRERA 12-22 (1912); A. STUART PENNINGTON, THE ARGENTINE
REPUBuC 323-24 (1910).
391. See MATiENZO, supra note 366, at 320.
392. See id. at 57.
393. The construction of railroads and ports increased opportunities for selling agricultural
products and fueled land speculation in Argentina toward the end of the nineteenth century.
See ROCK, supra note 12, at 139-40.
394. See LEWIS, supra note 9, at 20-22.
395. See GONzALEZ, supra note 384, at 171, 177-78; see also WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 44-45
(observing that foreign writers, influential Argentinian scholars, and others hailed social and
economic progress of state).
396. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 18.
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executed by an army officer without trial after leading a revolt that
President Mitre had charged Sarmiento with putting down. 97 But
the times had changed sufficiently so that Sarmiento found himself
sharply criticized both for the severity with which he put down the
revolt and for the execution, which he claimed not to have autho-
rized."9 ' No official execution for an act of political rebellion would
occur from the 1860s until 1955.3' The change in attitude toward
executions is particularly striking given uprisings in the 1860s and
1870s of federalist caudillos, frequent provincial disturbances, and
revolts with national political significance in 1874, 1880, 1890, 1893,
and 1905. Although heated situations abounded, the government
accepted the need for tolerance. In most instances rebels received an
amnesty or pardon within a few years of their defeat and often
returned to full participation in political life.4"u Even active military
officers who revolted, who conceivably faced the death penalty under
the Code of Military Justice, suffered lesser punishments and
sometimes retained or later regained their ranks. 0 1 Limits on
repression following an armed revolt became part of the political
system.
397. See DARDO DE LA VEGA DiAZ, MITRE Y EL CHACHO 245-46, 317-23 (1939).
398. See BUNKLEY, supra note 161, at 410-11 (noting that Mitre's government censured
Sarmiento for his counterrevolutionary measures); SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 228-31
(recounting that intellectuals praised Pefialoza and denounced Sarmiento for his death); DE IA
VEGA DiAZ, supra note 397, at 330-31 (noting that Sarmiento denied responsibility for the
execution and that President Mitre condemned the execution as illegal). Sarmiento
subsequently wrote a book to justify the campaign against Pefiaoza and his execution. See
DOMINGO FAUSINO SARMIENTO, EL CHACHO (circa 1864) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, EL CHACHO],
in 7 OBRAS GOMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO, supra note 148, at 285 (presenting text of book). He
claimed that under U.S. practice, the execution was justified under martial law. See id. at 376-78.
399. See 2 ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLrICS IN ARGENTINA 1945-1962, at 232-33
(1980) (noting that no political executions occurred in the twentieth century until 1955). There
are partial exceptions to this statement, however. In 1921, dozens of strikers in the Patagonia
were executed illegally by Lieutenant Colonel Hctor Varela, see 2 OSvALDO BAYER, Los
VENGADORES DE LA PATAGONIA TRAGICA 206-09 (1972), and in 1930 several anarchists were
punished for common crimes and terrorist acts that they committed, but their executions also
bore a political tinge. See generally OSvALDO BAYER, ANARCHISM AND VIOLENCE: SEVERINO DI
GIOvANNI IN ARGENTINA 1923-1931, at 52-222 (Paul Sharkley, trans., Elephant ed. 1986)
(recounting the crimes and trial of several violent anarchists of the period).
400. See Law No. 714,July 26, 1875, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 996; Law No. 843,June 29, 1877,
[1852-1880] A.D.LA 1144; Law No. 2310, Sept. 1, 1888, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 438; Law No.
2713, Sept. 1, 1890, [1889-1919] A.D.LA 207; Law No. 3223,Jan. 25, 1895, [1889-1919] A.D.LA
336; Law No. 4939,June 13, 1906, [1889-1919] A.D.LA 703 (establishing general amnesties for
political and military crimes related to prior uprisings, with slight variations).
401. A typical illustration is the case of Colonel Mariano Espina, who provoked the torpedo
boat "Murature" to mutiny during the Radical revolt of 1893 and who subsequently was
condemned to death by a court martial. The Press lobbied heavily for commutation of the
penalty, which President Sgenz Pefia commuted to twenty years in prison and loss of rank. In
1898, President Uriburu ordered his release and reincorporation into the army. See2 CUTOLO,
supra note 217, at 695.
THE AUTHORrY OF A-FOREIGN TALISMAN
There is little doubt that competition for political power was
primitive and corrupt. "Representative" government in Argentina had
two essential characteristics: (1) provincial governors controlled their
provinces, not only controlling access to provincial government
employment and exercising influence over the state legislature, but
also choosing the membership of the legislature and determining
electoral outcomes; and (2) the president controlled the governors.
Jos6 Nicol.s Matienzo in El gobierno representativo federal en la Rep iiblica
Argentina, a classic political analysis first published in 1910, describes
Argentine governors as exercising the "mando"-the power of
command, over all political activity in their province, and as maintain-
ing control through a Tammany Hall style combination of electoral
fraud and patronage. 4 2 The governor controlled most elections in
the province, both for provincial and national offices, through links
that he in turn developed with local political bosses and officials."°
Voters were rounded up and taken to the polls in groups for better
control."' Electoral laws required voters to choose among closed
lists of candidates, each list appearing on a separate voting ballot,"
and the local political boss then would ensure that voters were given
the "right" ballot before entering the polls. 6  If the governor
enjoyed the loyalty of the local chief of police, the mayor, the tax
collector, and the justice of the peace, then he could count on that
district following his orders on election day." 7  Each of those
officials, who usually owed their loyalties to the local political boss,
could use the powers of their office to the detriment of recalcitrant
voters or to the benefit of cooperative ones. °" Voter rolls were a
farce, excluding many eligible voters and including the names of
nonexistent ones.40 9 Double voting was common, as were payments
for votes. ° In the rare event that the opposition won a significant
number of seats in the provincial legislature, staggered legislative
terms, which were common in most provincial legislatures, permitted
continuing legislators to vote to reject the credentials of incoming
opposition members.4" Though a pre-eminent figure in the political
establishment, even Joaquin V. GonzAlez admitted that "suffrage in
402. See MATIENZO, supra note 366, at 196-99, 214, 221-38.
403. See id. at 221-22.
404. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 180.
405. See id. at 178.
406. See id. at 180.
407. See MATIENzo, supra note 366, at 200.
408. See id. at 222-23.
409. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 178-79, 181.
410. See id. at 181-82.
411. See MATiENzO, supra note 366, at 224-26; see also BOTANA, supra note 125, at 183-84.
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the Republic has only been an ideal aspiration of the revolution of
ideas, a written promise in the constitutional documents of the nation
and provinces" but never a reality.
412
However, Argentina was not a repressive place. A. Stuart
Pennington, an Englishman who spent more than twenty years in
Argentina,41 described Argentina in 1910 as a place where, unlike
England, a man was free to do what he wanted.
Another thing which soon reconciles a stranger to residence in
Argentina is the freedom which is so conspicuous an element in
everyday life there..... [U]nless a man be absolutely unreasonable,
he finds that he can do pretty much what he likes without anyone
interfering with him.... Where at home he has been expected to
go to church regularly, or with something approaching regularity,
he finds that, in Argentina, no one troubles as to what he does with
his spare time, so long as he turns up to business at the right
hour.414
This freedom to do what one wanted certainly included freedom of
worship, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. The
restrictions on religious freedom of the colonial period disap-
peared.4 15  Furthermore, although the secularism of Argentina's
presidents in the 1880s and early 1890s made relations between
Church and State a tumultuous issue and led to rupture of diplomatic
relations with the Vatican,416 Georges Clemenceau, writing in 1911
after a visit to Argentina, commented that even the Church had
accepted a situation close to separation of Church and State.417 In
examining freedom of the press, the contrast between Argentina
before 1853 and Argentina after 1860 is equally dramatic. It is
difficult to find a foreigner writing about Argentina during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century who does not comment on the
variety, freedom, and power of the press .4 " La Prensa had an
international network ofjournalists ideally placed for a country that
412. GONZALEZ, supra note 384, at 13, 150.
413. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 7.
414. I& at 322.
415. See BRYCE, supra note 389, at 342-43.
416. SeeArmando Braun Men~ndez, PrimeraPresidenda deRoca (1880-1886), in 1(1) ACADEMIA
NACIONAL DE HISTORIA 269, 319-20 (1964); ROCK, supra note 12, at 55.
417. See GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, NoTAs DE VIAJE POR AMERICA DEL SUR (Hyspamdrica 1986)
(Miguel Ruiz trans., 1911); see also BRYCE, supra note 389, at 342.
418. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 105, 114-18; see also BRYCE, supra note 389, at 344;
WILLIAM H. KoEBEL, MODERN ARGENTINA, THE EL DORADO OF TO-DAY 78 (1907); PENNINOTON,
supra note 390, at 281-89; ADOLFO POSADA, LA REPUBuCA ARGENTINA: IMPRESIONES Y
COMENTARIOS 46-48 (Hyspam6rica 1987) (1912); THOMAS A. TURNER, ARGENTINA AND THE
ARGENTINES 35-36, 240-41 (1892). See gnerally C. GALvAN MORENO, EL PERIODISMO ARGENTINO
212-45, 297-353 (1944) (describing the variety of newspapers existing in Buenos Aires and rest
of country, focusing mainly on second half of the nineteenth century).
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considered itself closer to London, Paris, and New York than to the
rest of Latin America. La Naci6n, a newspaper edited by former
President Mitre, played a major role in encouraging the revolt of
1890, and along with the Socialist newspaper La Vanguardia, was
almost always conspicuous in its opposition to the government in
power.19 Freedom of association was extensive. The Radical Party
participated in rebellions against the government in 1890, 1893, and
1905, but never faced limits on its activities for very long once a
rebellion was over. The Socialist Party-with newspapers, a deputy in
Congress, and workers' co-ops-was well established by the early
1900s. 42" Although until 1912 the political system may have depend-
ed upon fraud, only anarchists were subject to serious political
persecution. 421
Furthermore, the government realized several constitutional
objectives requiring government action rather than mere forbearance.
Although it does not create a right to an education, the Argentine
Constitution assigns responsibility for education to both the federal
and provincial governments.422 Education figured prominently in
Alberdi's social objectives4' and was vital to Sarmiento. 424 Due in
part to enormous efforts by Sarmiento and U.S. school teachers that
he imported into Argentina during his presidency (1868-1874),'
Argentina developed an extensive network of primary and secondary
schools that received favorable comment from foreign observers,428
although primary education remained less than universal.427
419. See TURNER, supra note 418, at 35-36.
420. SeeJACINTO ODDONE, HISTORIA DEL SOCIALISMO ARGENTINO 24-41 (1983) (describing
formation of Socialist Party), 18-23, 265-268 (describing Socialist press), 240-41 (describing
election of Aifredo Palacios to Congress), 273-81 (describing organization of workers' co-
operatives); ROCK, supra note 12, at 187-88.
421. See Law No. 7029, art. 7, June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 787, 787-88 (barring
associations and meetings of persons with object of spreading anarchist doctrine).
422. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 5 & art. 67, § 16.
423. See ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 416-20.
424. Sarmiento wrote extensively on education, his principal works being EDUCACI6N
POPULAR (1848), in 11 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950);
EDUCAC6N COMOjN (1855), in 12 OBRAS COMPLErAS DE SARMIENrO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950);
LAS ESCUELAS: BASES DE LA PROSPERIDAD DE LA REPOiBUCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (1866), in 30
OBRAS COMPLETAS E SARMIENTO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950); see also BOTANA, supra note 125,
at 320-23; Georgette Magassy Dor, Sarmiento, the United States, and Public Education, inSARMIENTO
AND HIS ARGENTINA, supra note 148, at 77.
425. See Leoncio Gianello, La ensefanzaprimariay secundaria, in 3(2) ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE
1A HISTORIA 115, 12330 (1964). See generally Dora, supra note 424, at 80-86 (describing
Sarmiento's efforts, first as director of the Department of Education of the Province of Buenos
Aires, and later as President).
426. See TURNER, supra note 418, at 39 (detailing how much better the Argentinian school
system was compared to European schools); see also POSADA, supra note 418, at 120-23.
427. SeeJUAN CARLOS VEDOYA, C6MO FUE LA ENSE&ANZA POPULAR EN LA ARGENTINA 61, 71,
121 (1973). See generally Gianello, supra note 425, at 115, 132-47 (offering history of public
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Illiteracy dropped from 78% in 1869 to 35% in 1914 among individu-
als over the age of fourteen, 42" and after 1884, public education
became strictly secular, with religious instruction permitted only after
normal class hours.429 The government also respected a constitu-
tional requirement that it maintain healthy and clean prisons
designed for security rather than for punishment.41° In 1911,
Georges Clemenceau commented that the federal penitentiary in
Buenos Aires offered state-of-the-art facilities and the most advanced
program for rehabilitation of prisoners anywhere in the world,"' an
observation shared by other foreign observers.432 He also observed
that the city's insane asylum put those of Paris to shame.33
It would be wrong to paint Argentina as a paradise in the protec-
tion of individual rights. Individual rights probably were not as well
protected in some interior provinces as in the cities, and foreigners
complained about lack of judicial protection from provincial judges
beholden to local caudillos.434  Further, anyone suspected of anar-
chist sympathies was subject to political persecution, particularly
starting in 1910, after a bomb exploded in the Col6n Theatre.4 5
Women were seriously discriminated against in civil legislation,4 6
and the combination of lack of opportunities for women and large
numbers of single male immigrants led to the development of
extensive prostitution and white slavery.47 Workers' strikes were
education between 1882 and 1916).
428. See GINO GERMANI, ESTRUGTURA SOCIAL DE LA ARGENTINA 231 (1955).
429. See Law No. 1420, art. 8, July 8, 1884, [1881-1888] A.D.LA. 126, 127.
430. See CONST. ARC. OF 1860 art 18.
431. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 81-86, esp. 84.
432. SeeJULES HURET, 1A ARGENTINA DE BUENOS AIRES AL GRAN CHACO 131-36 (G6mez
Carrillo trans., 1913) (1911); see also POSADA, supra note 418, at 113-16.
433. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 77-81.
434. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 64 (explaining how government often took control
of small provinces); see also DOUGLAS W. RICHMOND, CARLOS PELLEGRINI AND THE CRISIS OF THE
ARGENTINE ELrrES, 1880-1916, at 104-05 (1989) (describing British government's frustration with
mistreatment of a British citizen by government of the Province of Entre Rios and with
provincial courts); ROWE, supra note 72, at 12.
435. Two pieces of legislation provided legal authority for government repression of
anarchists. See Law No. 4144, art. 1, Nov. 23, 1902, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 560, 560 (authorizing
Executive to expel any foreigner whose conduct makes him a threat to national security or
public order); Ley de Defensa Social, Law No. 7029,June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.LA. 787
(barring anarchist meetings and propaganda, allowing expulsion of anarchists, and prohibiting
possession of explosives and terrorist acts).
436. See Argentine Civil Code of 1869, Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [1852-1880] A.D.LA.
496, art. 186 (husband administers all marital property in absence of prenuptial contract), art.
188 (husband's authorization required to bring law suit), art. 189 (husband's authorization
required to enter into contract to buy or sell goods). This legislation was not liberalized
substantially until Law No. 11.357, Sept. 23, 1926, [1920-1940] A.D.LA. 199. See 1 EDUARDO A.
ZANNONI, DERECHO CRIIL 343-44, § 269 (2d ed. 1989).
437. See generally DONNAJ. GUY, SEX AND DANGER IN BUENOS AIRES: PROSTITUTION, FAMILY
AND NATION IN ARGENTINA (1991) (providing an account offemale prostitution and white slavery
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frequently repressed,' and declarations of a state of siege often
undercut rights. During the operation of a nationwide state of
siege-approximately 4.5% of the time between 1870 and
1930 4 8-- the government censored and dosed newspapers and
detained rebellion-prone elements of the opposition. But even with
the states of siege, which were concentrated largely in the early 1870s
and early 1890s, the situation compared favorably with the United
States and many Western European countries during the same period.
Moreover, the states of siege, declared on twenty separate occasions
between 1862 and 1930, rarely lasted more than two or three months
and were directed at quelling some immediate disturbance.'
Rights other than habeas corpus and freedom of the press were
hardly affected, and even habeas corpus and the press often contin-
ued with little change when the individuals and newspapers involved
were not connected to the disturbances motivating the state of
siege." 1
Not only did the government follow the Alberdian vision, but it
produced the desired results. Argentina received more than 600,000
permanent immigrants from 1881 to 1890, and after a reduction
during a depression in the 1890s, the flow reached over 1.1 million
during the years from 1901 to 1910.' By 1895, foreign-born
individuals represented 34% of the population of Argentina"0 and
more than half the population of greater Buenos Aires.' In 1914,
the percentage of the population born abroad peaked at 42.7%.45
Total population doubled every twenty years, growing from 1.7 million
in 1869 to almost 4 million in 1895 and nearly 7.9 million in
1914.' Although agriculture provided the engine of the econo-
in Argentina).
438. See ODDONE, supra note 420, at 80-124 (offering description of clashes between labor
and government between 1902 and 1910).
439. The 4.5% figure is calculated using the starting and ending dates for each state of siege,
vith the relevant laws and decrees provided by the Legislative Reference Office of the Argentine
Congress. The data used was essentially the same as that provided in 3 REPUBLICA ARGENTINA,
COMISI6N DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES, MATERIALES PARA LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL 26a
(1957). The calculation for total time between 1870 and 1930 spent under state of siege rises
to slightly more than nine percent if one includes partial states of siege that included only a
single province or a small group of provinces facing local disturbances.
440. See id. at 26.
441. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 68 (explaining effect of declaration of state of
siege).
442. See GERMANI, supra note 428, at 82.
443. See id. at 81.
444. See id. at 88.
445. See id. at 81.
446. See id. at 21.
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my,"7 land was expensive and land colonization schemes were
limited,"8 so most immigrants eventually settled in urban areas.449
Argentina attracted enormous amounts of foreign investment,
particularly from Great Britain," ° and by 1914 had 31,000 kilome-
ters of mainly British owned railroads to facilitate its agricultural ex-
ports. 1 As Carlos Waisman explains in his book, Reversal of Develop-
ment in Argentina, comparisons between Argentina and other Latin
American countries are less appropriate than comparison to other
lands of recent settlement like the United States, Canada, and
Australia. 2  However, it was the Alberdian vision, which the
country's leadership followed enthusiastically starting in the 1860s,
that created a political climate hospitable to development of
Argentina's natural endowments. Argentina's elite chose the model
of California as it grew under the United States rather than California
as it stagnated under Mexico. Electoral fraud prevailed, and the
president imposed his will on the provinces. However, free elections
were never part of the Alberdian vision, and federalism was viewed
more as a temporary political necessity than as a practice offering
tangible benefits to the development process. 53  Perhaps to avoid
military service, and perhaps because corrupt elections made
citizenship less meaningful, fewer than five percent of immigrants
became citizens between 1850 and 193 0 .4" Nevertheless, citizenship
was unnecessary for immigrants to achieve their principal aim of
making money. The individual liberties protected under the vision
attracted the needed immigrants, drew in foreign capital, and sparked
the necessary domestic initiative for a long period of rapid
growth.4
55
Although the Constitution of 1858/1860 was the product of liberal
intellectuals, the Buenos Aires elite, and caudillos from the interior,
the Constitution and the rules actually established by the Alberdian
447. See generally DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 141-59 (detailing tremendous growth of
rural production and land tenure characteristics).
448. See id. at 35-40.
449. See GERhIANI, supra note 428, at 84 (describing the tendency of immigrants to settle in
urban areas).
450. See DIAz ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 28 (explaining the connections between the
Argentine capital market and world markets).
451. See id. at 2-3, 29-39; WINTHROP R. WRIGHT, BRITISH OWNED RAILWAYS IN ARGENTINA:
THEIR EFFErT ON ECONOMIC NATIONAuSM 87 (1974).
452. See WASMAN, supra note 7, at 51-58.
453. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
454. ROCK, supra note 12, at 143.
455. SeeRoberto Cortes Conde, Sarmiento and Economic Progress: From Facundo to the Presidency,
in SARMIENTO, AUTHOR OF A NATION 114, 121-22 (Tulio Halperin Donghi et al. eds., 1994)
(maintaining that immigrants were attracted to Argentina because of individual liberties).
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vision enjoyed wide acceptance among most active participants in
Argentine politics until the 1930s. When the liberals in power passed
effective electoral reform laws in 1911 and 1912,"56 and when they
handed over the Presidency to Radical Party leader Hip6lito Yrigoyen
in 1916, they knew that their opponents accepted the constitutional
rules underlying the economic system. The Radical Party's primary
agenda was free suffrage, and its revolts in 1893 and 1905 invoked the
Constitution as a means to support their claims for free suffrage.
During both revolts, and in meetings held with President Jos6
Figueroa Alcorta in 1907 and 1908, the Radical Party questioned the
legitimacy of the government, because it depended on electoral fraud
in violation of the Constitution.4' They did not, however, question
the Constitution itself.' Not only did most of the Radical Party
membership come from the middle class, which agreed with the
Constitution's protection of property and commerce, but many of its
leaders were landowners, sharing the same agricultural-export
orientation as the elite who governed the country until 1916.4"9
Moreover, the Radical Party leadership generally did not betray the
elite's confidence that the Radicals would respect their economic
interests. During the Radical Party's years in power, first under
Hip6lito Yrigoyen (1916-1922), then under Marcelo T. de Alvear
(1922-1928), and again underYrigoyen (1928-1930), the state became
slightly more interventionist, but it never seriously threatened the
elite.4" Examining Argentina generally during the time from
456. The electoral reforms, often referred to as the Sdenz Pefia Law, consisted of two
enactments: Law No. 8130, July 27, 1911, [1889-1919] A.D.LA 815 (creating a secure system
of electoral registers based on military conscription rolls); and Law No. 8871, Feb. 13, 1912,
[1889-1919] A.D.LA. 844 (establishing nearly universal male suffrage for all citizens over age
18, mechanisms to eliminate fraud, and voting by lists of candidates, but awarding a portion of
the seats to the party placing second).
457. See Manifiesto de la junta revolucionaria de la uni6n civica radical al pueblo (1893), in 3(2)
HiP6rO YRIGOYEN, PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO 290, 291 (2d ed. 1956) (giving the text of the
declaration issued by rebels on July 30, 1893, in Santa Fe, after taking over the city); Manifiesto
de la Union Civica Radical alPueblo de la Repflica Argentina (1905), in 3(2) PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO
at 298,300 (declaration issued at the start of 1905 revolt); Informeelevado a la Convend6n Nacional
de la Uni6n Civica Radical (Dec. 1909) in 3(2) PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO at 270, 274-75 (report by
Yrigoyen on his two meetings with President Figueroa Alcorta in 1907 and 1908).
458. See supra note 457 and accompanying text; see also PETER SMITH, ARGENTINA AND THE
FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY 91 (1974) (explaining that the problem the Radicals had with system
was not with the Constitution or its protections, but rather with government violation of these
protections).
459. SeeDAVID ROCK, POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1890-1930: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICALISM
58, 60-61, 95 (1977); see also WAISuMAN, supra note 7, at 83-84 (noting that all social and political
forces in Argentina, with the exception of the anarchists, supported the basic characteristics of
Argentine society).
460. See ROC, supra note 459, at 271-72. To the elite's distress, the Radical Party may have
shown greater sympathy toward striking workers than previous governments. See generally id. at
125-56. It also allowed the army to violently quash several strikes, most notably inJanuary 1919,
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Mitre's election to the Presidency in 1862 through the coup which
displaced Hip6lito Yrigoyen in 1930, Argentina generally lived in
accordance with the Alberdian vision.
V. THE ROLE OF THE TALISMAN
The Alberdian vision, although clearly summarizing the philosophy
that guided the Argentine elite, was hardly ever cited for constitution-
al authority, perhaps because Alberdi spent most of the rest of his life
as a political dissident in self-imposed exile in Europe after Mitre
defeated the Confederation in 1861. Alberdi's work is generally only
cited in Argentine Supreme Court decisions and legislative debates
starting at the turn of the twentieth century.461 By contrast, cites to
U.S. court decisions, treatises and legislative practices formed the
staple of constitutional debate. Writing to the U.S. Secretary of State
in 1891, the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina commented that "[n]o
leading lawyer here is without his complete set of our U.S. Supreme
Court reports."462 Even as late as 1900, Argentina published more
translations and adaptations of works by U.S. authors writing on the
U.S. Constitution than Argentine treatises on the Argentine Constitu-
tion.4" Furthermore, usually only the U.S. works were cited by the
in the City of Buenos Aires. See id. at 157-79.
461. The first time that Alberdi is cited by the Argentine Supreme Court is probably in
Hileret c/Provincia de Tucumdn, 98 Fallos 20, 48-49 (1903), a leading case on the protection
of economic liberties from state regulation.
462. Letter from John Pitkin, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, to U.S. Secretary of State (May
16, 1891) (on file with The American University Law Review).
463. There were only two books on Argentine constitutional law published in the nineteenth
century that offered a treatise-like study, both written by professors at the University of Buenos
Aires. Florentino GonzAez, the first person to hold the new Constitutional Law chair
established in 1868, wrote LECCIONES DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL to accompany his course,
and by 1889 the book entered into its fourth edition. Josd Manuel Estrada was the second
person to hold the chair, and his lectures were published as CUPSO DE DERECHO
CONSTI-UCIONAL FEDERALYADMINISTRATIVO (1895). Lucio L6pez, the third person to hold the
chair, published a less significant book, CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (1891), a short
compilation of lectures. See generally HfcTOR P. LANFRANco, La cdtedra de historia y de derecho
constitucional en la facultad de derecho de Buenos Aires y sus primeros maestros, in 8 REViSTA DEL
INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DEL DEREcHo 63 (1957); Hector Jos6 Tanzi, La ensefianza del derecho
constitucional en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 31 Revista de Historia del Derecho "Ricardo
Levene" 91, 92-104 (1995) (both articles offering a history of the constitutional law chair of the
University of Buenos Aires under GonzAlez, Estrada, and L6pez). Except for the above three
books, only two other Argentine works offered some guidance on a limited number of
substantive constitutional questions: JULIAN BARRAQUERO, ESPiRrrU Y PRAGrIcA DE LA
CONSTITUCa6N ARGENTINA (2d ed. 1889) (this book was originally a thesis and the original
edition, published in 1879, was only a limited edition); and AMANCIO ALCORTA, LAS GARANTIAS
CoNsTrrUcONALES (1881). By contrast, a search of the stacks of the Argentine Supreme Court
Library yielded the following important U.S. works translated and published by Argentine
authors (or foreigners living in Argentina): THOMAS M. COOLEY, PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DE
DERECHO CONSITUCIONAL EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMRICA (Julio Cartit trans., 2d ed.
1898); LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTOS DE LA LEY Y PRACTICA DE LAS ASAMBLEAS
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Supreme Court." 4 The Alberdian vision as expressed in Bases
summed up what the Argentine elite wanted, but it was not a source
of authority; the U.S. Constitution was.
The use of the U.S. Constitution as authority is illustrated in many
nineteenth century legislative debates. For example, one of the
toughest political issues in the 1860s and 1870s was the extent of the
federal government's authority within the City of Buenos Aires. One
of the sharpest debates arose regarding the construction of a new port
for the City of Buenos Aires, by far its most important engineering
project. Initially the federal government under President Sarmiento
sought to undertake the entire project without any participation by
the province, which raised a host of constitutional issues regarding
which government entity possessed the authority to embark on the
project and under what conditions. Former President Mitre, leading
the Senate debate for those opposed to the project, sounded like
Sarmiento in his invocation of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that
because the Argentine Constitution is almost identical to that of the
United States, it is inevitable that Argentina examine U.S. constitu-
tional practice.4" "Our written law is the Constitution, and our
subsidiary law, where we must search to discover the true doctrine, is
the case law of the Constitution which we took for a model."4"
While Mitre criticizes V6lez Sirsfield, then Minister of the Interior, for
LEGISLATIVAS EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DEAMERICA, 3 vols., (NicolAs Antonio Calvo trans., 1886);
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY, EL FEDERALISTA (J. M. Cantilo trans.,
1868);JAMES KENT, DEL GOBIERNO YJURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
(Alejandro Carrasco Albano trans., 1865); FRANCISCO LIEBER, SOBRE LA LIBERTAD CIVIL Y EL
PROPIO GOBIERNO (Juana Manso trans., 1869); FRANCISCO LmBER, LA LIBERTAD CIVIL Y EL
GOBIERNO PROPIO, 2 vols., (Florentino Gonz6lez trans., 1872) (published in Paris, but while the
translator was living in Buenos Aires); G.W. PASCHAL, ANOTACIONES A LA CONSTITUCI6N DE
ESTADOS UNIDOS, 2 vols., (Nicolds Antonio Calvo trans., vol. 1 in 1888, vol. 2 in 1890) (includes
annotations referring to the Argentine Constitution); JoSt STORY, COMENTARIO SOBRE LA
CONSTrITCI6N FEDERAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, 2 vols., (NicolAs Antonio Calvo trans., 1888)
(translating fourth edition of Story's treatise); JOEL TIFFANY, GOBIERNO Y DERECHO
CONSTITUJIONAL (Clodomiro Quiroga trans., 1874); see also NICOL4S ANTONIO CALVO,
DECISIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DE LOS TRIBUNALES FEDERALES DE ESTADOS UNiDOS DESDE 1789
(2d ed. 1886) (translating a digest of U.S. case law compiled by Orlando Bump);JORGE TICKNOR
CURTIS, HIsTORIA DEL ORIGEN, LA FORMACI6N Y ADOPCI6N DE LA CONSTITUCI6N DE LOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS (J.M. Cantlo trans., 1866) (providing a history of the origins of the U.S. Constitution).
A substantial amount also was published in Argentina on the history of the adoption of the
Argentine Constitution. See, e.g., ARIST6BULO DEL VALLE, NOCIONES DE DERECHO
CONSTTUCIONAL (1897); ADOLFO SALDIAS, ENSAYO SOBRE LA CONSTITUCI6N ARGENTINA (1878).
However, these books rarely help resolve concrete cases.
464. One tendency of the Argentine Supreme Court which can be noted in all periods of
the Court's history has been to avoid citation to living Argentine authors, probably to avoid
giving the appearance that any national author enjoys special authority. This unwritten rule
never has applied to foreign authors, however.
465. See Congreso Nacional, Cdmara de Senadores, Diaio de sesione de 1869, Sess. of Sept.
11, 1869, at 691 (statement of Mitre).
466. IK
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showing a frivolous attitude toward U.S. precedent, discussion of U.S.
authors and cases during three days of debate made up the bulk of
the constitutional argument on both sides. 7 In the give-and-take
of a legislative setting, it is difficult to evaluate the respective weight
of principle and partisanship. There is no proof that invocation of
the U.S. Constitution actually won votes. Nevertheless, most of the
membership of the Senate listened to several hours of discussion of
U.S. case law and practice on the exercise of eminent domain and on
sovereignty over waterways before voting to return the government's
bill to the committee for reconsideration.4" U.S. practice was the
intellectual currency of the debate.
The most powerful examples of U.S. influence appear in decisions
of the Argentine Supreme Court, however, because in the case of the
Supreme Court's decisions one can demonstrate not only that U.S.
practice was an important source of authority, but that it was binding.
Beginning in the late 1890s, the U.S. influence begins to decline, but
from the 1870s through the mid 1890s, Sarmiento clearly was the
winner in his debate with Alberdi on the binding nature of U.S.
practice. For example, in 1877 the Supreme Court asserted:
The system of government which governs us is not of our own
creation. We found it in action, tested by long years of experience,
and we have appropriated it. And it has been correctly stated that
one of the great advantages of this adoption has been to find a vast
body of doctrine, practice and case law which illustrate and
complete its fundamental principles, and which we can and should
use in everything which we have not decided to change with
specific constitutional provisions.'
Cynics may respond that this is nothing but "lip service," however,
many situations exist in which U.S. practice seems to have been
decisive in the Court's decisions. One of the best examples is the de
la Torie/Acevedo/Sojo line of cases in the 1870s and 1880s, discussed
below, in which Congress ordered the detention of variousjournalists.
467. The debate occurred on September 11, 14, and 16, 1869. See id., Sessions of Sept. 11,
14, & 16, 1869, at 668-755.
468. See id., Sessions of Sept. 11 & 14,1869, at 689-721 (discussing U.S. practices); id., Session
of Sept. 16, 1869, at 754-755 (voting to return government's bill to Committee to be analyzed
along with a proposal from the Province of Buenos Aires). Ultimately construction of the port
was authorized, but on the basis of an agreement with the Province. See Law No. 383,July 15,
1870, [1852-1880J A.D.LA. 911 (authorizing Executive to engage in engineering studiesjointly
with the Province and to enter negotiations with Provincial government); Law No. 496, Oct. 14,
1871, [1852-1880] A.D.LA 940 (providing forjoint participation in construction of the port);
law No. 585, art. 4, Nov. 5, 1872, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 964, 965 (authorizing construction on
the basis of a bidding process established by the Province); Law No. 755, Oct. 11, 1875, [1852-
1880] A.D.LA 1016 (revising some of the terms of construction).
469. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos 231, 236 (1877).
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Because the results of these cases varied according to the Argentine
Supreme Court's understanding of U.S. Constitutional law, and not
according to the political situation, and because the result in Sojo
simply makes no sense outside the United States, there cannot be
much doubt about the authority of U.S. practice in this period.
A. de la Torre, Acevedo, and Sojo
De la Torte,470 Acevedo,47' and Sjo472 all involved habeas corpus
actions brought before the Supreme Court by journalists detained by
order of the Senate or the House of Deputies. In de la Torre, the
Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction but held against the journal-
ist;47 in Acevedo the Supreme Court required the release of the
journalist;474 and in Sojo, the Supreme Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions as a court of first in-
stance. 5  De la Torre and Sojo both depend on U.S. constitutional
practice, but Sojo exemplifies something further: a decision that
makes sense only in the context of U.S. practice. Sojo can only be
explained by the fact that the Argentine Court finally learned that the
U.S. Supreme Court had decided that it could not exercise original
jurisdiction in situations not expressly provided for in the Constitu-
tion. The rule denying the Supreme Court jurisdiction made little
sense in the Argentine context, because it was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court due to the unique political circumstances Chief
Justice Marshall faced in Marbury v. Madison,4 6 but apparently this
did not matter. In Sojo, U.S. practice was followed solely because the
Argentine Supreme Court considered itself bound by the U.S. model.
Institutionally during this period, the Argentine Supreme Court
functioned much like the U.S. Supreme Court, but with greater
stability. The constitutional and legislative provisions governing the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts were
almost identical to those of the United States.477 The Argentine
470. 19 Fallos 231 (1877).
471. 28 Fallos 406 (1885).
472. 32 Fallos 120 (1887).
473. SeeAcevedo, 19 Fallos 231,241 (1877). A case was brought by de la Torre several weeks
earlier, after the order for his detention but before he was detained, was dismissed by the
Supreme Court on grounds that habeas corpus could be granted only to persons actually in
detention. See id. at 191.
474. Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 408.
475. Sojo, 32 Fallos 120, 136 (1887).
476. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
477. Compare CONST. ARG. of 1860, with U.S. CONST. art. M. With regard to Supreme Court
and lower federal court jurisdiction, compare Law No. 48, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.LA.
364, with U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789; 1 N6stor Pedro Sagi6s, DERECHO PROCESAL
CONSTITUCIONAL: RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO 245, 256-57, 257 n.23 (3d ed. 1992).
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Court consisted of five judges from 1863 through 1960,478 and until
1947, its members enjoyed life tenure without political interference.
(In 1947, President Per6n had all but one member impeached and
removed from office.)479 Unlike U.S. practice, even the chief
representative of the government before the Court was a lifetime
appointee.' This individual, the Procurador General, was the head
of all federal prosecutors and prepared opinions for the Court on
most issues of public interest."1 Members of the Court in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century tended to come from the highest
ranks of the political elite." 2 Moreover, the Court's authority to
engage in judicial review of congressional and executive action was
widely recognized even before the appointment of its first mem-
bers. 
4a
1. de la Torre
The three cases are best considered consecutively. In de la Torre,
the House of Deputies ordered the imprisonment of Lino de la Torre,
the editor of a small Buenos Aires newspaper, El Portefio, for revealing
478. See Law No. 27, art. 6, Oct. 16, 1862, [1852-1880] A.D.LA 354, 354 (establishing a
Supreme Court of fivejudges and a Procurador General). This Court continued in force until
Law No. 15.271, art. 1, Feb. 9, 1960, [XX-A] A.D.LA 9, 9-10, which increased the number of
judges on the Supreme Court to seven.
479. See Fueron destituidos los ministras de 1a Corte y el Procurador Geneza LA NACI6N, May 2,
1947, at 1.
480. See Law No. 27, art. 6, Oct. 16, 1862, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 354, 354 (treating the
Procurador General as a member of Supreme Court, which implies the same life tenure). This
practice eroded in 1989, when President Meneur forced the resignation of the person then
serving as Procurador General, insisting that regardless of prior practice, the Procurador General
served at the discretion of the President.
481. See Law No. 2372, art. 116, Oct. 17, 1877, [1881-1888] A.D.LA. 444, 451 (establishing
Procurador General's role as supervisor of all federal prosecutors and as the government's
representative before the Supreme Court in all cases of original jurisdiction and appeals by
federal prosecutors). The other functions of the office never were spelled out in legislation.
See 4 RAFAEL BIELSA, DERECHO ADMINISRATIvO 991 (4th ed. 1947).
482. For example, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the Court included Benjamin Victorica,
who in addition to past experience as a jurist was a prominent general and had served as
Secretary of War on three separate occasions, once during the Confederation, once under
President Roca, and once after leaving the Court, under President Luis Sienz Pefia. See generally
B ATRiz BOSCH, BENJAMN VicroicA, DOCTOR Y GENERAL, 1831-1913 (1994) (providing
biography with detailed description of Victorica's varied political career). Luis S5enz Pefia, a
former President of the House of Deputies, served on the Court between 1890 and 1892 and
was elected President of the Nation while serving on the Court. His place on the Court was
taken by Benjamin Paz, a former Governor and Senator from the province of Salta, who had
served as President Roca's Minister of the Interior in 1882-83. See 5 CtrroLO, supra note 217,
at 338; Men~ndez, supra note 416, at 269, 279. From 1915 to 1931, the Court even included a
former President, Jos6 Figueroa Alcorta.
483. See generally DARDO PfEZ GuILHoU, PRIMER DEBATE SOBRE EL CONTROLJURISDICCIONAL
DE CONSTIrUCIONALIDAD (1857-1858); 10 REviSTA DE HsTORIA DEL DERECHO 147 (1982)
(offering an analysis of the debate on judicial review that took place when the Argentine
Confederation passed legislation to establish Supreme Court).
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the proceedings of a secret session of the House of Deputies in July
1877. During the preceding years, the Chilean government had
begun to settle scattered points in the Argentine Patagonia, 4M and
the House of Deputies had called a secret session for the interpella-
tion of Bernardo de Irigoyen, the Minister of Foreign Relations.
485
Despite the secrecy, however, El Porteio, a newspaper edited by Lino
de la Torre, offered a general report on the session. It described
Irigoyen as calling for diplomatic negotiations prior to any use of
force, and indicated that F6ix Frfas, a former foreign minister and
now President of the House of Deputies, replied with a passionate
speech calling for expulsion of the Chileans.486 The House of
Deputies responded to ElPortefids article by having its Vice-President
write a letter to each newspaper in the city to advise it that it would
consider any future publication of its secret sessions an act of
contempt against its authority.487 El Portefo, however, although
publishing the House's letter and stating that it would comply with
the demand, in practice did not. Instead, it published the satirical
headline, Special Telegraph Despatch for El Portetio, A Secret Session in
China, Billiant Speeches by the Minister of Foreign Relations and Non-Nan
Friaj. The text that followed then described the second day of the
secret sessions, but replaced references to Argentina and Chile with
references to China and a fictitious neighbor.m The House of
Deputies responded by ordering de la Torre's detention.
De la Torre's detention by the House of Deputies was not due to
his political preferences. El Portefio's politics essentially favored the
484. See MINISrERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES, 3 MEMORIA DEL MINISTERO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES PRESENTADA AL HONORABLE CONGRESO NACIONAL EN EL AIO 1877, at 1-12 (1877)
(providing text of letter to the Chilean government by Bemardo de Irigoyen, Minister of
Foreign Relations, complaining of the incursions). This entire volume of the Ministry of
Justice's annual report to Congress is devoted to the question of Argentina's border with Chile.
The disputes eventually were settled through negotiations. See generally MARIO BARROS, HISrOIA
DIPLOMATICA DE CHILE, 1541-1938, at 295-325 (1970) (describing the dispute and subsequent
negotiations from the Chilean perspective); Carlos Heras, Presidenia de Avellaneda, in 1(1)
ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE HISTORIA, supra note 416, at 149, 225-29 (briefly describing the dispute
and negotiations from an Argentine perspective).
485. See La cuesti6n inzernaciona4 LA PRENSA, July 19, 1877, at 1.
486. See La sesi6n seceta de la Cdmara de Diputads, EL PORTENO, July 19, 1877, at 2. This
newspaper is very difficult to locate, but the relevant pages may be found in the Case Dossier
to de la Torre, Don Lino, stored in Legajo No. 237, Divisi6n Archivo de la Corte Suprema,
Archivo General del PoderJudicial [hereinafter de la TorreDossier].
487. See Desacatos de la Cdmara deDiputads, LA PRENSA,July 21, 1877, at 1; Las sesiones secretas,
EL PoRTE&O, July 20, 1877, at 2, available in de la Torre Dossier, supra note 485.
488. See Despacho telegrnfwco especial para El Portefw, Una sesin secreta en la China, Brillantes
Discursos delMinistro de RE. y de Non-nan Friaj, EL PORTEO,July 20, 1877, at 2, available in de la
Torre Dossier, supra note 486.
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governing coalition of then President Nicolds Avellaneda.4 9 The
reports on the secret session, although satirical, avoided taking sides
and complimented both Irigoyen and Frias for fine speeches.49  De
la Torre was detained solely because the House wanted to establish its
authority, and the House ordered his release the day after the
Supreme Court decided the case in its favor.9
The Argentine Supreme Court reached its decision on the basis of
U.S. law.492 In fact, the Supreme Court took advantage of the case
to make the pronouncement quoted earlier that "[t]he system of
government which governs us is not of our own creation" and
therefore Argentina "can and should use" U.S. doctrine, practice, and
case law "in everything which we have not decided to change with
specific constitutional provisions."493 Even without this statement,
however, U.S. influence would have been clear. Unlike the political
tradition of the United States or Great Britain, Argentina and
Hispanic political tradition had no history of parliaments ordering
detentions for contempt. Reliance on U.S. practice in this area meant
acceptance of an innovation. The Argentine Court noted that in the
U.S. case of Anderson v. Dunn," decided in 1821, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Congress could imprison or fine an individual on the
489. El Porteflo appears to have supported the Autonomist Party of Adolfo Alsina. See Club
Libertad, EL PORTERO, July 19, 1877, at 1, available in de la Torre Dossier, supra note 486
(trumpeting a meeting of Club Libertad, a political club led by Hctor Varela, an Autonomist).
The Autonomist Party was one of the two main parties of Buenos Aires politics, and at the time
supported the government. Adolfo Alsina, the Minister of War, and Bernardo de Irigoyen, the
Minister of Foreign Relations, also were Autonomists.
490. See supra notes 486, 459 and accompanying text.
491. See Congreso Nacional, Cdmara de Diputados, Diario de sesione de 1877, Session of Aug.
22, 1877, at 566 (voting in favor of de la Torre's release).
Interestingly, de la Torre's arrest was incredibly clumsy. The Vice President of the House of
Deputies gave the Buenos Aires Police Chief a controversial search warrant authorizing him to
enter uninvited into any home anywhere in search of de la Torre. See Los Portefios sin garant(as,
EL PORTElao, July 23, 1877, at 1. In spite of this broad authorization, de la Torte managed to
escape when twenty policemen burst into the house of a friend where he was hiding. See
Violaci6n del domicilioy de la ley, LA PRENsA, July 24, 1877, at 1. De la Torre's capture/surrender
may well have been negotiated in order to have his case heard by the Supreme Court, because
the Court refused to hear the case while he remained out of custody. See de la Torte, 19 Fallos
190 (1877). La Prensa makes no mention of de la Torre's capture.
492. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos at 231 (1877).
493. I& at 236. This is not to say that all members of the Court understood U.S. case law
as binding in exactly the same way. Benjamfn Gorostiaga, in a dissent in Dvila c/Valdes, 23
Fallos 726 (1881), describes his dissent on ajurisdictional issue as looking at the letter and spirit
of the jurisdictional statute, the legislative history, the Court's own precedents, U.S. Supreme
Court precedents, and U.S. commentators and legislation. See id. at 739. Although he does not
explicitly rank these sources of authority, because he offers these sources in a list, it certainly
could be understood as a ranking. SeeVANOSSI, supra note 207, at 89 (describing list as ranking
of sources).
494. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
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basis of its contempt powers.495 Furthermore, Kent's and Story's
treatises on constitutional law both insisted that congressional
contempt powers were necessary for Congress to maintain its
authority, and that such powers existed for acts occurring both inside
and outside the legislative chambers.496 Naturally, if the U.S.
Congress enjoyed contempt powers so did the Argentine Con-
gress.497  The situation, according to the Argentine Court, would
have been different if Congress had sought to exercise ordinary
criminal jurisdiction,49 but the conduct here was not covered by a
criminal statute.
The one dissent in de la Torre, by Judge Laspiur, only heightens the
importance of the case as a landmark on the role of the U.S.
Constitution. Judge Laspiur's dissent focuses on his disagreement
with the binding nature of U.S. precedent.4 Although he recog-
nized that the U.S. Supreme Court favored Congress in Anderson,°
Judge Laspiur argued that, because British practice here was superior,
Argentina appropriately could follow the British practice instead.501
Under British practice, a prior law was required identifying the
circumstances under which an individual would be held in contempt
of parliament,52 thus avoiding arbitrary use of congressional power
and improper punishment through an ex post facto legislative
decision. 3 Most of the Court insisted on U.S. precedent, however,
which meant creation of a new Argentine practice-detentions
ordered by a House of Congress.
2. Acevedo
United States law also helped ensure that the new practice turned
out to be very limited in scope, however. In 1885, the Argentine
Supreme Court ruled in Acevedo that Congress could not hold a
journalist in contempt for defaming a member of Congress, because
such defamation was penalized under federal criminal law.' 4 In de
la Torre, the Court had specifically noted that it was not ruling in a
situation where Congress sought to usurp ordinary criminal jurisdic-
495. See de 1a Torre, 19 Fallos at 237, 238 (citing Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 204).
496. See id. at 237.
497. See id.
498. See id. at 239.
499. See id.
500. See id. at 246-47.
501. See id. at 247-49.
502. See id. at 244-48.
503. See id. at 249-51 (citing art. 18 of the 1860 Argentine Constitution, regarding ex post
facto laws).
504. SeeAcevedo, 28 Fallos 406, 408 (1885).
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don, but in a case involving breach of congressional secrets where
there was no statute on point and Congress had no other way to
protect itself. 5 Acevedo involved this exception, and the Court held
that the existence of a criminal statute penalizing defamation of a
member of Congress meant that Congress had granted jurisdiction
over defamation to the courts and could not reclaim it whenever it
wished to exercise jurisdiction itself."°
Unlike the Court in de la Torte, the Court in Acevedo did not focus
on U.S. practice. The Argentine Supreme Court, however, was aware
that its opinion was at least generally consistent with recent trends in
U.S. law that took a restrictive view of Congress' contempt power.50 7
The Procurador General's opinion had favored Acevedo's release,
emphasizing that Congress did not need to use its implicit contempt
powers when the conduct in which the individual was engaged was
already penalized in criminal legislation. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently had declared a congressionally ordered detention
unconstitutional in Kilbourne v. Thompson,"08 in a move that limited
the scope of its earlier decision in Anderson v. Dunn.5  Kilbourne
involved the failure of a witness to appear at a congressional hearing
and explicitly limited Anderson, stating that Congress could not use its
contempt power when the matter at issue was outside its compe-
tence.510 Kilbourne, a poorly written decision, never indicates the
scope of congressional competence, nor fully explains why the
investigation of a local real estate scandal is outside of Congress'
competence. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court did emphasize
that the matter at issue already was the subject of ajudicial investiga-
tion, and in finding that Congress had exceeded its authority, it seems
to have been influenced heavily by the fact that the judiciary already
had intervened.' Acevedo-by stating that Congress' contempt
power does not extend to cases subject to judicial jurisdiction-is
more precise than Kilbourne and could almost be described as a
refinement and elaboration of its underlying principles. Although
only the Procurador General's brief analyzed Kilbourne, the Argentine
Supreme Court at the very least was aware of the decision from the
505. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos at 240-41.
506. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 408.
507. See id. at 472-73.
508. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
509. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 472-73 (opinion of the Procurador General) (citing Kilbourne
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) and Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)).
510. See Kilhourne, 103 U.S. at 196-97 (denying Congress power to fine or imprison a person
merely by asserting that person's guilt or contempt).
511. See id. at 194-96 (questioning propriety of congressional interference with suit pending
in court with proper jurisdiction).
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Procurador General's brief, and in practice wrote an improved version
of the Kilbourne holding.
3. Sojo and Marbury's shadow
The Acevedo decision is of interest primarily for the contrast it offers
to the Court's 1887 decision in Sojo, only two years later. Both Acevedo
and Sojo involved defamations that generated anger in Congress,
decisions by Houses of Congress to detain the responsible journalist,
and habeas corpus petitions filed directly with the Supreme
Court."' In Acevedo, El Debate, a newspaper owned by Eliseo
Acevedo, had accused a Senator of manipulating legislation for his
own self interest, claiming that he sponsored a bill creating a reward
for anyone introducing pink salmon into Argentine rivers in order to
share in the reward himself."' In Sojo, the offense consisted of a
political cartoon that defamed a Deputy 14 If anything, Sojo pre-
sented the more attractive case for blocking Congress. The Deputy
defamed in Sojo cut a particularly unsympathetic figure when he
raised the issue of Sojo's cartoon on the House floor, coarsely calling
Sojo a "fetid flea" and a "galleguito" (an offensive twist on the term
"gallego," itself a moderately offensive term used to refer to Spanish
immigrants).515 Moreover, there is no difference in the political
circumstances surrounding the two cases that would lead one to
expect greater Supreme Court support for Congress in Sojo than in
Acevedo.516 Due to U.S. practice, however, Sojo resulted in dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.517 Moreover, the issue was
512. See Sojo, 32 Fallos 120, 121 (1887); Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 406-08.
513. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 407. The full text of the El Debate article may be found in
Cdmara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones de 1885, Session of July 14, 1885, at 73 (statement of
Zapata).
514. See Prisi6n del seforr Sob, LA PRENSA, Sept. 6, 1887, at 5.
515. See CGmara de Diputados, Diarlo de sesiones de 1887, Session of Sept. 5, 1887, at 826-827
(statement of Mansilla). The Deputy's abusive remarks were criticized by the press, see Pisin
del seifor Sojo, LA PRENsA, Sept. 6, 1887, at 5.
516. While Lucio Mansilla, the Deputy defamed by Sojo, was an ally of the President, Carlos
Jurez Cdlman and the leader of the pro-Jufrez C6iman majority in the House, SenatorJos6
Vicente Zapata, the Senator defaned byAcevedo two years earlier, was a rising star in Argentine
politics. Only thirty-four years old at the time, Zapata already had served as President of the
Supreme Court of Mendoza and in the House of Deputies. Before his death in 1897, at age
forty-six, he would serve as Minister of the Interior under President Pellegrini and as Minister
ofJustice, Religion, and Public Instruction under President Luis Sdienz Pefia. See 4 CUToLo,
supra note 217, at 374-78 (describing Mansilla's career); id. at 775-76 (describing Zapata's
career). Nothing occurred politically between 1885 and 1887 that indicates that SoFowas decided
under less favorable political circumstances for the Court than Acevedo.
517. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 121.
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not raised by the parties, but on the Supreme Court's own motion,
and only then was it briefed by the Procurador General."'8
Articles 100 and 101 of the Argentine Constitution of 1860 closely
follow Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, 19 and U.S.
practice dating back to Marbury v. Madison52° has long held that the
list of situations in Article III under which the U.S. Supreme Court
exercises original jurisdiction is comprehensive. 2' Under U.S.
practice, the only instances in which the Supreme Court enjoys
original jurisdiction are those where the case affected "Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall
be a Party." 22  Otherwise the Supreme Court could hear cases only
518. Case Dossier to Sojo, Don Eduardo, interpone el recurso de htbeas corpus (hereinafter
Sojo Dossier], stored in Legajo No. 327, Divisi6n Archivo de la Corte Suprema, Archivo General
del Poder Judicial (order by Benjamin Victorica, the President of the Court, instructing the
Procurador General to brief the issue ofjurisdiction).
519. The Argentine Constitution of 1860 provides:
Art. 100-The Supreme Court and the lower courts of the Nation shall hear and
decide all cases that deal with points governed by the Constitution, and by the laws of
the Nation, with the limitation established in part 11 of article 67 [for matters
governed by the civil, commercial penal and mining codes], and by treaties with
foreign nations, of cases concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls, of
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, of the matters in which the Nation is a
party, of cases that arise between two or more provinces, between a province and the
residents of another, between residents of different provinces, and between a province
or its residents against a foreign state or citizen.
Art. 101-In these [above] cases the Supreme Court will exercise appellate jurisdiction
according to the rules and exceptions prescribed by Congress, but in matters
concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls and those in which a province
is a party it will exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
CONST. ARG. OF 1860 arts. 100, 101.
The U.S. Constitution reads:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consus;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-betyleen Citizens
of different States,--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
520. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803).
521. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803) (holding that the list of
situations where Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in Constitution is exclusive and that
Congress may not add to it).
522. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-75 (interpreting article III,
section 2).
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as an appellate tribunal.5" As almost all U.S. law students today
learn in their constitutional law courses, however, the reason for this
interpretation has much more to do with the political events
surrounding ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in Marbury in 1803 than
with the constitutional text.
Marbury concemed a demand by William Marbury, appointed a
justice of the peace for the District of Columbia during the closing
days of the Adams Administration, that the Jefferson Administration
deliver his commission and allow him to assume office. 24 President
Jefferson opposed the principle ofjudicial review and regarded Chief
Justice Marshall as a political opponent. When Marbury brought his
case directly to the Supreme Court, Marshall realized that Jefferson
was likely to ignore any writ of mandamus by the Court that ordered
him to give Marbury his Commission. Marshall, however, wished to
use Marbury to establish the principle ofjudicial review yet not leave
the Court vulnerable to subsequent defiance by the President.
52
Marshall's response was politically brilliant. Instead of issuing an
order that could be defied, Marshall declared the Judiciary Act of
1789 unconstitutional when it authorized the Supreme Court to issue
a writ of mandamus. He argued that writs of mandamus were a
function of courts of first instance, and given the limited list of
occasions of original jurisdiction listed in Article III of the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ demand-
ed.526 Marshall's argument was questionable in its interpretation of
both the Judiciary Act of 1789, as providing for original jurisdic-
tion,527 and of the Constitution, as not allowing Congress to expand
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. However, the argument
523. See infra note 531 and accompanying text.
524. See Marbuty, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153-54.
525. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25-27 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing how Marshall established doctrine ofjudicial review while limiting the Court's clash
with the Jefferson administration); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrrIcs 2 (Yale University Press 2d ed. 1962);
George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power John Marshall, 1801-15, in THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
203-04 (1981).
526. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-SO.
527. It was not necessary for Marshall to read the provision on writs of mandamus as
referring to situations other than those constitutionally within the Court's originaljurisdiction.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 actually uses much of the same language as article III,
section 2 of the Constitution and only authorizes writs of mandamus "in cases warranted by the
principles and usages of law." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81. There is
nothing in section 13 of theJudiciaryAct to indicate that Congress intended the Supreme Court
to exercise original jurisdiction in cases like Marbury's, where a citizen brings an action against
an officer of the federal government. Likewise, the statute, by referring to the "principles and
usages of law" hardly could be reasonably read as providing for the issuance of writs of
mandamus when these were not warranted under the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. See id.
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had the virtue of allowing the Supreme Court to declare a law
unconstitutional under a circumstance in which the Court's authority
could not be questioned. 2 Given that the Court's ruling involved
a refusal to hear a case,529 the Executive had no order that it might
refuse to refuse to enforce.
One side effect of Justice Marshall's political brilliance in Marbury
was to bind the U.S. Supreme Court to the rule that Congress could
not expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to allow it to
hear habeas corpus actions as a court of first instance. The impor-
tance of Marbury as a precedent meant that the Court could never
read Article HI of the Constitution as allowing Congress to expand its
original jurisdiction, even though the Article certainly may be read as
allowing it.5  The Court could have read Article III as providing a
list of when original jurisdiction must be permitted, creating an
irrevocable privilege for Ambassadors and States to litigate before the
Supreme Court, but not barring Congress from adding other types of
cases to the Court's original jurisdiction. Subsequent case law and
commentary following Marbury, however, consistently maintained that
the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions or any other kind of action not involving an ambassador or
a state.5 3' Regardless of the ambiguity of Article III of the Constitu-
tion, Marbury's political importance made it too central a constitution-
al precedent to overturn.
What is remarkable, however, is that the Argentine Supreme Court
was similarly bound to Marbury. The circumstances surrounding
Marbury certainly had nothing in common with those in Sjo in
1887.532 Considering that the defamed Deputy cut a very unsympa-
528. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court.").
529. See Marbuty, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-76 (declaring Marbury's claim as outside the
competence of the Court).
530. See supra note 519 (providing text of Article III).
531. SeeEx Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 341 (1879) (noting that writ of habeus corpus could
not be granted if it were an exercise of original jurisdiction); Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 243, 252 (1863) (restating rule of construction that affirmative grant of original
jurisdiction in the Constitution as to some cases must be construed as denial of original
jurisdiction in all other cases); In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 119 (1852) (Curtis, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court may issue a writ of habeus corpus only as an exercise of its
appellate, not original jurisdiction); see also Ex Parte Milbum, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 705
(Marshall, CJ.) (requiring appellant to show that habeas corpus relief sought was being sought
from the Supreme Court only in an appellate capacity provided in the Constitution). 3JOsEIH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUMON OF THE UNITED STATES § 1697 (Fred B. Rothman
& Co. 1991) (1833) (stating general rule that Congress cannot expand the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction beyond the list provided in Article III).
532. See supra notes 514-18 and accompanying text (providing fhctual backround of Sojo
case).
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thetic figure both law and politics argued in favor of jurisdiction in
Sojo, and unlike Marbury, there was no risk of non-compliance with
any Court order. The police had complied with the Argentine
Supreme Court's order immediately in Acevedo only two years before,
and when Sojo subsequently refiled his habeas corpus petition before
the federal district court, the district court judge ruled in his favor,
and the police immediately released him."8 In holding that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, the Argentine Supreme Court
followed U.S. practice because it felt obliged to follow U.S. law, not
because political convenience dictated avoiding jurisdiction.
In the absence of the U.S. precedent, the arguments in favor of
jurisdiction in Sojo would have been overwhelming. Those arguments
were developed fully by both the Procurador General and by Calixto
de la Torre, one of two judges who dissented in Sojo.51 First, Law
48 leaves no doubt that Congress intended the Supreme Court to
exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction. Article 20 of Law 48 states that
"[either] the Supreme Court or the district courtjudges will have the
power, at the request of a prisoner or his friends or relatives, to
investigate the origins of the imprisonment, and.., to order that the
prisoner immediately be placed at liberty."5 Second, this law was
drafted by jurists who presumably were acting consistently with the
intent of the Constitutional Convention,"6 having been members of
the first Supreme Court. 7 Third, there is no reason to read the
text of the Constitution as limiting the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in the event that Congress decided to expand it.
Article 101 of the Argentine Constitution (like Article III of the U.S.
Constitution) creates a privilege for foreign diplomats and provincial
governments to litigate before the Supreme Court.5" It states that
"in matters concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls
and those in which a province is a party [the Supreme Court] will
533. See Libertad del sefor Sojo, LA PRENSA, Sept. 28, 1887, at 5.
534. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 120, 137 (Calixto de la Torre dissenting); see also id. at 123
(Procurador General's opinion) (taking as "a given" the fact that Law No. 48 seeks to provide
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over habeas corpus).
535. Law No. 48, art. 20, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.LA. 364, 369.
536. See Sjo, 32 Fallos at 138-39 (de la Torre, J., dissenting).
537. The Supreme Court itself wrote the original draft of the law governing federal
jurisdiction, and the provisions on the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction do not appear to
have been modified by Congress. SeeCongreso Nacional, Cdmara de Senadores, Diario desesiones
de 1863, Session of June 27, 1863, at 203 (statement by Minister of Justice Eduardo Costa);
Congreso Nacional, Cgmara de Diputados, Diado de sesione de 1863, Session of Aug. 3, 1863, at
321 (statement of Ruiz Moreno); CLODOMIRO ZAVALIA, HISTORIA DE 1A CORTE SUPREMA DE
JUSTICIA DE LA REPC)BLICA ARGENTINA EN REiACI6N CON SU MODELO AMERICANO 61-62,78 (1920).
538. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 101.
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exercise exclusive original jurisdiction."5 9 It does not state that
Congress cannot extend this privilege.1 Fourth, as a general rule
of constitutional interpretation, it was inappropriate for the Argentine
Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, in this case Article
20 of Law 48, unless Congress had clearly violated the Constitution.
Reasonable congressional interpretations of the Constitution should
be respected, and the congressional interpretation of Article 101 in
passing Law 48 is at least as reasonable as that of the Supreme
Court.54 Fifth, the Supreme Court's precedents consistently had
permitted jurisdiction. The Court already had heard habeas corpus
actions as a court of first instance on five different occasions.
542
The Procurador General's opinion begins by listing the many habeas
corpus cases that the Supreme Court already had decided under its
original jurisdiction, and concludes with an almost sarcastic note that
"now the doubt has arisen that we have all been mistaken all
along."' 43
The Argentine Supreme Court's decision simply ignores these
arguments by focusing on U.S. case law and commentary.544 It
discusses Marbury as the original source of the doctrine that Congress
cannot expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction." The
Court did not ignore the Argentine constitutional text, but merely
compared both constitutional texts and applied all the same argu-
ments used by the U.S. Supreme Court.546 Apparently, the Argen-
tine Court felt that it now properly understood U.S. practice and,
therefore, wished to correct its past errors.
Citation to U.S. case law was not limited to the majority opinion.
In spite of the other arguments at their disposal, Sojo's attorney and
the Procurador General both felt obliged to argue that U.S. law
permitted jurisdiction. 547  Probably sensing the direction of the
Court's inclination, both cited U.S. precedents that they claimed
539. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 101.
540. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 139-40 (de la Torre, J., dissenting); id. at 124-125 (Procurador
General's opinion).
541. See id. at 140-41 (de Ia Torre, J., dissenting); see also id. at 125 (Procurador General's
opinion) (emphasizing that Congress has reasonably interpreted the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction as subject to expansion).
542. See id. at 123.
543. Id.
544. See id. at 130-34.
545. See id. at 132.
546. See id. at 126-29.
547. See Sojo's Brief onJurisdiction, in Sojo Dossier, supra note 518, at 64-68; see also Sojo, 32
Fallos at 124 (Procurador General's opinion).
1558
1997] THE AUTHORIY OF A FOREIGN TALISMAN 1559
supported Supreme Court original jurisdiction in habeas corpus
cases. 4 The Argentine Supreme Court examined their citations,
however, and correctly noted that they all involved habeas corpus
petitions against judicially ordered detentions, and therefore involved
only appellate review. 49 Only Calixto de la Torre's dissent admitted
that "[o]ne cannot in truth ignore the weight of authority that
supports the [majority's position], having as it does as a basis various
decisions of the North American courts.""' He insisted, however,
that merely because the U.S. Supreme Court found itself trapped by
stare decisis did not mean that the Argentine Supreme Court had to be
bound by its mistakes.55 '
The decisions in de la Torre, Acevedo, and Sojo not only illustrate the
Argentine Court's willingness to follow U.S. case law, but also, in Sojo,
to put its own precedents aside in order to follow U.S. law. Tradition-
ally, both the Argentine Supreme Court and lower courts took the
Argentine Supreme Court's precedents seriously. At least through the
1890s, Argentine Supreme Court precedents were regarded as binding
on the lower courts.552 There was some dispute as to whether they
were legally binding55 or only morally binding due to the Supreme
Court's prestige and the desire to avoid unnecessary appeals;5' but
as a practical matter there is little difference between the two
approaches.55 Regarding the Supreme Court itself, the Court
regularly cited its own precedents and sought to follow them,5 6 and
548. See Sojo Dossier, supra note 518, at 64-68; see also Sijo, 32 Fallos at 124-45 (construing
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in favor of finding original jurisdiction).
549. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 129-30.
550. Id. at 141 (Calixto de la Torre dissenting).
551. See id.
552. For examples of lower court judges treating Argentine Supreme Court case law as
binding, see Watteau c/Serpa, 81 Fallos 311,314 (1899); Videla c/Garda Aguilera, 9 Fallos 53,
54 (1870); and Balmaceda y Cfa c/Fsco Nacional, 6 Fallos 159, 160 (1868).
553. See supra note 552 and accompanying text.
554. See Pastorino c/Ronill6n, Marini y Cfa, 25 Fallos 364, 368 (1883).
555. See generally 1 Sag-ias, supra note 477, §§ 81-82 (reviewing treatment of Supreme Court
precedent during Court's early years); JUAN CARLOS HrrrERs, TVCNICA DE LOS RECURSOS
EXTRAORDMAPJOS Y DE LA CASACi6N §§ 73-74 (1991) (same).
556. Dozens of examples of the Argentine Supreme Court following its own case law during
the nineteenth and early twentieth century exist. One example is the Supreme Court's refusal
to allow federal jurisdiction in defamation actions against the press, with the Supreme Court
repeatedly citing its initial precedent ofFiscal General de la Nadn c/Argerich, 1 Fallos 130 (1864),
as authority. See, &g., M~ndez c/Valdez, 127 Fallos 429, 440 (1918); Salva, 114 Fallos 60, 68
(1910); Procurador Fiscal c/Correa, 85 Fallos 246, 251 (1900); Procurador Fiscal c/Moreno, 10
Fallos 361, 363 (1871); Procurador Fiscal c/Laforest, 3 Fallos 371, 372 (1866). But see
Procurador Fiscal c/Diario "La Provincia," 167 Fallos 121 (1932) (shifting the Court's case law
to allow federal jurisdiction over press). A second example is the Court's insistence on
permitting original jurisdiction when a province is sued by a non-resident. In Mendozay Hermano
cProvindcia de San Luis, 1 Fallos 485, 495-96 (1865), and Avengo cProuincia de Buenos Aires, 14
Fallos 425, 437-448 (1874), the Court reasoned that Argentina's Constitution did not include
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the Procurador General's opinions often simply referred the Court to
its own precedent.5 7  There are many early examples of the Argen-
tine Supreme Court carefully parsing its earlier precedents in much
the same manner as a common law court might.5" Remarkably,
however, for three of the Court's five members, Argentine precedent
was secondary when it conflicted with U.S. Supreme Court case law.
Sojo also is the first case in which the Argentine Supreme Court, at
least implicitly, declared a federal law unconstitutional. The Court
purported to read Law 48 consistently with the Constitution, and
therefore interpreted it as not providing forjurisdiction.559 Because
the language of Law 48 explicitly provided for original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus actions, the Court's interpretation of Law 48 really was
just a way of saying that the law was unconstitutional. Unlike Justice
Marshall in Marbuy, however, the Argentine Supreme Court had no
need to tread cautiously. Cases like Acevedo, decided only two years
before, and many others, were at least as politically controversial as
Sojo.s6a Moreover, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court during Justice
Marshall's tenure, the principle of judicial review was never under
attack. The first case in which the Court would explicitly declare a
law unconstitutional already was pending and would be decided only
seven months later.5 61 In historical terms, what Sojo stands for is the
the eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and therefore the pre-eleventh Amendment
case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793), supplied the appropriate law. Carrega
c/Provinda de Buenos Aires 61 FaIlos 409, 410 (1895), notes that the Court has maintained
consistent case law on this issue.
557. See CGsar c/Guzm6n y Compaiia, 51 Fallos 39,42 (1893); Municipalidad de ]a Capital
c/Sociedad Laurak Bact, 48 Fallos 71, 81 (1892); see also ProcuradorFiscal c/Coyrea, 85 Fallos at
254-55 (showing the Procurador General obliged to recommend consistency with the Supreme
Court's case law, but voicing his personal disagreement with it in the case at hand).
558. SeeMunicipalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo, 33 Fallos 162, 196 (1888) (distinguishing
prior case permitting expropriation from present case where more property than necessary for
public undertaking would be expropriated); see also Pastorino c/Ronill6n, Marini y Cia, 25 Fallos
364, 368-69 (1883) (examining and distinguishing a Supreme Court precedent in order to
decide case at hand differently); Acevedo, 28 Fallos 406, 409 (1885). The Court in Acevedo
emphasized that its decision was not inconsistent with the precedent of de la Torr because
unlike publication of secret session, as in de la Tore, Acevedo involved defamation, a codified
criminal act within judicial jurisdiction. Seeid
559. See Sojo, 32 Fa~los 120, 126 (1887).
560. For example, in Fiscal General de la Naci6n c/Argerich, 1 Fallos 130 (1864), the Supreme
Court blocked federal prosecution of the author of a letter in a newspaper attacking the Chief
of Police of the City of Buenos Aires. The Court also handed down a series of decisions against
the government in the aftermath of rebellions in Argentina's northwest provinces in the late
1860s. See, e.g., Urruti, 5 Fallos 384 (1968) (insisting on release of rebels on bail while their
cases were pending); Competencia entre elJuez Nacional de Salta y el GeneralJefe del Ejdrcito
del Norte, 7 Fallos 205 (1869) (blocking militaryjurisdiction over rebel fighters); Fiscal Nacional
c/Varios comerciantes de Mendoza, 5 Fallos 74 (1868) (holding that the national government
could not require merchants to pay customs duties that they paid earlier to rebel authorities
controlling Province).
561. See Munidpalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo, 33 Fallos at 162.
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binding power of U.S. constitutional law. U.S. constitutional practice
provided more than just a source of ideas that influenced the
Argentine framers, it was a source of authority in itself.
B. The Gradual Decline of the United States as Authority (1897-1930)
The Argentine Supreme Court never explicitly declared its
independence from U.S. practice. Rather, the process involved
gradual divergence. First, aspects of the Alberdian vision that varied
from the U.S. model inevitably required Argentine solutions.
Although the Alberdian vision behind the Constitution supported
U.S.-style protection of individual rights to attract immigration and
investment, as noted earlier, it had little concern for political rights
or for federalism-beyond the degree of federalism necessary to keep
local caudillos at peace with the central government 62 These
divergences from U.S. practice generally did not require variances
from U.S. case law, as most questions that arose were nonjusticiable
under the U.S. political question doctrine,5" but some significant
differences did arise. Second, there was a gradual decrease in the
talismanic authority of U.S. practice as Argentina's growth gave it self-
confidence and as nationalism increased. Third, the Argentine
Supreme Court always also focused on the rational interpretation of
the text of the Argentine Constitution. The introduction of a Civil
Code in 186911 pushed Argentine legal education in the direction
of continental rationalism."t In the nineteenth century, U.S.
practice often was recognized as binding, as demonstrated by the 1887
opinion in Sojo. 5  By the turn of the century, U.S. authority was
562. See supra notes 93-160 (discussing Alberdian vision); see also infra notes 575-85 and
accompanying text (discussing development of Argentine federalism and its divergence from
U.S. federalism).
563. See Cullen c/Llerena, 53 Fallos 420, 432 (1893) (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849)).
564. See Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [1852-1880] A.D.LA. 505.
565. See VICTOR TAU ANzOATEGuI, LA CODIFICACION EN LA ARGENTINA 29-30 (1977);
Bernardino Bravo Lira, Arbitro judidal y legalismo. Juez y derecho en Europa Continental y en
Iberoamtiica antes y despu&s de la Codificad6n, 28 REVISA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO "RiCARDO
LEE E" 7, 14-17 (1991); 2 ABEL CHANETON, HSTORIA DE VELEZ SARsFoELD, 412-16,418 (1937).
566. Perhaps most striking, aside from Skjo, 32 Fallos 120 (1887), and the Court's classic
statement on the importance of U.S. practice in de la Torre, 19 FalIos 231 (1877), is the Court's
repetition of its de la Torre statement on the binding nature of U.S. law in Alen, 54 Fallos 432,
459 (1893), one of the most politically delicate cases ever handled by the Court, in which the
Court clearly needed to maximize its authority. In Alem, the Court held unconstitutional the
detention by the Executive of a leading opposition figure who had led an unsuccessful rebellion.
See id. Various Argentine decisions contain discussions that focus almost entirely on U.S.
practice. See Divila c/Valdez, 23 Fallos 726 (1880) (containing dispute between majority and
dissent as to whether U.S. law allows federal diversityjurisdiction when jurisdiction would have
existed between the original parties but subsequently was lost through assignment of the claim
and then subsequently regained through a new assignment); Banco Nacional c/Villanueva, 18
1997] 1561
1562 THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1483
cited with less frequency, but remained influential. U.S. practice
continued to offer the Court important additional authority when it
addressed difficult political issues, but it clearly was supplanted by
rational authority as the primary source of authority of the Court.567
Only in 1897 did the Argentine Court openly recognize a major
divergence from U.S. constitutional practice."~ In Ferrocarril Central
Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F,569 the Argentine Court held that the
General Welfare clause of the Argentine Constitution offered the
federal government a general source of authority for legislation
affecting the provinces. The Court recognized that the United States
utilized the clause only as a source of authority for federal taxation
and spending, not for general legislation, but recognized differences
in the two constitutions. Unlike earlier cases discussing U.S.
constitutional practice, in Ferrocarril Central Argentino the Alberdian
vision dictated a constitutional interpretation at variance with U.S.
legal standards.
The plaintiff in Ferrocarril CentralArgentino, a railroad, protested the
imposition of a provincial property tax in the Province of Santa
F"57 The railroad passed through several different provinces and
had received a federal exemption from all federal and provincial taxes
when it initially obtained its concession from the federal government
in 1863.71 Three decades later, however, the Province began to
Fallos 162 (1876) (establishing the right of a Nacional Bank established by Congress to enjoy
federal jurisdiction in all litigation).
567. The clearest statement of a rationalist approach in the Argentine Supreme Court's case
law comes in Hileret c/Provincia de Tucumdn, 98 Fallos 20 (1903), where the Court derides
constitutional arguments that fhil to focus on the text of the Constitution, the needs and desires
of the Framers, and historical documents such as the debates at the conventions and writings
by publicists like Alberdi. See id. at 47-48.
568. Although there were two occasions in the 1860s and 1870s when the Court held that
it had no obligation to follow U.S. case law on issues for which the Argentine Constitution
diverged from the U.S. Constitution, neither case involved significant deviations. In one case
the Court held that a province could require a provincial bank to pay its depositors in gold
instead of silver, a decision that it based on the lack of a clause in the Argentine Constitution
on ex post facto civil legislation. See Caffarena c/Banco Argentino del Rosario de Santa F6, 10
Fallos 427, 435 (1871). However, because the U.S. Constitution also has been interpreted to
permit ex post facto civil legislation, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389-90, 893 (1798)
(Chase, J.), 396-97 (Patterson,J.), 399 (Iredell, J.); see also Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 326-32 (1866) (treating a law with the effect of inflicting a civil penalty as an
unconstitutional ex post facto law), this really was a case of misunderstanding U.S. practice and
reaching the same conclusion anyway. The other case involved Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in actions against a Province by non-residents and emphasized that the Argentine
Constitution had adopted the pre-eleventh amendment version of the U.S. Constitution in
establishing federajurisdiction. See Mendoza y Hermano c/Provincia de San Luis, 1 Fallos 485,
495-96 (1865).
569. 68 Fallos 227, 227 (1897).
570. SeeFerrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F6, 68 Fallos 227, 228-29 (1897).
571. See id.
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impose various taxes on the railroad's property. The Province
countered the railroad's claim of tax exemption by arguing that the
federal government had exceeded its constitutional powers by
granting an exemption from provincial taxes.572 The Supreme
Court decided the case in favor of the railroad 73 and focused on
Article 67, Section 13 of the Argentine Constitution, which authorizes
Congress to:
Provide for that which is conducive for the prosperity of the
country, to the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and
to the progress of enlightenment, providing curricula for general
education and university instruction, and, promoting industry,
immigration, the construction of railroads and navigable canals, the
colonization of public lands, the introduction and establishment of
new industries, the importation of foreign capital, and the explora-
tion of the interior rivers, through laws directed towards those ends
and through temporary concessions of privileges and bounties for
initiative.574
Although delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1853 empha-
sized U.S. federalism as a central feature of the U.S. model for
Argentina to copy,5 75 no delegate expressed concern about placing
limits on the power of the federal government to legislate in the
national interest. 6  Article 67, Section 13 was not taken from the
U.S. Constitution, but from the draft Constitution that Alberdi
included as an appendix to Bases.5 ' To the extent that the U.S.
Constitution offered a model for this clause, it is in the first para-
graph of Article I, Section 1: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States .... " 578  The U.S. Supreme Court and commentators consis-
572. See i. at 229.
573. See id. at 238.
574. CONsT. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, § 13 (emphasis added).
575. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of May 3, 1853, supra note 184, at 539
(statement of Zuvirfa); i&i, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, at 468 (statement of Gorostiaga); id. at 479
(statement of Gutifrrez).
576. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 28, 1853, supra note 184, at 529-
30 (debating Constitution of 1853, article 64-which becomes Constitution of 1860, article
67-and including no discussion of limits on congressional authority vis A vis the provinces, but
rather discussion of whether certain activities, such as seeking the conversion of the Indians,
should be encouraged specifically with a constitutional provision directed at Congress).
Moreover, the 1860 reforms, although addressing what would be short-lived federalism concerns
of the Province of Buenos Aires, likewise made no attempt to restrict the ability of the federal
government to legislate for the general welfare. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66
(1936).
577. ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 371 app. at 570 (Constituci6n de la Confederaci6n
Argentina art. 67, § 3 (1852)).
578. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1.
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tently have rejected this clause as a source of legislative authority for
the federal government, however, reading it instead as referring to
the power to "collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" for the
"general welfare of the United States." 79 The U.S. Supreme Court,
hearing the same case under the U.S. Constitution, would have
agreed with the province and declared that the federal government
lacked authority to issue a blanket tax exemption. An examination
of U.S. case law would have encountered precedents almost exactly on
point.-s°
Had the Argentine Supreme Court wished to, it could have come
up with an interpretation of the Argentine clause that, at least for the
case at hand, minimized differences from U.S. practice. Article 67,
Section 16 contains a specific reference to the development of
railroads as a federal function that the Court could decide the case.
Instead, the Court developed, in broad strokes, the general role of the
federal government in drafting legislation and embarking on grand
projects to promote the general welfare."' The Court insisted that
unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Argentine Constitution "charges the
federal government to promote everything that concerns ... the
advancement and general welfare of all the provinces,"8 2 and that
in doing so, it could enact any necessary legislative measure, such as
an exemption from provincial taxation."s This was entirely consis-
579. James Madison argued that the General Welfare Clause allowed taxation and spending
only in the situations specifically enumerated in the Constitution as within the authority of
Congress. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison). Alexander Hamilton, however, argued
that the Clause generally authorized any type of taxation or spending for the general welfare.
See i&. No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). See Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-67; C. Perry Patterson, The General
Wefare Clause, 30 MINN. L. REV. 43, 48-51, 60-61 (1946). Hamilton never argued that the
General Welfare Clause was a source of general legislative authority, however, but merely that
it was the authority to tax and spend. As a practical matter, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
has allowed Congress to use the General Welfare Clause to expand almost the same legislative
possibilities for the U.S. federal government as the Argentine Supreme Court has in Argentina
by allowing Congress to condition grants of funds to the states on their enactment of legislation
and programs that otherwise might fall beyond congressional authority. See South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987).
580. In Company v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5,30-33 (1873), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that federally chartered railroads could be subjected to state property taxes so long as those
taxes did not hinder them in the exercise of their functions, even though the railroad was
admitted to be agent of federal government. Congress had not explicitly granted an exemption
from state taxes, but the Court found that the situation would have been no different if it had,
holding that nothing in the Constitution contemplated abridgment by the federal government
of the power of states to levy taxes, the only limitation being that the states may not levy taxes
with the direct effect of hindering the exercise of powers belonging to the federal government.
See id. at 30; see also Thompson v. Union Pacific, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 590-91 (1867) (holding
essentially the same as Peniston, but in a case in which the railroad, while granted a concession
by the federal government, was organized under state law and not by an act of Congress).
581. Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F, 68 Fallos 227, 235-36 (1897).
582. Id at 236.
583. See id. at 237.
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tent with Alberdi and the vision of the Argentine elite, which took a
Hamiltonian view of the role of the federal government in attracting
capital and promoting commerce and industry, during the 1850s, as
well as the 18 9 0s.1' The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
the general welfare clause in Ferrocarril Central Argentino established a
precedent eliminating any hint of restrictions on federal initiatives in
the name of federalism and eliminated the need for Argentina to ever
emulate the U.S. Supreme Court's gradual expansion of the Com-
merce Power as the vehicle for expansion of federal authority."s
Twentieth century Argentine constitutional scholars and political
scientists clearly did not offer the unified front in support of the U.S.
model that they had in the nineteenth century. Whereas in the
nineteenth century it had been a matter of Constitutional dogma that
the Argentine Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution,
in the twentieth century it became an issue of debate as many scholars
584. See ALBERDI, Bases, supra note 95, at 478 (emphasizing that federal government is the
central figure in achieving major national goals, from encouraging immigration to building
public works).
585. See Compafifa Entrerriana de Tel6fonos c/Provincia de Entre Ros, 189 Fallos 272, 282-
83 (1941) (holding that Congress could exempt an interprovincial telephone company from
provincial taxes on the basis of its general authority under Constitution of 1860, article 67,
section 16 to legislate in the general interest, and offering an extensive citation to Ferrocairil
Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F as authority); see also Roca Hermanos y Cia. c/Provincia
de Santa F6, 188 Fallos 247, 257 (1940) (holding that a radio station authorized by the federal
government was exempt from provincial taxes and noting the general welfare clause as one of
the sources of Congress' legislative authority); Ferrocaril Central Argentino clMunicipalidad de La
Banda, 183 Fallos 181, 185-86 (blocking municipality from collecting taxes and fees from a
railroad that the federal government had exempted from taxes, and offering extensive discussion
of Ferrocarnil Central Argentino cProvincia de Santa F and the general welfare clause); Ferrocarril
dd Sud ciMunicipalidad deJudre;z 183 Fallos 190, 193-197 (1939) (blocking municipality from
collecting taxes and fees from a railroad that the federal government had exempted from taxes,
and offering extensive discussion of Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provdncia de Santa Fi and the
general welfare clause); 3 FEL.PE S. PiMEZ, LA CONSITUcI6N NACIONAL Y LA CORTE SUPREMA 80
(1962) (noting that article 67, section 16, has no parallel in U.S. Constitution, and that there
are no limits on the legislative jurisdiction of the Argentine Congress unless a power is reserved
specifically for the province, the only limit being that any concessions granted be temporary).
The only occasions on which the Argentine Supreme Court ever has blocked an assertion of
federal legislative authority on federalism grounds have been rare situations when a
constitutional provision specifically protects a provincial institution under attack; see Cfa. Dock
Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda., 204 Fallos 23 (1946) (declaring unconstitutional a measure that
merged provincial national labor relations boards into a national body and gave it authority to
resolve labor litigation); or where the Constitution specifically bars the federal government from
a determined type of activity, an issue that arose in the context of federal attempts to assert
jurisdiction unconstitutionally in defamation actions in spite of a bar on such jurisdiction; see
Argentine Constitution of 1860, article 32; see also supra note 554 and accompanying text; Banco
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires c/Naci6n Argentina, 201 Fallos 142, 149-150 (1945) (involving
federal measures that attempted to tax the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires in violation
of 1859 pact that led to ratification by the Province of Buenos Aires of the Constitution); Banco
de ]a Provincia de Buenos Aires c/Naci6n Argentina, 186 Fallos 170, 222-25 (1940).
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sought to de-emphasize U.S. influence. 8 By the 1920s and 1930s
Argentine intellectual circles were becoming increasingly nationalis-
tic,58 7 and even among liberals, the intellectual pendulum had
swung away from Sarmiento and back to Alberdi. For example, in
one of the period's leading works in political science, La Constitucid6n
Argentina y sus principios de itica politica, Rodolfo Rivarola begins his
book with a recap of the Alberdi-Sarmiento debate on the importance
of U.S. case law."8 For Rivarola, Alberdi is the clear winner in this
controversy, and he invokes Alberdi to exhort against scholars still
afflicted with the "North American fixation."589
The rejection of the U.S. model was only partial, however. At least
one of the Ministers on the Court in the 1900s, Mauricio Daract
(1901-1915), demonstrated his enthusiasm by procuring and reading
the advance sheets of U.S. Court decisions.9" Moreover, the Court
frequently cited U.S. case law as the basis for declaring legislation
unconstitutional. Such decisions, involving excessive taxation, 91
arbitrarily discriminatory taxation,592 and property rights/freedom
of contract issues,593 are not surprising, since they are fully consis-
586. For discussions emphasizing the U.S. model, see PADILLA, supra note 185 (examining
Argentine history and constitutional conventions to examine degree of U.S. influence); 1JUAN
A. GoNzLE CALDER6N, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO 320-21 (1930) (citing
Constitutional Convention of 1853 to support argument that the U.S. Constitution remained an
important model forArgentina); ZAVALIA, supra note 537 (offering history of Argentine Supreme
Court with underlying theme of how its case law and authority has compared to that of U.S.
Supreme Court). For discussions deemphasizing the U.S. model, see RODOIYO RIVAROLA, LA
CoNSTrTUcON ARGENTINA Y SUS PRINCIPIOS DE rICA POLITICA xvi-xxvi (1944) (examining
Alberdi-Sarmiento debate on authority of U.S. Constitution and criticizing attitude that
Argentine Constitution is merely a copy of the U.S. Constitution and may be interpreted by
looking at U.S. practices); DANIEL ANTOKOLTZ, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y
ADMINISTRATivO ARGENTINOS 16 (1926) (same); TOMAS CULLEN, Diferencias entre la Constitud6n
argentinay la norteamericana, in UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOSAIRES, FACULTAD DE DERECHOY CIENCIAS
SocALEs, 2 DisuPsOs ACADEMICOS 939, 940-41 (1936) (same); RAIMUNDO WnMART, DIFERENcIAS
DE ATRIBUCIONES ENTRE EL EJECUTIVO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EL NUESTRO, 2 Revista Argentina
de Ciencas Polfticas 314 (1911) (examining the many ways the Argentine Constitution varies
from that of the United States in its establishment of authority and limitations of Executive).
587. See generally DAVID ROCK, AuTHORTARIANARGENTINA 55-124 (1993) (describing growth
of extremist Argentine nationalism from World War I through 1930s).
588. See RrvAROLA, supra note 586, at xvi-xxvi.
589. I& at xxvi.
590. ZAVALIA, supra note 537, at 342.
591. See Melo de Can6, 115 Fallos 111 (1911) (citing U.S. case law and holding estate tax
unconstitutional); see also Drysdale, 149 Fallos 417 (1927) (citing U.S. law and holding later
Buenos Aires tax unconstitutional).
592. See Pereyra Iraola c/Provincia de Buenos Aires, 138 Fallos 161 (1923) (holding special
tax on roadside properties unconstitutional when owners' benefits were disproportionate to
payment and benefit enjoyed by entire populace); see also Vifedos y Bodegas Ariz6 c/Provincia
de Mendoza, 157 Fallos 359 (1930) (citing U.S. law and finding unconstitutional provincial tax
that targets specific high income groups and businesses to pay for pension system).
593. See Horta c/Harguindeguy, 137 Fallos 47 (1922) (finding that rent freeze could not
constitutionally modify terms of an already executed lease); see also Bourdieu c/Municipalidad
de la Capital, 145 Fallos 307 (1925) (holding that municipal ordinance designed to eliminate
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tent with the emphasis on property rights of the Alberdian vision, but
cites to U.S. cases presumably still added to their persuasiveness.
U.S. practice was most significant in the one pre-1930 case in which
the Court varied significantly from the Alberdian vision. In Ercolano
c/Lanteri de Renshaw," the Court held constitutional a 1921 law
temporarily freezing apartment and commercial rents nationwide. In
this instance, the Argentine Court relied on Block v. Hirsh,595 a U.S.
Supreme Court decision handed down only a year before, which held
a similar rent freeze in the District of Columbia constitutional. 96
The Argentine rent freeze, enacted in response to a housing shortage
caused by materials shortages and an economic downturn during
World War I, was one of the most controversial pieces of legislation
passed during the first government of Hip6lito Yrigoyen. 97 The law
pitted the populism of the first Argentine President elected in clean
elections against the economic elite's concern with protection of
property. The U.S. decision clearly strengthened the President's
hand. When Jurisprdencia Argentina, the leading legal journal,
published the text of the legislation, it included the full text of Block
in a long footnote,5 9 1 so the Argentine Court's focus on the U.S.
decision is hardly surprising.
Moreover, U.S. case law was significant once again in 1925, when
the Supreme Court reconsidered the rent freeze and this time held
all profits from sale of cemetery lots through 100% tax on profits unconstitutional).
594. 136 Fallos 161 (1922).
595. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
596. Ercolano c/Lanteri de Renshaw, 136 Fallos 161, 178 (1922) (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135 (1921)).
597. The rent freeze initially was enacted in Law No. 11.157, Sept. 19, 1921, [1920-1940]
A.D.LA 79, to apply for a period of two years, was extended for one more year by Law No.
11.231, Oct. 4,1923, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 115, and then extended for an additional year by Law
No. 11.318, Dec. 5, 1924, [1920-1940] A.D.LA. 193 after a two month gap. The positions of a
number of Argentine constitutional law and civil law professors are noted in RAYmUNDO
WILMART, Las leyes nuevas sobre alquilere, in 22 REVisTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLiTICAS 440,
440-42 (1921) (opposing rent freeze); see also La ley de aiquileres, el derecho de propiedad y la
Constitudn Nadona4 in 14JuRISPRUDENciA ARGENTINA 25 (1924) (offering an interpretation of
Constitution in support of rent freeze). The issue and the Supreme Court's decisions were
reported on exhaustively in the Argentine press. SeeJA Gonzlez Calder6n, Inconstitucionalidad
de las leyes sobre alquileres, LA PRENSA, Sept. 22, 1921, at 6 (containing lengthy explanation of why
rent control law was unconstitutional); La cuesti6n de los alquileres, LA PRENSA, Apr. 29, 1922, at
9 (discussing Ercolano decision in detail); Aplicaciin de la Ley sobre alquileres, LA PRENSA, May 6,
1922, at 15 (discussing lower court decision that cited Ercolano); Las leyes de alquileres, LA PRENSA,
Aug. 22, 1922, at 12 (discussing decision holding rent control law unconstitutional when applied
retroactively to contracts already signed at higher prices); La Suprema Corte declar6 que es contraria
a la Constitud6n y afecta el dominio la pr6rroga de la ley de alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 27, 1925, at
15 (providing extensive analysis of Mango c/Traba, 144 Fallos 219, 224-25 (1925), which
declared the law unconstitutional); La pr6rroga de los alquieres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 28, 1925, at 9
(providing editorial supporting Supreme Court's position that rent control law is unconstitution-
al).
598. See 7jurisprudencia Argentina, Secci6n Legislaci6n 1 (1921).
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it unconstitutional on grounds that too much time had passed to
continue to consider it a temporary, emergency measure, and that the
emergency had ceased to exist."s The Argentine Court's decision
once again relied on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair,' decided three years after Block and holding the same
District of Columbia rent freeze unconstitutional because it had gone
on too long. 1 The Argentine Court followed the approach taken
by the U.S. Supreme Court a year later. There is no indication in the
two Argentine cases that the Argentine Court regarded U.S. case law
as binding. Those days were far behind. But U.S. case law provided
a source of authority in a politically delicate situation. The situation
would repeat itself in 1934, when the Court needed authority to
permit the government to suspend mortgage payments during the
Depression."°  Although the days of magical faith in U.S. practice
had long ended, even its lingering effects underline its earlier
vitality.6°3
CONCLUSION
In insisting that "it is absolutely essential that the constitution
should not be regarded as something made," but rather as "divine,"
"constant," and "exalted above the sphere of things that are
made,"' Hegel makes a good point about the weakness of rational-
ism. He fails, however to recognize two factors that are particularly
important in the modem world: (1) the demonstration effect of
599. See Mango, 144 Fallos at 224-25.
600. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
601. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543,543 (1924). In ChastletonJustice Holmes
reversed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in a decision allowing the continuation of
a rent freeze instituted during a housing shortage in the District during World War I. Holmes
indicated that the District Court should analyze whether the emergency conditions originally
justifying the rent freeze continued to exist, to determine whether the freeze should continue.
See id. at 547-49.
602. SeeAvico, 172 Fallos 21 (1934) (citing U.S. law extensively and holding constitutional
legislation suspending mortgage payments and evictions).
603. The Argentine Supreme Court continues to cite U.S. law today, but since the late 1940s,
unlike in the 1920s and 1930s, little intellectual integrity has accompanied its use. The Court
cited U.S. case law in the 1920s and 1930s in order to change Argentinian practice, but its use
of U.S. law was accurate, and in cases with similar factual scenarios. In the late 1940s, however,
the court began to interpret U.S. law out of context in order to reach a desired result. See S.A.
Merk Quimica Argentina c/Naci6n Argentina, 211 Fallos 162, 198-209 (1948) (using extensive
citations to U.S. practice to justify seizure of German property based on executive war powers,
despite seizure of property occurring after German World War II surrender); Rodfgue, 254
Fallos 116, 134-37 (1962) (using extensive citations to U.S. authors to justify presidential
emergency powers that incorporated striking railroad workers into Army and subjected them to
military discipline); Peralta c/Naci6n Argentina, 313 Fallos 1513, 1547-49 (1990) (citing U.S.
case law on economic emergencies tojustify constitutionality of presidential decree that turned
ordinary bank accounts into long-term government bonds).
604. HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178, 1 273.
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foreign practices; and (2) the possible talismanic authority of a
foreign model.
Today's world is full of models moving from one country to
another. Today, most non-Western countries strive to emulate the
Western model of industrial production, a model that requires
dramatic changes in lifestyles and attitudes. These changes include:
(1) regular work hours; (2) participation in a monetary economy; and
(3) division of labor in societies formerly based on subsistence
agriculture. But many countries have adopted Western economic
models with success. Hegel's statements, carried to an extreme,
would imply that one nation's constitutional structure can never
influence that of another, a position that should have been apparent
as false even in Hegel's day. Cultures inevitably interact.
Identifying foreign talismans may prove more difficult in the late
twentieth century than in the nineteenth, but even today such
talismans exist. Argentina, for example, recently has granted ten
international human rights instruments constitutional hierarchy by
wholly incorporating them into its Constitution.35 Most delegates
to its 1994 Constitutional Convention probably were hardly aware of
the specific content of these ten declarations and treaties, but their
inclusion involves yet another Argentine attempt to cure its institu-
tional defects with a foreign symbol-this time the symbol of
international law. °6 In the Eastern European context, George
Fletcher has described a 1990 Hungarian constitutional decision
banning capital punishment as a "yearning to join the 'European
House,"' where the death penalty has been eliminated. 7 Although
605. See CONST. AR.G. art. 75, § 22.
606. It is striking that in recent years Argentina probably has given more deference to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights than any other major country in the Americas.
Argentina is the only tountry to have reached friendly settlements with petitioners before the
Inter-American Commission, and it did so on two different occasions. See Report No. 1/93,
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization ofAmerican States, AnnualReport:
1992-1993 35 (1993) (settling claims for compensation for detentions, physical injuries and
murders by military government in power from 1976-1983); Report No 22/94, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Organization ofAmerican States, AnnualReport: 199435 (1993)
(eliminating special criminal provisions on defamation of a public official from the criminal
code).
607. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN CONsFITUTIONAussM, IDENTFIY,
DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPEcTIVES 223,225 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994)
(citingJudgment of Oct. 24, 1990, ALK~OTiANnmm6sAG, 1990 Magyar Kazlany Hungarian Gazette
107 (describing Hungarian Constitutional Court decision as lacking convincing argument, and
based on a need to adopt values now dominant in Western Europe)); see alsoA.E. Dick Howard,
The Indeteminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 386-87 (1996) (offering similar
observation, noting that international human rights instruments were influential in drafting of
new constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe). Howard, however, attributes the tendency
to borrow to a desire to achieve international acceptance, without noting the possibility that
borrowing also helps achieve internal acceptance because of the authority of the source. See id.
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difficult to perceive from the United States, which long has enjoyed
sufficient stability to reduce the need for foreign models, the banner
of international human rights may offer a modem talisman for
countries in transition from dictatorship that need an extra source of
authority for establishing new rules of behavior. Like the imported
constitutions of the nineteenth century, international human rights
instruments seek to establish rights with only limited local roots, but
like the U.S. Constitution in Argentina in the nineteenth century,
they also are free of local critique.'
One possible critique of this Article could be that the Argentine
experience does not describe cultural interaction, but rather the
cultural submission of a small elite to the expectations of British
imperialist interests.' Parts of what happened in Argentina may
certainly be described in the context of imperialism and the world
trading relationships of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. Although Argentina never was a colony of Great Britain, the
enormous amount of British investment in Argentina created an
economic relationship of great import to the British Empire, one that
far overshadowed investments from other countries.6 10 Short of
accepting Queen Victoria as its sovereign, adopting the U.S. Constitu-
tion as its model probably was the best thing that Argentina could do
to reassure British investors that their property would be protected.
Describing Argentine constitutionalism as imperialist dependency
ignores both Argentine realities and present day tendencies through-
out the world, however. First, any British participation in nineteenth
century Argentine constitutionalism was minimal. The British never
told Alberdi and Sarmiento what to write, and their rare attempts to
intervene politically in Argentina ended poorly."' The Argentine
elite determined its model without foreign interference. Second, the
at 386-87.
608. Cf Brian Z. Tamanaha, TheLessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 482,
484-85 (1995) (noting similarity between transplant of international human rights and elements
of western legal culture and pointing out that individuals who critique shifts of western legal
models as ethnocentric rarely make similar charge regarding international human rights
transfers).
609. Dependency theory--a leftist critique of development economics that was especially
popular in the 1970s-describes social and economic development in Latin America as a
product of the domination of the economically advanced nations, and views economic and social
developments in Argentina, as in other Latin American countries, in terms of the needs and
opportunities offered by foreign capitalism. See FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO
FALETTO, DEPENDENCy AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 35, 82-84, 88 (Majory Mattingly
Urquidi trans., Univ. California Press 1979) (1971).
610. H.S. FERNS, BRiTAINANDARGENTINA INTHENINETEENTH CENTURY 1-2 (1960) (discussing
trends of British investment in Argentina during late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
611. Seeid.at487-89.
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economic elites of many of today's emerging democracies probably
would love to copy the Argentine constitutional experience of the
nineteenth century if they similarly could comfort potential investors.
The emerging democracies of Eastern Europe seek economic
integration into the European Union in much the same manner that
Argentina once incorporated itself into the trading and investment
flows of the British Empire. Eastern European countries also face the
same issues of establishing investor confidence. What is noteworthy
about the Argentine experience is that its elite was so successful in its
goal of attracting immigrants and investors.
When Argentine constitutionalism began to break down in the
1930s, it had little to do with its focus in earlier periods on the United
States as a model. Argentina's coups of 1930 and 1943 and the rise
of Per6n in the wake of the 1943 military government involved issues
of political participation. The coup of 1930 was provoked in part by
conservative distrust of forces brought to power by popular elections.
Reluctance by the military to continue upholding the electoral fraud
of the conservatives 2 provided one motivation for the 1943 coup.
Per6n emerged in the 1940s in part due to the mobilization of the
working class as a political force.613 One can argue that part of the
failure of post-1930 Argentina stemmed from an inability to modify
the nation's rules of mutual security in light of seventy years of social
and political change since 1860. Such an analysis requires an article
in itself.614 But these issues, although showing a lack of adaptability
in the political system, do not undercut the utility that the U.S. model
initially offered to attain political stability in the nineteenth century.
Sixty-eight years of unbroken constitutional government, from 1862
to 1930, is a good record in comparison with most of the world
during the same time period.
To the extent that one views the Argentine Constitution of 1853
and 1860 as successful, and little doubt exists in terms of their
establishment of basic rules of mutual security, one also must concede
that Argentina benefitted from its "faith" in U.S. constitutionalism.
For although Argentine constitutionalism contained its distinctive
elements, the talisman of U.S. practice so inspired the elite's concept
of constitutionalism that Argentine constitutionalism simply cannot be
understood in isolation from its U.S. influences. Certain character-
istics probably aided Argentina in its use of the United States as a
612. See ROBERTA. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945, at 183 (1969).
613. See generally ROCK, supra note 12, at 214-61 (summarizing political forces at work from
1930-1946).
614. The author of this Article is presently engaged in research in this area.
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model. First, Argentina was fortunate to have an endowment of
resources capable of luring foreign immigrants and capital, and hence
could keep most politically relevant groups satisfied with its model.
Success breeds support. Second, because the group of individuals
who were politically relevant was small, with the mass of Argentina's
largely rural population simply outside the political process, generat-
ing support for the model was easier than if a multitude of disparate
groups had to be satisfied. But neither of these observations change
the fact that the consolidation of the Constitution ended the chaos
and bloodshed of the past.
Obviously the key for the success of an emerging democracy is not
to copy the constitutional practice of a selected foreign state blindly.
Even Argentina's practice consciously varied from parts of the U.S.
model. But political leaders and constitutional scholars must realize
that they may require more than rational acceptance and interpreta-
tion of a text to attain political stability. If the jurisdiction is
unaccustomed to reducing political disputes to legal arguments,
rational interpretation of a constitution may not provide legal rules
or sufficient authority to maintain stability. Rational authority often
needs a crutch, and under the right circumstances, the talisman of a
foreign model may lend authority to a rule of law that it otherwise
would lack. Hegel was correct in noting the inherent vulnerability of
a visionary constitution that seeks to establish new rules of political
conduct, but he failed to note the possibility of sources of authority
outside of a country's own political traditions. Countries emerging
from long periods of dictatorship have no choice but to adopt
visionary constitutions. The life of the law in such a country often is
not "logic" or "experience,"615 but faith.
615. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881) (stating that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience").
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